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Peace or Philocrates

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

presented by

Fleming James, Jr..

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THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES -

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH.

From the library of the University of Toronto, 404 - 146 B. C.

During the early summer of 348 B. C., while Philip was still occupied with the war in the Chalcidic Peninsula, some Euboean ambassadors coming to Athens with a view to arranging peace between that city and their own state, declared in the demos "that Philip, too, bade them say to the Athenians that he wished to be reconciled with them and be at peace." This was apparently the first time during his war with Athens that he had expressed such sentiments. Hitherto his language had been scornful and abusive; and he had taken pains to heap upon her by words as well as deed, such insults as would render her contemptible in the eyes of Hellas. Now, however, his tone had changed. What had caused the change? Many causes have been suggested. Demosthenes maintained that the blockade of the Macedonian harbors by Athens and the ravages of pirates on its coast had become unbearable. This may be true. But it seems to me that modern historians are right in urging another and deeper motive on Philip's part. When Olynthus should fall—and of its fall Philip could now have little doubt—he would be master of everything north of Thermopylae, except some parts of Thrace easily to be subdued. His next move must be upon Central Greece. But over Central Greece Athens stood resolute guard, hand in hand with her allies, the Phocians, in the pass of Pylae. However lax she might be in defending Hellenic liberty in Macedonia and Thrace, she had already shown that in matters nearer home she would act in quite a different way. Her navy was far superior to Philip's. He could not approach Hellas

1. FL 153. et passim.

2. The forces of Phocis, other than the mercenaries of Phalaecus, D. esti-
mates as 10,000 odd hoplites and 1,000 horse. These were, of course, not
under arms, but could be mustered in case of need. FL 230.
He is speaking here of the forces that fell into Philip's hands after the
departure of Phalaecus

3. A. 2, 13.

proper by sea.¹ By land, it was equally impossible; for the same navy would support the Phocians² in holding Thermopylae. It was expedient, therefore, to win Athens over to his side and, this being done, to trust to his all-successful diplomacy for the rest. It would, moreover, be of immediate advantage to quiet Athens, for from her alone could he encounter serious opposition in completing his conquest of Chalcidicè.

How she, on her part, regarded his indirect overtures, we are not told. We may imagine, however, a feeling of surprise far from unpleasant. Notwithstanding we find her about this time voting her third and last succor for her ally Olythus. That city, alarmed by the rapid advance of Philip, had sent a final appeal for aid, especially praying that Athenian citizens be dispatched instead of worthless Mercenaries. The demus consented to the sacrifice—a proof how grave the crisis seemed—and voted a reinforcement of 17 triremes, 2000 hoplites and 300 horsemen, all under the command of Chares. Probably, I say, the vote took place about this time; but even if this be true, it is quite certain that the expedition was not actually sent till fall.

Sometime during August an Athenian citizen, Phrynon of the deme Rhamnus³ returned to Athens from abroad with a story of wrong which he made known to the demus. He had, he said, been travelling during the Olympian truce (in the latter part of June) feeling secure in the protection of the god, when some of Philip's piratical soldiers had seized upon him and held him for ransom.

1. A. 3,15.

2. A. 3,83 15.

3. A. 3618.88 THREE HED TO 1875 CASH RECEIVED ONLY BY A HED FOR 1875.

L. 17.3, 27, 160,

This ransom he had been obliged to pay before he could secure his freedom. Such proceedings were an outrage; and he besought the demus to elect an ambassador to go with him to Philip and demand a restitution of the money. They were persuaded and chose Ctesiphon in that capacity. He and Phrynon, starting as soon as they could for the Etesian winds, which would not cease till the end of August, sought out Philip and delivered their message. He forthwith restored the ransom with fitting apologies for Phrynon's treatment and apparently did all he could to make friends of the two Athenians. During the course of his conversation with them, he spoke much of his kind regard for Athens; and expressly charged them to inform the demus that he was most unwilling to war with her and would even now gladly be at peace.

The two ambassadors returning about the end of September made a full report of their visit in the demus. Besides reporting the business entrusted to them and Philip's message to the people, they spoke freely of his general cordiality toward Athens. Their words were received with the utmost enthusiasm.¹ Not a single expression of disbelief or hostility to Philip was uttered. Immediately Philocrates² of the deme Hagnus—a man of whom we shall hear much in the coming transactions—proposed and carried unanimously a decree that Philip be allowed to send to Athens a herald and ambassadors to treat for peace. This concession—small as it seems—had hitherto been opposed by the extreme war party;³ and now, in spite of its victorious passage in the demus, they decided to contest it in the courts. An indictment for illegal proposition

was accordingly brought against Philocrates by one Lyeinus, who acted as their representative. The penalty affixed was 100 talents, the greatness of the sum probably indicating the heinousness of the offence in their eyes. The necessary preliminaries having been gone through with, the case came in due course into the dicastery. Philocrates being sick at the time and unable to attend, induced Demosthenes to plead his cause: with the result that the accuser failed to receive a fifth of the votes.

This affair, which on account of the delays of litigation, was probably not finished before November, excited much interest in Athens. No doubt the issues involved were prominent in the public mind. For us, the position of Philocrates and Demosthenes is significant. The former appears at once as the foremost advocate of peace; a role which he continues to fill until peace is actually accomplished. The latter's attitude is not so easy to make out. Of course he might have defended Philocrates only because "it seemed unreasonable to impeach a statesman for such a motion" "altogether indefinite and pledging Athens to nothing"; but as a practical politician he could not but be aware that the public would associate defender and defended together as advocates of the same cause. If, therefore, he was now strenuously opposed to peace, he would hesitate to ally himself in any way with the peace party, however unjust he might deem the accusation against Philocrates. It appears to me that his tone here is changed from that he had assumed in his Olynthiac orations. It may be that,

1. A. 2, 15 ff. ²

2. Cf. D. PL 266. et passim.

3. Diodor. 16, 54.

4. PL 267.

despairing of persuading his countrymen to exhibit an energy adequate to the occasion, he now embraced the new prospect of peace with Philip as a means of saving Olynthus and extricating Athens from her present difficulties. The decree, however, produced no result; for Philip never availed himself of the permission it gave. Evidently he chose rather to wait till Athens should be ready to make overtures of her own accord.

The leaning toward peace on the part of the Athenian public evidently existing at his moment, was soon abruptly checked by the news of the fall of Olynthus.¹ The fate of that city which represented fully the Hellenic ideal of independence and autonomy, shocked the Athenian mind more than the combined need of the other 29 Chalcidic towns that fell with it.² It brought home to all the progress that the conqueror was making and the necessity of checking him immediately. One feature of the tragedy aroused especial indignation and concern. Olynthus had been betrayed by two of its own citizens, Lasthenes and Euthycrates, men in the pay of Philip. This last glaring ⁱⁿexistence of an evil that had been increasing steadily throughout Hellas ever since Philip had begun his aggressions³, made men realise what danger it forboded in the years to come if allowed to proceed unhindered. Though we may be sure that such feelings were not confined to Athens, yet it was there that they were strongest. The severest votes were passed against the Olynthian traitors⁴ and there is yet other evidence that anger and alarm ran high among the people.

1. Certainly for us, and perhaps for the Athenians as well. Cf. τὸ πρῶτον PL 9.

2. PL 10.

3. PL 502 ff. For the tenor of his declamation see PL 505, 511.

4. This statement is not accurate. D. did not recommend a congress, but merely the sending of ambassadors to Thessaly to announce Athens' intended movement against Philip and to encourage the states there in their resistance. D. 2, 12. He may have been unsuccessful in this instance, but Diodorus assures us that he induced the Athenians to employ this policy toward other states. Diodor. 16, 54.

5. dC. 24. /

It was about this time, apparently, that Aeschines, who now appears for the first time as public adviser, brought before the Boulé and then before the demos, the actor Ischandrus, who said that he had come from some of the friends of Athens in Arcadia with the message that Philip was corrupting some of the leading men in that State.² Using this information as starting-point, Aeschines declaimed at length upon the danger of Hellas.³ Philip, he said, was winning over by bribes Hellas and the Peloponnesus, while Athens slept. Let her rouse herself before it was too late. He strenuously recommended a motion which Eubulus had proposed: that Athens dispatch ambassadors far and wide through Greece urging the various states to send envoys to Athens to deliberate upon the war with Philip. This was no new idea. Demosthenes had brought forward a similar project a year earlier,⁴ but had apparently failed in carrying it out. Now, however, Eubulus' motion passed without difficulty. It is noticeable, though, that Demosthenes did not support it. Probably he felt that the time for such action had gone by.

The embassies were accordingly sent out. Aeschines himself served as the leading envoy to Arcadia whence the disturbing news had just come. All had practically the same task. No Grecian State except Athens and Phocis was then at war with Philip.⁵ The ambassadors of Athens were not to bring about a union between states already warring separately in the common cause, but to rouse her sister commonwealths from apathy and induce

1 PL 505.

2 PL 11

3 A. 2, 78. A suspicion regarding Athens' promises of action existed generally throughout Greece. D. 2, 12

4 PL 306.

5 A. 2, 15. FF.

them to take active measures against a king with whom they were now at peace. We cannot wonder then that their language was violent and abusive toward Philip.¹ Aeschines before the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis,² made a speech in reply to Hieronymus, Philip's supporter, in which he frequently called Philip a barbarian and an ἀλκίτωρ and showed at length how much Philip's paid partisans injured not only their own states, but the whole of Greece as well. Such language, however, did not have the desired effect and the embassies proved a dismal failure. Not a single state joined Athens in the war.³ Notwithstanding this, Aeschines was not discouraged in his course. Upon his return home, he made his report with zeal. The Arcadians, he said, had expressed their pleasure at the fact that Athens was at last waking up and laying to her hand: and he advised the dispatch of a second embassy to that country for the purpose of accusing Philip's partisans there; for he had heard from his friends that if Athens would press the case, these men would be punished.⁴ There is no reason to doubt that Aeschines implicitly believed in the truth of this statement, unlikely as it seems.

Meanwhile an embassy of quite a different kind had been sent out from Athens. Many Athenian citizens had been captured in Olynthus when it fell, among whom were two named Iatrocles and Eucratus.⁵ The relatives of these two men, on hearing of their captivity, deposited the suppliant olive-branch upon the altar in the Pnyx and entreated the demus to do something in their behalf.

1. 828 2076 100. 2. 14.

2. FL 192. Diador. 66, 55.

3. A. 7, 73. ff.

Philocrates and Demosthenes seconded their request. The demus complied and dispatched Aristodemus, the great actor, as an ambassador to treat with Philip upon the matter. Aristodemus was chosen because his reputation and the favor shown those of his profession by Philip, assured his cordial reception at the Macedonian Court. Probably, also, he was about to visit Philip of his own accord, to take part in the Olympic Games celebrated by that King upon his victory over Olynthus.² He did not return to Athens before the next autumn, at the earliest.

The Olympic Games above referred to took place probably during the Spring of 347 B.C. As to what happened in the months succeeding thereto, we have only the most fragmentary information. It seems, however, that Philip soon attacked Thrace once more.³ He would naturally do this during the Etesian winds in July and August, when the Athenians could not interfere. His progress in those regions was so rapid that before long the islands, Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, were ^{en-}dangered: while the Athenian colonists in the Chersonesus began to leave for places of greater safety. The disturbance in Athens was very great. "You were compelled" Aeschines tells the jury four years later "to hold more special assemblies in fear and clamor, than those appointed by the laws; and affairs were so full of doubt and danger that Cephisophon, one of Chares' friends, was obliged to move that Antiochus, the superintendent of the navy, sail as soon as possible in search of the general in command of your force, and, if he find him anywhere,

/ For testimony as to the exhaustion of Thebes and her motives in asking aid of Philip, see D. R. 21, 2, 65:40 19:FL141 146 520. Diodor. 18, 53 59.
A. G. 133.

^{that}
 tell him that the Athenian demus are astonished ~~if~~, when Philip is marching upon the Athenian Chersonesus, the Athenians are even ignorant of the whereabouts of the general and fleet they have sent out." This general, Chares, who as we know, had been dispatched at the head of the last expedition sent by Athens to aid Olynthus, had been delayed by a storm and in consequence had been unable to reach the bes^eged city before its fall. On learning of this disaster, he had returned with his force to Athens and had been later sent out again to Thrace with another command. He had, no doubt, conducted himself on this occasion as on many others, and acted without regard to orders from home. Certainly, the vote of the demus shows that no news had been had from him for some time. He was probably neglecting the safety of Athens' Thracian possessions in order to indulge in some marauding raid upon the defenseless communities in that vicinity.

The damage actually inflicted upon Athens by this campaign of Philip's could not have been great; for the Chersonesus and the endangered islands still remainⁱⁿ her hands. Probably Philip's activity was confined to the interior of Thrace, where the continual quarrels of the petty despots would afford him ample occupation; but what he accomplished even there is unknown to us. We find him next in Macedonia, busied with greater matters. During the late fall and winter of 3⁴7 he was making preparations to respond to the request of the hard pressed Thebans¹ for aid against Phocis. It was rumored through Greece that a joint expedition

1. A. 2, 132 ff.

2. 21-22. 18 53.

3. FL 1537

⁴ FL 322.

2. A. 2 16. ff.

of Philip and the Thessalians was impending. Great alarm prevailed in Phocis.¹ The reform party which had supplanted Phalaecus in authority there,² determined to invoke the help of Athens. In evident mistrust of their own mercenaries, who were with good reason supposed to favor Phalaecus, they deemed it best to withdraw from Thermopylae such force as they had there and to turn over the pass to Athens. Ambassadors were accordingly dispatched to Athens requesting aid and offering to yield up Alponus, Thronium and Nicaea, the fortresses commanding the pass. The action of the demos shows how disquieted the city was at the prospect of the threatened invasion. The offer of the Phocians was at once accepted and they were bidden to hand over the fortresses to Proxenus, the Athenian general in command of a force at Oreus in³ Euboea. This as a preliminary- Fittingly to occupy the impregnable strongholds about to be gained and to oppose to Philip an invincible force, it was further decreed to fit out 50 triremes and man them by a levy of all citizens under thirty years of age. This vote was apparently not to be carried out till the occasion demanded. It was merely to be held in readiness for an emergency. In the following June it seems to have been still in force.⁴

So occupied had the public mind been with these aggressions of Philip that it had thought little about Aristodemus and his mission. He, indeed, seems to have returned to Greece² and possibly to Athens, by winter, but he occupied himself there with other matters and did not make any report to the Boulè. If any

/ Demosthenes was a member of the Boule for this year 347-346 B.C. A. 2, 17: 3, 62.

great hope that he had favorable news to communicate, had prevailed, his failure to report would not have passed unnoticed; but, I suppose, Philip's evident hostility had shattered the fond expectations of kindness and favor existing at the beginning of the year. Perhaps the relatives of the captives had already learned of the actor all that interested them privately and so did not press for his report. At any rate, in the words of Aeschines, "Aristodemus having come back from the embassy, on account of some business matters, did not report to the Boulé."

This state of feeling was abruptly changed, however, when there suddenly appeared at Athens Iatrocles, one of the prisoners, having been released without ransom by Philip. The mere fact of his release was a pleasant enough surprise; but when he announced that Philip still felt in the same way toward Athens as before the fall of Olynthus, the effect upon public sentiment was marked. Immediately, as the news got abroad, there was general indignation at Aristodemus for not making his report when he undoubtedly had so much to tell. This grew apace till finally, on motion of Democrates of the deme Aphidna, the Boulé¹ voted to serve upon the careless actor a formal summons. This had the desired effect: and some time during the first ten days of Anthesterion (February) 346 B.C. Aristodemus appeared before the Boulé.

Meanwhile the general Proxenus, in obedience to orders from home had dispatched two ambassadors to the Phocians at Thermopylae requesting them to deliver to him the fortresses, as had

1. Diodorus mentions this revolution. 16 59. Φάλακον πάλιν τῆς στρα-
τηγίας ἡγευόμενον

2. A. 2 133. ff. FL 733. A. says Phalaecus - 'probably about this time' - refused a
similar offer from Archidamus, king of Sparta. A. 2 135

3. A. 2, 17

4. A. 2, 18: 3, 43.

been offered. These ambassadors, on their arrival, learned that Phalaecus had once more regained his authority in Phocis, and that he intended to hold the pass himself by the aid of his own mercenaries. Proxenus, learning this, immediately wrote home a letter telling the state of the case. This letter was read in the same assembly in which Aristodemus, having previously addressed the Boulè, made his report. The news of Phalaecus' repudiation of Athenian aid, would weaken the spirit of resistance materially; while the lessening of cordiality toward the Phocians, would accentuate the newly revived favor toward Philip. This would be yet more the case, when the heralds, sent out the previous month to announce the truce of the Mysteries, entered the assembly and reported that the Phocians alone of all the states visited had refused to accept the truce and had imprisoned the ambassadors recently sent to Athens with the offer to cede the fortresses.² When therefore Aristodemus came forward with long assurances of Philip's regard for Athens and added that he wished to become her ally, the demus was completely won over.³ Demosthenes, who now, if not earlier, was certainly working hand in hand with Philocrates to bring about peace with Philip, moved that the actor be crowned or, in our parlance, be awarded a vote of thanks. The motion was carried. It was now that Philocrates, encouraged by the response that Philip's message had called forth, deemed the time ripe to propose a measure toward which, I think, he and his party had been working for some time.⁴ Its intent was briefly that Athens should

1. A. 3, 58. ff.

2. A. 3, 57.

^{er}
himself take the initiative in arranging matters with Philip. As a means thereto the decree provided that 10 men be chosen as ambassadors to Philip, whose duty should be to discuss with him the question of peace and the common advantage of both parties. The motion was passed without trouble. Evidently, the majority of the people were now thoroughly tired of the war and ready to take what steps they could to bring it to a close.

The prospect of peace having been thus opened, a party in Athens conceived the idea that it might be turned not only to the relief of the state but to her honor and glory. It will be remembered that a number of embassies had previously been sent out over Greece summoning the States to war in the common cause. These had signally failed. Now, however, it was thought that similar embassies charged with a different message, might be more successful. If Athens should invite the Hellenic cities to deliberate in common with her upon concluding peace with Philip, they might be glad to comply. True, most of them were already at peace with him in fact, but a definite treaty shared by all would give far greater general security. If such a combination could be arranged, Athens would make peace, not as an isolated state, but as the head of Hellas; and she would be in a fair way, it was thought, to receive in time the hegemony from willing allies. This idea appealed to the demos and it was resolved, apparently about this time, to dispatch embassies inviting the Greeks to a congress at Athens,² "in order that they might both make war in common, if it

1. All but Nausicles are mentioned in the orations on the embassy. The authority for Nausicles is found only in the second introduction to D's speech: but the tradition may, in the absence of more trustworthy information, be accepted.

2. The Demus had a high opinion of Aristodemus' influence with Philip, as may be seen by their anxiety to induce him to serve. A. 2, 19.

3. This opinion prevailed generally in Athens at that time. FL 12, a. f., 27.

That A. had nothing to do with the peace agitation, is certain. FL 95 94 333, 97.
536; A. 2, 20.

4. FL 12.

5. A. 2, 18.

6. A. 2, 54, 56.

should be necessary, and might share in the peace, if that should seem advantageous." Who were the promoters of this project, we do not know; but it looks like a last effort of the party that had led to the dispatch of the first embassies. Aeschines apparently viewed it with favor. Demosthenes regarded it with contempt. But to return to the embassy to Philip.

The motion of Philocrates being passed, the demos proceeded to elect the ten ambassadors. Those chosen were Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, Iatrocles, Cimon, Nausicles, Dercylus, Phrynon, Aeschines, and Demosthenes.¹ Aristodemus,² Phrynon, Ctesiphon, and Iatrocles were elected doubtless because they had been the actual recipients of Philip's promises. Philocrates and Demosthenes were chosen as heads of the peace party, though not by any means personal friends of Philip, as were the others. Aeschines, on the other hand represented the war party, not now indeed so violent as formerly, but still quite hostile and suspicious towards the present peace movement.³ His duty says Demosthenes,⁴ was to keep an eye on his fellow ambassadors: this being the purpose for which he was elected. He was proposed, he himself tells us,⁵ by Nausicles: which would lead us to infer that the latter was intended to perform like surveillance. Demosthenes was proposed by Philocrates⁶—another of the many indications that these two were now working together in harmony. Of the position of Cimon and Dercylus at this time we know nothing; though on the second embassy they, like the rest, fell into line in following Aeschines and

1. 3. 3, 33.

2. 4. 8, 88.

Philocrates. It has been remarked that the composition of the ten shows all parties in Athens united in the desire for peace. This may be true: yet I am inclined, as I have said, to regard Aeschines and his associates as not yet won over.

Besides these ten men, the demus elected¹ one Aglaocreon of Tenedos to represent upon the embassy the synod of the allies assembled in Athens. This was done, not because the question as to who were the allies of Athens, was expected to arise; but rather, I think, because it was desirable that the city treat with Philip, not as a single state, but as the head of a Grecian Confederation. The craving after recognition as the head of Hellas was strong just now at Athens: a fact evidenced by the new series of embassies sent out about this time.

As to the instructions given the ten, other than the general directions above stated, we learn from Aeschines's third oration² that they were enjoined to request Philip to send Plenipotentiaries to Athens to treat on peace: but this was not their only duty. The decree contained other particular instructions. We are not told what these were, but to judge from what the ambassadors later did and said, their purport was, loosely speaking, to try to get back Amphipolis, to assure safety to the Chersonesus and to come to an understanding with Philip on the subject of the Sacred War.

That the people at large expected to recover Amphipolis as the price of peace, cannot be doubted. Philip's words reported

1. A. 3, 54.

2. D. 4, 13. speaks as though it were the great object of the war. Or. A. 2, 72.

3. A. 2, 31.

4. The complaint that the peace gave up Amphipolis, was very bitter: as may be seen from the oration on Halonnesus, 24 et passim. See also FL 253: D. 5, 25 and 14, where the possible renewal of the war with a view to regaining Amphipolis is spoken of. Philip resents ^his attitude of Athens in his epistle. Ep. 2, 20.

to them by Ctesiphon, Aristodemus and others, had been construed as promising this. It was also the object of their greatest desire. The war had begun over Amphipolis.¹ Primarily for Amphipolis² they had suffered defeat after defeat for ten years; and now, when the question of peace came up, the regaining of Amphipolis formed their chief concern. So much was this the case, ~~that the embassy now created was later popularly termed "the embassy about Amphipolis"~~ and we gather from stray expressions in the orators that the matter of Amphipolis was regarded as constituting almost its whole business.³ How bitter the disappointment they were destined to meet in this affair, proved to the Athenians, can be seen by the tone in which it is referred to again and again by the orators. Nor, indeed, was the hope ~~of~~ regaining the former colony definitely given up till the evil day of Chaeronea settled such questions once for all.⁴

The danger threatening the Chersonesus from Philip's invasion had also, as we have seen already, been the occasion of much excitement at Athens, and could not but cause anxiety concerning the future. The people, therefore, would be urgent to have the safety of the peninsula guaranteed as one of the conditions of peace.

In regard to the Sacred War, the state of the public mind at Athens seems somewhat confused. This question will come up a little later, when we find the Macedonian ambassadors refusing to admit the Phocians to the treaty as allies of Athens; and I shall

endeavor to discuss it briefly at that point. Now I must pass it by, saying only this much: that as far as I can see, it had not as yet come to occupy anything like the place in the popular interest that it afterward ^{assumed} usurped. Of course, it was present to the mind of the demos as a great problem, vitally affecting Athens, which must be solved in the near future. But now it was temporarily thrust into the back ground by the expectation, recently heightened, of regaining Amphipolis. We shall see how these two matters soon changed places and how, on the return of this embassy, attention was suddenly turned away from Amphipolis and directed eagerly to the affairs of Central Greece. But as yet, that change had not taken place.

Such then was the appointment, the composition and the purpose of the 1st of the 3 embassies with which we have to deal. The 1st step had been taken in a series of transactions which in the course of a few months was destined to bring about the ruin of Phocis, the exaltation--albeit short-lived--of Thebes and her allies, the discomfiture and disgrace of Athens, and the permanent establishment of Philip within Central Greece. The 1st scene of the last act of the great drama had been ushered in. But this the Athenians little guessed. They saw only that the long and weary war with Philip was now to be ended. Henceforth he was to be their friend and, for the privilege of their friendship, was to give them Amphipolis and many other things besides.

Brighter days were coming, with peace and ease in abundance. The immediate result of this feeling was naturally an utter relaxation of all warlike efforts. "From the day in which you began to expect peace," says Demosthenes, "you let all preparations for war go." From henceforth we shall see the Athenian people looking idly, though with keen expectation, into the bright future, until the bright future darkens suddenly into a desolate, blackened past.

1. IL 185. ff.

2. FL 184.

II.

Inasmuch as there yet existed a state of war between Athens and Philip, it would have been dangerous for the ambassadors to proceed to Macedonia unannounced; and a herald was accordingly sent ahead to secure safe-conduct for them from Philip.¹ This herald they were ^{to} wait ^{for} in Oreus; for they could go as far as Oreus without fear. They set out from Athens in great eagerness; and so impatient were they to get to Pella that when they arrived at Oreus and did not find the herald there, they wasted no time in taking matters into their own hands. Knowing that a Macedonian army was besieging Halus near the shore of the Pagasæan Gulf, they set sail for that place and seeking out Parmenias the general in command asked him to pass them through his camp to Pagasæe. Having obtained this, they pressed on and did not meet the returning herald until they reached Larissa. Demosthenes, who gives us this information, declares that the haste was made on Philip's behalf; for it was to Philip's interest to have the peace consummated as soon as possible.² This is most unfair. Athens needed the haste far more than Philip. To say nothing of the fact that she had been suffering more than her enemy from the war all along, she had now relapsed into a state of passive waiting in which she was particularly open to attacks from Philip's "superabundant activity." Either she must gain peace at once or, failing in this, must rouse herself anew. The worst thing for her would be to allow the matter to hang fire without coming to a definite decision one way

1. + FL 253, 13. He claims to have broken with A. and Philocrates at that time.
This may be true, but his relations toward the rest of his colleagues did
not become hostile till after the departure of the second embassy FL 156a. f.
See also FL 254.

or the other. Under these circumstances, any loitering on the part of the Ambassadors would have been treason. Demosthenes seems to have seen the danger of delay clearly enough a little later and no doubt was aware of it now, did it not suit his purpose momentarily to let it appear otherwise. Indeed, I think he must have been one of the most zealous in pushing forward. Nor shall we look upon this impatience as peculiar to the ambassadors; for in all probability it was then permeating the whole of Athens. Impatience always goes hand in hand with excited hope. Certainly we can not infer from it in this instance any collusion with Philip on the part of a single one of the ten. More, during the whole time the 1st embassy was absent from Athens, nothing else occurred which would fasten upon any of its members the suspicion of working on Philip's behalf. Demosthenes himself elsewhere says so distinctly.⁺ He asserts in so many words that he suspected nothing until the debates came off at Athens after their return; and Aeschines complains justly that, in view of this¹ fact, he has no business to accuse anybody of what happened before that time. We may be sure that had he any real ground for his charges regarding the 1st embassy, he would not thus exonerate his colleagues. And so, I incline to treat these charges as possessing little weight.

Of course, however, I do not presume to say that such men as Philocrates, Aristodemus and Phrynion were all the while acting from the purest motives. On the contrary, I think it

⁺ ~~Schaeffer's~~ curious blunder.

1. PL 199, 270. A. casts a suspicion upon his veracity. A. 2, 12. ὡς αὐτὸς ᾔτι/ατο.
2. This is evident, I think, in both the orations on the embassy. Moreover, the fact that such men as Eubulus believed in A.'s integrity, and lived upon intimate terms with him, would lead us naturally to this conclusion. Eubulus was certainly an honorable man and known to be such by all. D. testifies to the influence he enjoyed in the community. His confidence in A. could not but have great weight with his fellow-citizens. PL 290 300 A. 2 184. A. more -
over, ^{appeals} with confidence to his own life and character, as known to all the Athenians. A. 2 5ff. 146, 181.
3. PL 207 A. 2, 145: 3, 84, 79.

likely, from his later conduct that Philocrates upon this very embassy came to a secret and corrupt understanding with Philip. He was certainly bribed at some time, doubtless often. Finally his conduct grew so shameless that by 343 he had been banished and his name had become the object of universal execration. Phrynon also seems from casual expressions in the orations of both orators to have had a most unsavory reputation at Athens.¹ But quite different is the case in regard to the others. They evidently were looked upon as respectable citizens by a large portion of the people.² And although Demosthenes's continued accusations of Aeschines and the others after the embassies gradually created a party which considered them all, and Aeschines in particular, as traitors,³ yet Athens as a whole had not made up her mind about them as she had about Phrynon and Philocrates. This fact must influence us when we come to discuss their actions farther on: it must at least compel us to see if after all, whatever their shortcomings, they might not have been, as their countrymen regarded them, honest men. But whether they were or not, undoubtedly before the 18th of Elaph, nothing occurred which even a Demosthenes could turn to their blame or to that of their colleagues.

But we must not on the other hand give too much credence to what Aeschines has to tell us of the proceedings of this, or, indeed, of the second embassy. Of what took place in each case after the 10 left Athens, they themselves were the only witnesses,

1. 12. 8. 84. τῶν πρέσβευτ σεσιωπηκότων.

2. 4. 8. 80ff.

except, of course Macedonians and other foreigners, who, when this case was being tried, were far away or otherwise unavailable. Now of these ambassadors, the majority were supporting Aeschines heartily against Demosthenes. The result was that while Demosthenes on his part could not induce them to tell what they knew against Aeschines, or to confirm his own statements, even though true, Aeschines was at liberty to say pretty much anything he wished without fear of their contradicting him. Indeed, they were only too willing to testify on his behalf, since he and they were the common objects of Demosthenes' ^{general} accusations. Therefore, in view of the temptation to pervert the facts which Aeschines must have experienced in narrating what happened away from Athens, we should be chary of believing him when he overleaps the bounds of sober probability. This is especially necessary just now, for from his account we must derive almost all we can know concerning the first embassy; since Demosthenes only touches upon it and that briefly and in few places.

What he tells us of the journey to Macedonia, is little and can best be given in his own words. "Demosthenes" he says.² "made a point of taking his meals with us, not by my consent but by that of my associates Aglaöcreon and Iatrocles. And he says that on the road I urged him that we in common keep an eye on that wild beast Philocrates, which is a lie. For how would I have urged Demosthenes to watch Philocrates when I knew he had pleaded Philoc's cause at the time of the παρανόμων γραφή, and had

1. FL 18.

2. Probably the same as the man mentioned in A. 2, 124. He seems to have been an orator of considerable ability, who was banished from Athens on account of his Macedonian leanings and took up his abode at the court of Philip.

3. FL 189. A. 2, 22, 183.

been nominated for the embassy of Philoc.." Demosthenes had indeed made such a charge and almost in these very words.

"Throughout the whole trip we ambassadors were obliged to put up with the intolerable annoyance the fellow occasioned us. For instance, when we were casting about as to what we ought to speak of and Cimon said he was afraid Philip would get the better of us in pleading his causes, Demosthenes declared that he had rivers of words inexhaustible and that he would lay down the right in the case of Amphipolis and the source of the war so mightily that he would stop up Philip's mouth with an unsoaked rush and would persuade the Athenians to take Leosthenes² home again and Philip to give back Amphipolis." We see thus that the four men Aeschines, Aglacreon, Iatrocles and Demosthenes messed together on the road; and all that Aeschines may say cannot make us believe that he and Demosthenes were not on good terms at this time. Greek ideas would not permit two persons not friendly to each other to share the same repast. In eating with a man you bound yourself to him by ties of union not lightly to be broken. Indeed, one of the great charges Aeschines brought against Demosthenes in the trial was that by accusing his fellow-ambassadors he was disregarding the sacredness of relations formed when he broke bread with them upon this embassy.³ On the next embassy after Demosthenes had begun to come into conflict with the others, Aeschines asserts that they refused not only to eat at the same table, but even where

/ Plutarch Dem., cap. 4. See also the passages cited in Holden's note on this passage. A. recalls this fact concerning D. in 2, 99.

possible, to put up at the same inn as he. So by his own showing we can know that, despite his denial, he could not have been at odds with Demosthenes as yet.⁺ Accordingly we are not to believe that Demosthenes made himself disagreeable to his colleagues by extravagant boastfulness or in other ways. It is possible that the great orator did not possess many of the little graces of manner which win the hearts of men. Grand and intense natures in their strivings for exalted aims too often overlook the small courtesies of life and by their lack of tact offend and antagonise. Such men are apt also to violate the canons of decorum and good taste which mean so much to the multitude. If this is true, they ^{are} ~~exile~~ both disgust and ridicule. This may have been the case with Demosthenes. We know that among his boy acquaintances he was never popular. Their feelings toward him were summed up in the brutally ludicrous nicknames with which he was early designated. And there is much in the speech of Aeschines to make us infer that in this respect the man was like the boy. Aeschines never tires of ascribing to his rival words or of placing him in positions calculated to rouse the scorn and derision of the hearers. So frequently does he do this that one begins involuntarily to suspect that the shoe must have fit in some way; that in these gibes of Aeschines there was a point which the Athenians saw, though it is invisible to us. The Demosthenes we know in his orations is any-

⁺ The charge of Demosthenes (which I think he amply refutes) being testimony from his rival that they were still friends, supports us yet more firmly in our view. C.f. FL 221

1. Cf. A. 2, 155, 157, 42.

2. One reason of his popularity was doubtless his disposition to let other people alone. A. 2, 122. D., on the contrary, in his anxiety to see the business of the state properly conducted, must have made many enemies among those who were not disposed to do their duty in this respect. He realized this fact himself. Pl 221 ff.

3. For instances of this .see A. 2, 22 54 40ff 108ff 163a. f. 165.

4. A. 2, 22.

5. A. 2, 25ff.

thing but ridiculous. But how of the Demosthenes whom his fellow citizens saw in the assembly and about the streets? Aeschines, on the other hand, seems to have been a man of great popularity:² and as such he doubtless looked down upon his enemy because of his inferiority in social gifts. Indeed, the sins which he lays to the charge of Demosthenes are many of them merely social sins, having nothing to do with patriotism in any way;³ as for instance the one quoted above. But however this may be, we know from Aeschines's own words that just now he is not telling the truth. 3 of the 10 got along pleasantly enough with Demosthenes and probably the others did also.

"But not to delay over this fellow's high and mighty ways," Aeschines continues,⁴ "as soon as we arrived in Macedonia, we arranged that when we met Philip we should speak in order of seniority. Now Demosthenes happened to be the youngest of us, so he said. So when we had been ushered into Philip's presence x x x x" and "the elder ones had spoken, my turn came."⁵ He then proceeds to give a summary of his speech, which we shall pass over in a few words. He began by recounting the benefits conferred upon Amyntas, Philip's father, by Athens, and the friendship arising in consequence between the 2 powers. He then told how this kindness had been extended to Philip himself. How Iphicrates had befriended him and his house in an hour of need and practically reconquered for him his kingdom. After that came a recital of the injuries done to Athens by Macedonia in the matter

1. A. 2, 50.

2. A. 2, 53.

3. A. 2, 54ff.

of Amphipolis, by Ptolemaeus and by Perdiccas, and of the kind spirit in which Athens had met them. "Nay more," says Aeschines "I did not hesitate to accuse Philip himself, charging him with taking up the war against our city." ¹ He next told the story of the mythical founding of Amphipolis and passing on from thence recalled what had happened in his own time--the council of the Greeks where Amyntas had joined in recognising ^{Athens'} ~~Aeschines'~~ right to Amphipolis. Every statement Aeschines supported by witnesses or documentary evidence, as an advocate pleading his cause before the court. "What therefore," he concluded "Amyntas your father, relinquished before all the Greeks, not only by word but by vote, this it is not just for you his offspring to claim. But if you claim that it is yours by right of seizure in time of war--if on the one hand you took it from us, your enemies, at the point of the sword, it is yours by the laws of war: but if on the other hand, you took from the Amphipolitans the city which belongs to Athens, you hold not their property, but the territory of Athens." ²

³ "When I had finished this and what else I had to say, it was at last time for Demosthenes; and all gave attention expecting to hear a speech of surpassing power: since even Philip (as we learned later) and his courtiers had been told of his boastful promises. Everybody then being thus eager to listen, this *Θηριον* bellows out an exordium full of obscurity and cowardice: and having entered a little way into the business of his discourse, suddenly became silent and couldn't go on; and finally lost himself entirely.

1. A. 2, 37.

5

When Philip saw the state he was in, he bade him take courage and not think that here such a thing was fatal as it would be in a theatre; and he urged him to take his time and try to remember what he had intended to say. But he, having once become confused and forgotten what he had written, couldn't recover himself; and when he tried again, he met with the same fate. And when silence reigned, the herald bade us retire." "When we ambassadors were alone, this noble fellow with a scowl as black as night, declared that I had done for the city and the allies. Overcome by surprise--not I alone but all of us--we inquired of him why. He asked if I had forgotten how matters stood at Athens; if I did not remember the exhaustion of the demus and their great desire for peace. "Or," said he "are you puffed up on account of those 50 ships which have been voted but are never going to be filled? Because you have so angered Philip and said such things that you would bring not peace out of war, but a truceless war out of peace. And as I was beginning to make some reply, Philip's servants called us."

I have quoted thus at length from Aeschines because I think it better for the actors in the events to tell their own story where that is possible. Much is gained thereby. The scenes are made more vivid and the character and attitude of the speakers come out more clearly. Here we see, moreover, fully exemplified that kind of accusation which I have just said Aeschines loves to employ toward Demosthenes. Demosthenes comes

1. Senaeffer points out that if D. really had failed so ignominiously, it would have become the talk of the town upon the return of the gen, and a second election of D. as an ambassador would have been impossible. This seems to be reasonable.

2. Plut. Dem., 8, 9. So, in 11, Chalcus the Thier tried to say something witty εἰς τὰς ἀρτυνίας αὐτοῦ καὶ νυκτογραφίας.

3. PL 253.

4 A. 2, 43 2. f..

before us not as the dishonest or incompetent statesman,⁺ but as the awkward and disgusting member of a social circle. Many have been the views held as to the probable truth of his failure. Of course in this matter we can only conjecture: yet it seems to me that Aeschines has invented the incident.¹ At any rate he had here a glorious opportunity to strike his enemy where he was well known to be weak. Demosthenes's inability, or rather, unwillingness to speak ex tempore was a standard joke of Athens;² and the jury would picture to themselves with great amusement his helplessness when at a critical juncture he forgot his written speech and could not go on.

In considering what Aeschines tells us of his own harangue we are at once met by a difficulty. Demosthenes declares that on this embassy Aeschines never even mentioned the name of Amphipolis.³ "And this," he says "he himself announced to you (the Athenians). For you surely remember him saying "I too had something to say about Amphipolis; but that Demosthenes might have the chance of speaking upon it, I left it untouched." He represents this as occurring in the assembly when the ambassadors made their report on their return. To understand this we must notice two passages in Aeschines. He says⁴ that while on the homeward journey Demosthenes besought him to be sure and mention that "Demosthenes too had said something about Amphipolis." In recounting his

⁺ His failure is not so much an instance of incompetency as of ridiculous clownishness.

1. A. 8, 12.

2. A. 8, 35.

3. PL 15 et passim.

speech in the assembly later he says¹ "I did not forget Demosthenes' request that if we omit anything, he be assigned to speak about Amphipolis." Evidently Aeschines had on that occasion said something about leaving the matter of Amphipolis for Demosthenes to treat of, either there or in Macedonia, a fact which was still remembered at Athens—no doubt because of the retort it elicited from Demosthenes. Was it in the audience of Pella that Aeschines had been silent on this subject? So Demosthenes charges: and the scene in the assembly, as he reports it, bears this out.

Aeschines, on the other hand, while he does not refer to this charge of Demosthenes, yet implies that he did speak of Amphipolis before Philip and that it was only at Athens when making his report that he passed over it. Even there he can not mean that he did so wholly; for he tells us elsewhere that he reported his speech made to Philip², and that certainly contained much about Amphipolis. What he intended to say was probably that he contented himself with doing thus much and did not touch upon Philip's answer or the subsequent arrangements. Now Demosthenes's statement is open to question. He says distinctly that he has nothing in Aeschines's conduct on the 1st embassy to accuse: that he did not suspect him till he came home.³ But if Amphipolis played the important part in the negotiations which he ascribes to it—and there is every reason to think it did—then Aeschines's omission

⁺ He would easily do this, since the remembrance of it would be only general, not detailed. see next page

1. See note at bottom p. 29

of it would have been decidedly suspicious. I think therefore that Demosthenes did not report the scene truly and that the accusation he bases upon it is false. We have no difficulty, accordingly, as far as Demosthenes's contradiction is concerned, in believing that Aeschines delivered such a speech as he represents. Nor am I of those who regard the speech as the acme of foolishness. It is true that it amounts to a demand for Amphipolis—that in one sense it was ridiculous for Athens the defeated party, to demand of Philip the victor the city concerning which the war had been begun. Yet it is doubtful whether Aeschines or any Athenian statesman who at all realised the situation, expected the demand to be complied with. Why then make it? Because it would have been still more foolish to give the place up without a word. Do not nations today in similar circumstances put forward far larger claims than they hope ever to realise? Athens had always looked upon Amphipolis as her own and Hellenic sentiment in great part acknowledged that she had some right so to do. All this was a point in her favor which Philip could not ignore. Did she insist upon it, he would not of course give up Amphipolis, but he would be obliged to do something to indemnify her for its loss. Did she quietly relinquish it, he would be released from this obligation. So Aeschines was right in his demand. I think too, that he made it in the right way. ⁺ He assumes that ^{Athens} ~~Amphipolis~~ is negotiating

⁺ Philip's reply was argumentative.

¹ xi, p. 384 ff.

2. A. 2.30 af. καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ὤκνουσιν κατ' αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ἐπιτιμῶν
ὅτι τὴν ἐκδοχὴν ἐποίησατο πρὸς τὴν πάλιν τοῦ πολέμου κ.τ.λ.

3. 1. 2, 59.

on equal terms with Philip. Accordingly she has no reason not to expect justice: and to prove the justice of her demands he adopts the regular methods of the court—the production of witnesses and confirmatory documents—This amuses Grote¹ exceedingly. Yet what was Aeschines to say? Was he to put it thus—"Well, you have beaten us and it is your place to make terms. What is the best you can do for us?" Hardly.

It is to be remembered that Aeschines was still the leading representative of the war party on the embassy and as such it would naturally fall to his share to make the extreme demands for Athens. Not yet convinced of Philip's honest intentions, he would be likely to adopt toward him a tone not only uncompromising, but even tinged with hostility: which he actually professes to have done.² It is not incredible therefore that those of his colleagues whose hearts were set upon peace, thinking he had gone too far, did in truth remonstrate with him after they had retired from the audience room. Possibly it was only Demosthenes who did so: though if such is the case, his words would not have excited, on the part of all the ambassadors the indignant surprise Aeschines describes. But to return to the narrative--

"When we had gone in" he continues,³ "and were seated, Philip, beginning at the beginning endeavored to make some reply to each of our arguments, but he naturally paid the greatest attention to my words, for I had, I fancy, left nothing unsaid that there was to say: and he mentioned me by name frequently as he

spoke. But to Demosthenes who had left off in such a ridiculous way, he answered practically nothing: which fact Demosthenes didn't like at all. When, however, Philip's speech began to grow cordial and Demosthenes's prophecy that I would be the cause of war and strife proved untrue, immediately, before everybody, he so utterly lost control of himself that even when we had been invited to partake of the hospitalities of Philip's table, he could not behave himself with common decency."

This ^entirely personal information is all that Aeschines has to give us concerning Philip's reply to Athens' demands. Nothing is said of the substance of that reply nor of the subsequent agreement arrived at by the conferring parties. When next our orator takes up his story, he is occupied with incidents which occurred on the homeward trip of the ambassadors. We must therefore fill up the gap he leaves as best we can. To the general request of the ambassadors—that plenipotentiaries be sent to Athens to treat on peace—Philip apparently acceded with readiness. This was, indeed, fully in accord with his own wishes.

From Aeschines's words we see that he adopted a warm and friendly tone toward Athens; and I have little doubt that he requested her alliance, as he had already done before this time, and was going to do so strenuously a little later. It is not unlikely also that he conceded Athens' right to the Cherson~~esus~~s; for this he seems to have freely acknowledged from the very first.

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Amphipolis he naturally refused to give back. Yet he seems to

1. FL 37 a.f., 208.

2. FL 38. Here 0. argues from results.

0

3. For a sample see D. 2, 19ff.

have hinted his intention to make that all right with Athens if she would only become his ally. What he said regarding his attitude toward the Sacred War is totally unknown to us; but there is no reason to doubt that thus early he adopted the tactics that so successfully deceived Athens in the end;—and that even now he tried, without committing himself, to give the 10 the idea that he was really, though secretly, the friend of Phocis and the enemy of Thessaly and Thebes. ¹ But if Aeschines neglects to disclose the actual business transacted, he throws light upon an occurrence far more interesting and possessing far more important consequences. I mean his own change of attitude toward Philip. We see him going to Macedonia Philip's suspicious enemy: we see him leaving Philip's devoted admirer and friend. ¹ What is the cause of it? Demosthenes declares that Philip bribed him: ² a simple explanation which satisfied him perfectly, as it has satisfied so many others since his time. But—to repeat in part what I have already said—it is not ours to condemn unheard a man whom so many of his fellow citizens believed honest. I think we can easily account for Aeschines' ³ change of base on other grounds than that of corruption. Let us picture the situation. During the last ten years Aeschines had been listening to the harangues of Demosthenes and others far more violent than he, who never wearied of painting Philip in the blackest colors. ³ All that was most disgusting to Greek ideas of morality, of culture and of beauty, was repeatedly and unhesitatingly affirmed of the Macedonian King. Gradually

D.2. does not deny D.3 statement that before the peace his policy was προ-
βεβλημένη καὶ ἄπιστος πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον. FL 27.

Aeschines' idea of Philip came to be that of a cruel, brutish barbarian, harsh, uncouth, and in every way hateful--the mortal enemy of Athens and of Hellas. With this idea still uppermost in his mind, he is ushered for the 1st time into Philip's presence. Instead of what he expected, he finds a man of great physical beauty, possessed ^{of} with all the graces of the highest Hellenic culture. Philip receives the ambassadors with winning courtesy. He listens to all politely. He opens his mouth to reply, and Aeschines suddenly awakes to the fact that he is listening, not to an unlettered barbarian, but to a trained ^rthetor whose eloquence and power ^{he} Demosthenes is compelled to acknowledge with wonder. More, this enemy of Athens, as he had ^{regarded} him, adopts a tone of the most friendly cordiality toward the state. Can it surprise us that under such circumstances ^{the} impulsive and unreflecting Aeschines experienced a complete revulsion of feeling? Along with his new admiration of Philip would come a great anger at those who had so wrongly calumniated him, at the very men with whom he had himself been lately coöperating. His prejudices and party-sympathies would shift at once from one extreme to the other. Such a phenomenon Demosthenes could not understand. His own clear insight and unshaken principle kept him from appreciating the motives of a man who possessed neither. He knew that had he himself acted as Aeschines now acted, he would have done so as a conscious traitor to Athens; and he judged Aeschines by his own standard.

He exclaims, ² "But when he (Aeschines) went to Macedonia and saw

1. A. freely admits ^his change. It is right, he declares, for the statesman to shift his policy according to circumstances. Athens herself had always done as much. 2, 34ff. He rejects with indignation the charge that he is a traitor. Rather he is an Athenian through and through! 2, 23 His strenuous advocacy of a peace policy has been the source of great blessing to the state. 2, 183 et passim. D., on the contrary, is a dangerous man. His continual war agitation is going to bring disaster upon Athens. 2, 171, 177 et pass. This is the view that A. works out fully in his latest oration, delivered after his predictions had been-according to his thinking-so signally fulfilled.

this enemy of his and of the Greeks, did he sing the same song, or anything like the same song, as before? Not a bit of it.

Philip was, Heavens!, a very Greek of Greeks, a splendid orator, the best friend in the world to Athens—though some people in town were such ill-natured fools that they did not blush to slander him and call him a barbarian. "Now is it possible" asks Demosthenes "that one and the same man would have had the face to be so inconsistent if he had not been bribed?" What a question! Demosthenes by his own words unwittingly shows us that Aeschines did the most natural thing for such a man as he to do. I do not doubt moreover that he changed his views, not only without any compunction, but even with an overwhelming conviction that by so doing he was following the path of right.¹

All this is shown to some extent by Aeschines's account of Philip's reply: but what we see chiefly therein is another fact which evidently impressed our orator deeply and must have done much in winning him over—the personal flattery addressed to him by the king. Instead of showing anger at his rude and uncompromising speech, Philip directed his attention chiefly to Aeschines's words, repeating his name often and on the whole speaking in such a way as to give Aeschines the idea that not only was he considered the leading member of the embassy, but that to him was due in large measure ^{the} cordiality expressed by Philip toward Athens. This was surely intentional on Philip's part. Knowing the state of parties in Athens, he would realise the powerful interests that

Aeschines represented and the consequent importance of gaining his support. Aristodemus or Phrynon could easily give him such a cue and tell him something of the character of the orator. Certainly he succeeded in striking him in a vulnerable part. Like all vain, self-conscious men, Aeschines was peculiarly open to flattery; and he fell into the net without hesitation. Henceforth, though he was ignorant of the fact, he was Philip's, body and soul. And Philip had now at the outset discovered a way to manipulate him.

Aeschines was not a leader in the highest sense. When not supported by strong public opinion he was always leaning upon Eubulus or Philip or some one else. He never stood on his own legs.

This was due partly to a lack of moral courage, partly to the fact that he ~~had~~ let others do his thinking for him. But of this he does not seem to have been aware. In his own eyes he was ever in the van. Philip's policy was to foster this opinion and to allow Aeschines to fancy himself the leader, though all the while being led. To my mind there is little evidence that Aeschines was at any time a conscious tool. Nor would Philip have had him so.

The public by instinct recognises aⁿ honest man and gives him its confidence: but when the ring of sincerity passes out of his life, confidence falls away. Aeschines believing himself honest could do more for Philip at Athens than Aeschines knowing himself a fraud.

Scarcely less striking was the effect of Philip's words and deportment upon the rest of the ambassadors. Those that had

1. That the were won over by Philip's personal charms, may be seen from A.'s account of the dinner at Larissa, where, although D., Otesiphon and A. himself are the only speakers, it is plainly indicated that they voiced the thoughts of the others. (A. 2, 40ff.) That Philip inspired their confidence, is evident from the disposition to trust him which the Athenians displayed in the coming negotiations—a disposition which must have been due to the ambassadors themselves.

2 A. 2, 47 52. τῆς ἐν τοῖς πότεσις ἐπιδεξιότητος. — συμπτειν δεινὸς ἦν.

3. FL 235 shows this.

4 A. 2, 100.

before regarded him with favor were confirmed in their good opinion while the others were likewise completely captivated. To all he seemed most friendly toward Athens; and a general feeling that the interests of the state would be safe in his hands, arose and grew apace.¹

The conference over, as we have seen, Philip invited the ten to a banquet. Here he entertained them so charmingly over their wine² as to excite anew their enthusiastic commendation. His example was followed by his courtiers and the stay of the ambassadors at Pella seems to have been one round of similar festivities conducted on a scale which struck even the Athenians as extraordinarily lavish.³ During this time there was much opportunity to discuss the political situation with their Macedonian hosts. Aeschines tells us⁴ that these friends of Philip were unanimous in declaring that Philip, if he obtained peace, would let go all the Athenian captives not previously freed. This casual remark indicates that the courtiers were inclined (as on the next embassy) to talk freely about Philip's intentions: and it was from their conversation, no doubt, that Aeschines and his friends conceived some of the ideas which they later presented with such effect before the *demos* e.g. the purposed cession of Euboea in return for Amphipolis. These may of course have come from Philip himself. Whether or no Philip promised anything to Aeschines in private conversation in this or on the succeeding embassy—we can not say. Yet it seems probable that even thus he did not commit himself, but rather used

1. Of the action of the Athenians in the case of Philocrates and Eucrates. A. 2, 15.
and the clause in the instructions of the second embassy A. 2, 105.

2. Pl. 171. I suppose he gave this promise at this time, though he does not
say so.

3 A's tone in speaking of Philocrates in his second oration, is wavering. At
times it is condemnatory, as in sec. 8, though he never employs any of the ep-
ithets which D. uses; and at times it is quite friendly, as in sec. 161. On the
whole we may say that A. was not one of those men that feel constrained to re-
gard the enemies of their country as their personal enemies. In the speech
against Pimacrus, he unhesitatingly identifies himself with Philocrates, s. 174

his courtiers as his mouth-pieces. At any rate Aeschines nowhere in his 2nd oration claims to have been in Philip's confidence.

The fate of the captives just mentioned was a matter of no little concern at Athens¹ and we can not wonder that the ambassadors should speak about them on this occasion. Indeed, Demosthenes (as he says)² saw some of the unfortunates personally and promised to come back bringing money for their ransom. But it is improbable that the embassy was instructed to breach³ the subject officially to Philip. Such business would naturally be deferred till the preliminaries for the peace were settled.

Before the ambassadors set out homewards, Philip accomplished something that was to be of the greatest importance for his success. He managed to come to a secret understanding with Philocrates. Such at least is the view advanced at 1st by Böhnecke and accepted by nearly all historians since his time. Nor do I find cause to question it. Philoc. was, as I have said, undoubtedly bribed by Philip at sometime; and his action upon his arrival at Athens points so clearly to a program previously arranged in Philip's interest, that I do not doubt the bribery had already taken place. Philoc., as we shall see, proved himself of use to Philip in many ways: but his chief task seems to have been to manage the more influential Aeschines. We soon find the two on the most intimate terms and continuing so until the banishment of Philoc. compelled Aeschines publicly to renounce the friendship which apparently he still continued to cherish in private.³

1 A. 3, 83. That Phillo's assurance brought such relief is clearly implied in the passage.

2 A. 3, 40ff.

The leading spirit in this friendship—which proved at once so profitable to Philip and so fatal to Athens—was, I feel sure, Philocrates.

Contemporaneously with the departure of the ambassadors from Pella, Philip was on his part just setting out at the head of an army to subdue the refractory portions of Thrace. Inasmuch as this was a dangerous direction for him to be exerting his activity, the 10 on parting with him expressed some anxiety for the safety of the Chersonesus. Philip at once promised them that until a decision should be reached regarding the peace, he would not trespass upon that territory with an armed force. The frank spirit in which this promise was given reassured the Athenians; and they said farewell to the king with a mind relieved of all immediate apprehension for their cherished peninsula, and a firmer conviction than ever that he meant to be the benefactor of Athens.

The homeward journey of the 10 is characteristically described by Aeschines,² but we have not time to give his account in detail. Demosthenes, he says, suddenly^{and} unexpectedly changed his deportment and began to do everything in his power to make friends with his colleagues. He was especially profuse in his flattery of Aeschines himself—so much^{so} as to become actually disgusting. Having by these means lulled their suspicion, the "Sisyphus" asked Ctesiphon and Aeschines to promise that they would repeat in the demus some extravagant compliments of Philip which they had uttered. They foolishly consented. He also (as I have already said)

1. As far as we know, he, like A., had on this embassy seen Philip for the first time. He claims, however, that Philip's appearance and deportment in no way astounded him, as it did A. (PL 358. Ἐγὼ Φίλιππον μὲν οὐκ ἔθαύμασα.) He certainly did not lose his head, as did the others.

2. ii. p. 207.

besought the latter to state "that Demosthenes too, had spoken on Amphipolis."

The truth of this account is, I think, that the praises of Philip—of his personal qualities and of his friendliness towards Athens—were loudly sung by all the ambassadors along the way. Demosthenes himself was not silent, we can believe.¹ He, as well as Aeschines had found Philip much different from his expectation and could not but have been impressed by him. Possibly he even shared in some degree the confidence concerning Philip's favorable intentions toward the state. But the rest of what Aeschines has to tell the Athenians is, as Schaeffer remarks,² too palpably told with a purpose. When the ambassadors returned, the people found Demosthenes on good terms with his colleagues. Aeschines must explain that. The people likewise remembered that Aeschines and Ctesiphon~~on~~ had said a great deal in the demos about Philip's excellence. Aeschines must explain that also. To meet the emergency he invents a story, which, if it does not exonerate himself^{and} Ctesiphon, has at least the merit of making Demosthenes appear a false friend. Thus at least it seems to me.

So, about the beginning of Elaphebolion, the 10 returned to Athens from their visit to Macedonia. That visit was fraught with weighty consequences for the after history of Athens and of Hellas. Hitherto the great leaders of Athenian politics had pursued their respective courses without regard to Philip as Philip. In their eyes he represented not so much a man as a power. They had

1. Cf. FL 248. ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς πόλεως τὴν Φιλίππου ξενίαν καὶ φιλίαν
πολλῷ μείζον' ἡγήσαθ' αὐτῷ καὶ λυσιτελεστέραν.

2. FL 343. et passim. τοῖς μὲν ἅπαντα πεπρακόσι χρήματα, δόξαν,
ἀφορμὴν, τὴν Φιλίππου ξενίαν περιοῦσαν.

D. describes A.'s pompous behaviour under these new conditions. FL 314.

3. FL 259.

looked upon him with fear, with hatred, or with favor not because he was Philip, but because, as an aggressive king of Macedonia, he promised to become an important factor in Hellenic affairs. This still continues to be the case with the Anti-Macedonian party, especially with Demosthenes. But from the 1st embassy dates the appearance of a new feature in the public life of Athens. There come before us a group of influential citizens, Aeschines and Philocrates among the first, who consider themselves and are considered by the multitude as the "friends" of Philip.¹ Whether from interested or disinterested motives, they have attached themselves to him by close personal ties and proudly present themselves at all times as his loyal supporters before the people. Their whole manner of thought is colored by this attachment. Around Philip as a centre revolve their views of statesmanship and of patriotism. In Philip's actions, to their mind is bound up the welfare of the state. Their aim is ever to reconcile their countrymen to Philip—to "Philippize" Athens. Nor do the people seem to resent this. Rather the glitter of the Macedonian power lends itself to its friends. The crowd admires: and, when it sees the favors that are showered upon these men by their royal patron, it envies.² Nothing more. So the "deadly sickness that has fallen upon Hellas"³ in other parts now seizes Athens also. But so insidiously has it begun its attack that even the great physician who is destined to fight it to the death, has not yet perceived it. Demosthenes enters the city on friendly terms with his fellow ambassadors and quite satisfied

with the result of their mission.

1. A. 2, 44.

2. A. 2, 45.

3. The, passages are only two in number, viz. FL 40ff. and De Hal. 33. Also FL 316.

III.

"And now" Aeschines continues innocently "up to this point my witnesses are my colleagues, whom this fellow has repeatedly insulted and slandered in his accusation. But what I said from the bema here at home, you (Athenians) yourselves heard, so that about this it is not possible for me to lie." Quite true, Aeschines. Now that we are back to Athens again, where the people at large were witnesses of what took place, we are upon surer ground. Certainly, the story from henceforth must bear some resemblance to the well remembered course of actual events. Yet we must not consider this resemblance as necessarily always faithful. Memory can play tricks with people and people can play tricks with memory. A skillful special-pleader can easily mould a mass of vague and confused—albeit sometimes vivid—recollections into whatever shape he desires. We cannot therefore lay aside our caution even now. ~~§~~ Arrived in town the ambassadors as was the custom, first made a summary report before the Boule of the business transacted on the embassy and delivered to that body a letter from Philip of which they were the bearers.² This letter is not given to us in full but from several passages in which it is alluded to, we can make out some of its contents.³ The writer throughout emphasized his kindly feeling for Athens. He declared that it was his desire not only to beat peace with her but even to share her alliance. Upon the advisability of this alliance he laid His interests and those of Athens were really common special stress. Some men represented him to the demos as its

1. De Hal. 68.

2 History of Greece, iii p. 265. (Holm.)

3. 4. 3, 31. Ἐγὼ γὰρ * * καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστερᾷ πρεσ-
βείᾳ, ἃ μὲν εἶδον, ὡς εἶδον, ὑμῖν ἀπήγγελλον, ἃ δ' ἤ-
κουον, ὡς ἤκουσα.

enemy. Let him have peace and he would soon stop their mouths. Yes, he would have written the Athenians definitely what he would do for them, if he had felt sure that he could persuade them to conclude alliance also with him. No doubt he further expressed his intention of sending the plenipotentiaries—preceded by a herald—immediately to Athens.

We have here a fair specimen of Philip's diplomatic lying. He knew well how to create a false impression without making any definite statement which could afterward be produced as an impeachment of his veracity. Here though by the whole tenor of his words he implies his intention of doing something wonderful for Athens, he yet does not commit himself. Three years later¹ he could confidently affirm that he had never promised anything to the demos. Thus he contrived to justify himself in the eyes of the Hellenic world, for whose opinion he entertained a high regard. It surprises us, however, when a 19th century critic can so far confuse the letter and the spirit of truthfulness as to pronounce Philip "a man of his word!"²

It is pointed out by all historians that these hints of Philip were taken up and interpreted to the demos by Aeschines and his friends. What Philip said indirectly and obscurely, they said directly and openly. What he merely implied, they expressed. His supporters were the authors of all the promises by which the people were cajoled. These promises, however, they did not make upon their own authority: they professed only to announce what they

/ A. S. 45-46.

2 PL 854.

had heard from others. This was of course true, for whether corrupted or no, they surely did not originate the ideas which they circulated. Yet they apparently did not claim to have got them immediately from Philip: though certainly it was he who first set the ball rolling. Thus we see a curious and most effective shifting of the responsibility. Philip promised nothing: his friends at Athens only announced what they heard. Somebody lied--but who? ~~/~~ Aeschines next proceeds to tell us that while this report was being made, "Demosthenes"--who seems to have been the spokesman of the 10--complimented us (his colleagues) to the senators, and swore by the Hearth of the Boulé that he congratulated the city for sending such men upon the embassy--men worthy of the city by reason of both their eloquence and their fidelity. And in praise of me he said something to the effect that I had not deceived the hopes of those who chose me for the embassy. Finally he moved that each of us be crowned with a crown of olive for his loyalty to the demos, and be invited on the morrow to dine in the Prytaneum." /

Everything seems to show that the attitude here attributed to Demosthenes is correct, though of course he may not have used the actual words reported by Aeschines. It is certain that he offered the commendatory motion, for it is produced by Aeschines and freely admitted by Demosthenes himself.² Indeed he never pretended that at this juncture the relations between him and his colleagues were otherwise than cordial.

What other business was transacted by the Boulé Aeschines does not inform us. It is natural however to suppose that some provision for the reception of the coming ambassadors would be made and for deliberations with them after their arrival. Since in the following meeting of the demos we find Demosthenes introducing motions to this end, I think it likely that he brought them up now for the consideration of the Boulé. If so they were doubtless passed.

The main interest of Aeschines's story attaches itself to the report made by the 10 in the demos not much later. Here he may speak for himself. "When then we were making our report " he says "Ctesiphon, being the oldest, came forward 1st and said—among other things—what he had agreed with Demosthenes to say; I mean concerning Philip's conversation and his beauty and his agreeableness over his cups. After him Philoc. said a few words and Dercylus and then I came forward. And when I had told about the rest of the embassy, I came to the statement which I had admitted in the presence of my colleagues--that Philip in his speech displayed a good memory and considerable power. Nor did I forget Demosthenes's request that if I omitted anything, he be detailed to speak about Amphipolis. After us all, finally Demosthenes rose and playing the marvellous, as usual, in his bearing and rubbing his head, seeing as he did the demos receiving my words with applause, he said he was surprised at both —at the audience and at the ambassadors, because letting go the time, the former, for de-

liberating, the latter for giving advice, they occupied themselves delightedly with impertinent nonsense about private matters.

For nothing was easier than to report the business of an embassy.

'And I want to show you' he said 'how the thing should be done.'

He then ordered the instructions given by the demus to be read.

This being done, he continued 'In accordance with this we were

dispatched and we performed what is therein written. 'Now take

the letter which we have brought from Philip.' That being read

'You have' said he 'the answer and it remains for you to deliberate.' And as there was a demonstration made, some thinking that

he was a clever and concise speaker, but more that he was a jealous knave,

'And now see' said he 'how concisely I shall finish

my report. Aeschines thought Philip had a good memory and was

an able speaker, but I didn't; but if one would strip him of his

good luck and invest another with it, the other wouldn't be greatly

his inferior. Ctesiphon thought he had a striking appearance.

I think Aristodemus the actor has no less. One says he has a good

memory. So have others. That he is a capital boon-companion —

our Philoc^{rates}, here is a better. One says he left me the chance of

saying something about Amphipolis; but neither to you nor to me

would this orator leave a chance of saying anything. This then

is all nonsense' — " Whereupon Demosthenes proceeds to introduce

some motions which we shall consider later.

In this description I think that Aeschines is strenuously endeavoring to pervert in his own favor a scene yet vividly present

to the minds of the jury—a scene in no way creditable either to himself or to his friends. In consequence of this vividness he can take but few liberties with the facts as they occurred. Rather he seeks by putting these facts in a distorting light, to cast reproach upon his rival and so turn away attention from himself. We ^{may} therefore draw our conclusions from the account with some confidence. It is plain from Demosthenes's words that the preceding speakers had been so occupied in praising Philip and relating matters of purely personal interest, that they had grossly neglected the business pressing to be done. Apparently, they had not even presented Philip's letter to the demos. Certainly they had made no recommendation for future action. This was perhaps excusable in the aged Ctesiphon, in Philoc. and Dercylus: from them little was expected and they doubtless said only a few words. Aeschines, however, was one of the two prominent orators and statesman on the embassy. To him and Demosthenes was entrusted the main burden of the report: and it was a breach of duty on his part to speak as he did. To be sure he gave what seemed to him an account of the whole embassy, including his full speech before Philip; and he must have emphasized the friendliness felt by the King for Athens. Yet we ourselves have seen how he can apparently tell a thing at length and still give us little but personal details. Such, I suppose, was the case here. Full of enthusiasm for Philip's newly discovered virtues and elated by the impression he fancied himself to have made upon that prince and his court, he

4. D.S words in FL 230 may have reference to this assembly.

doubtless could talk of little else; and true to his nature, he made his entire speech nothing but a means of parading these ideas before the demos.

While reporting his argument before Philip he must of course have touched upon the matter of Amphipolis. How far he pursued it is a question. He may have declared Philip's refusal to give it up. If so, the applause which his speech elicited can only be accounted for by the supposition that at the same time he satisfied the people with the promises with which the ambassadors themselves had been satisfied in Macedonia. It is possible that even now the people were told of Philip's alleged intention to give Athens Euboea in return for Amphipolis. Certainly the readiness with which we find them yielding to the status quo clause of the peace in the coming assemblies is remarkable. But however this may be, Aeschines seems to have become aware as he was closing his speech that he had not said enough upon this important subject; and so he bethought himself to inform the audience that he could have said more, but had generously by request, left the rest to Demosthenes. ~~That~~ That orator had meanwhile been listening to his colleagues with anything but approval. As I have said, he had at first probably shared somewhat of their surprised admiration of Philip. He had not, however, like them been carried utterly off his feet: nor could he, as time went on and their praises did not moderate, have failed to feel some impatience and disgust. But he must have realised now (if indeed not earlier) that he was face to

A. FL 254.

face no longer with mere idle talk but with a new tendency of thought full of menace to Athens. When the brilliance of Philip could so turn the heads of orators and people alike that the immediate needs of the state were lost sight of: when, worse still, the splendor of a foreign King threatened to eclipse in their eyes the nobler glory of Athens, the bright and fair—then it was time to administer a sharp and decisive rebuke. This thought must have been ripening speedily to a determination as Aeschines was spinning out his long story; and now the patronising self-conceit of his final words stirred Demosthenes's anger into flame. Rising he expressed his condemnation of the foolish way in which all were wasting time. He next brought before the assembly clearly and briefly the business to be done. Then, feeling it necessary to correct the extravagant ideas of Philip's power and attainments which had just been put into the people's heads by Aeschines and the others, he began to take up one by one the various Eulogia uttered and to administer to each, as it were, a cold bath. Philip, he said, was really not such a grand man, after all. There were plenty full as good as he, some better. Aeschines's words regarding himself he met with an indignant denial. That orator he declared would sooner part with his blood than what he had to say.⁺ Finally he proposed such motions as seemed to him expedient under the circumstances. On the whole a thoroughly Demosthenic bit of oratory--short, pithy--to the point.⁺

⁺Of course Demosthenes said nothing in praise of Philip, also Aeschines would have said something of himself.

1. FL 356, 13. καὶ μέχρι τοῦ δευρ' ἐπανελθεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης πρεσ-
βείας, ἐμὲ γοῦν διεφθαρμένον καὶ πεπρακῶς ἑαυτὸν ^{ἐλάνθανε} ~~καὶ~~ κ. τ. λ.
A. 3273 3, 33. καὶ κεῖθεν (ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας) ἐπανύκων ἐπανέ-
ης ἦν τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις πρέσβεσιν
ἀπήγγελε (Δεμοσθένης).

He himself, in this oration, declares that D. did not quarrel with his colleagues
till after the return of the third embassy! (3, 31ff.)

2. See pp. 19, 20.

3 A. 3, 66-67. He does not emphasize this fact in the earlier oration, but
his narrative shows that such was the case.

4 A. 3, 64. A. himself, in this very passage, alludes to the danger threatening
the Chersonesus. sec. 65 a. f.
Cersobleptes.

Now we should probably from first sight suppose from Demosthenes's retort and the evident ill-feeling toward Aeschines which it showed, that the deadly feud between these two men had already begun. This however cannot be the case. Demosthenes himself places its origin no earlier than the 19th of Elaph.; and it is possible that the break did not become final till after the 2nd embassy left Athens.¹ What we have here is only a temporary burst of temper. Yet Demosthenes must already have noticed Aeschines's new born self-importance with repugnance and his adoration of Philip with suspicion.

There is nothing, moreover, in the incident to shake us in the belief that Demosthenes still believed a favorable peace could be obtained. He does not deny Aeschines's statement that at this time he was urgent for peace; and indeed the decrees which we find him bringing forward show this to have been the case. Whatever he may have thought of Philip's promises, his visit to Macedonia certainly had only tended to confirm his desire to see matters settled between Athens and Philip.⁺

⁺ He was moreover, as Aeschines clearly proves,³ anxious that such a settlement should be arrived at with all possible speed. Nor can we be surprised to find this the case. Apart from the considerations already stated,² which would lead him to hasten the negotiations, there was also the knowledge of the expedition now being carried on by Philip in Thrace—*vs.* Cersobleptes⁴—the friend of Athens. This campaign though it did not ^{afflict} the Chersonesus directly, was yet every day gaining ground for Philip at Athens' expense in the surrounding regions. The sooner this could be stopped, the better. Natural and legitimate reasons for Demosthenes's haste are therefore easy to discover; and the sinister interpretation which we ~~shall~~ find Aeschines putting upon it, is, to say the least, altogether unnecessary.

1. We know that the third was in this form and therefore we may suppose the others to have been likewise.(PL 234.)

2 A. 2, 55.

3. A. 3, 67.

The decrees just mentioned which were probably presented in the form of $\pi\rho\omicron\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha'$, seem to have passed the *demus* without difficulty; an evidence that Demosthenes's spirited words had met with an adequate response. They were three in number:

1. To decree a truce for the herald who had already arrived from Philip and for the ambassadors who were on their way.

2. For the presidents to call an assembly on 8th Elaph⁺ in order that, if the ambassadors of Philip be already arrived, the *demus* may deliberate without delay concerning their relations toward Philip.

3. To commend the ambassadors, if they seem worthy, to crown them and invite them to dinner in the *prytaneum* for the morrow.

With the passage of these decrees ends for us, the meeting of the assembly.

Somewhat later, though still before the arrival of the ambassadors, Demosthenes proposed in the *Boulé* a decree which he had probably not thought to bring forward in the assembly. It was to furnish the ambassadors with seats for the Dionysic Festival¹

⁺ Aeschines tells us that this day was sacred, being reserved for the sacrifice ~~and~~ to Asclepius + the $\pi\rho\omicron\kappa\rho\acute{\omega}\nu$: and that, in consequence, an assembly had never been held upon it before. If this is a fact, it furnishes him with an additional proof of Demosthenes's desire to hasten the negotiations. The passage of the decree also shows that the Athenians shared his desire.

1. A. 3, 63 implies this. They were Antipater and Parmenio (PL 69) with possibly a third, Eurylocus. See Schaeffer's Dem., II p. 312, note 2., where the matter is discussed at length.

2 A. 2, 31; 3, 63.

3 A. 2, 65.

4 A. makes it an argument to prove D.'s opposition to the famous "Decree of the Allies", though, since that decree had not yet been presented to the demos and was probably not yet in existence, it is hard to see how D. could be supposed to know its contents. (A. 2, 61) Of similar weight is the charge that this motion, by appointing a fixed time for deliberating upon the peace, thrust aside the recommendation of the decree, that the deliberation be postponed until the arrival of the absent Hellenic embassies (A. 2, 62.)^{3.64/67 67} See the text of the decree p. 62. It is most unlikely, however, that D. would have consented to any such postponement, had he already known of the decree. See p. 63.

⁵ As Thirlwall points out.

now about to take place— a courteous bit of forethought which shows how pleasant were the relations now existing between him and the court of Philip. The decree was passed.

On the 8th of Elaph., in accordance with Demosthenes' motion, an assembly was held . Apparently the expected ambassadors had come,¹ but for some reason or other things were not ready for a final settlement. Little was done except to provide for another meeting after the Dionysia. To this end Demosthenes proposed and carried a new decree.² It was to hold 2 assemblies after the festival, on the 18th and 19th Elaph, for the purpose of deliberating on peace and alliance. On the former of the two days free discussion was to be allowed: on the latter the proedri were to put the motions offered to the vote.³ Whether the ambassadors were given an audience or no, is uncertain. The appearance of the word "alliance" in this second decree —if it signifies anything⁴—may indicate that they had been heard and had made a special request for alliance. Possibly they even announced here the conditions on which Philip would be willing to make peace. If so, the questions regarding the Phocian which those conditions involved would have been pretty well talked over and settled among the citizens before the debates began.

It does not seem to have been the function of any official at Athens to entertain visiting ambassadors:⁵ and so this duty rested upon those individual citizens who chose to assume it. In this instance we find Demosthenes throwing open his house to the

1. A. 3, 73.

2. A. 3, 111:3, 61. D. implies that A. was fond of bringing up this point in FL 235.

3. FL 235:30, 38.

Macedonians, and exerting himself to show them every courtesy. Not only did he feast them sumptuously at home, but in the words of Aeschines' "he conducted them" at the time of the festival "into the theatre, at break of day", ushered them to the front seats he had secured for them, "placed cushions for their heads and spread out for them purple robes * * * so that he was actually hissed for his indecent toadying." The people at large being in an amiable mood toward Philip, would view Demosthenes' action with approval: and the hissing is no doubt a fiction of Aeschines' imagination, created to suit the state of Athenian sentiment at a later date. This courtesy, which he himself probably admired at the time, served him afterward as a never-failing proof of Demosthenes's corrupt Macedonian leanings.² That orator himself freely acknowledged his action.³ "I saw" he said "that Philip's ambassadors in their own country had prided themselves upon their splendid hospitality and I immediately determined to out-do them and seem even more magnificent than they." And in another place: "What should I have done? Not bid the superintendent of the theatre to give them seats? Why, if I had not made the motion, they could have seen the play for two obols! Was I to stand watch over the tiny interests of the state, while I sold its vital interests, as these fellows (my colleagues) have?"

Of the further happenings of this festival we have no information. No doubt it passed off quietly and happily. What interests us is the course of events after its close.

/ A. 3, 32.

2. Schaeffer Dem., 11p. 224.

3.A. 2, 58.

IV.

At last, on the 18th of the month, the festival being finished and the time for business come again, the demos assembled at the call of the presidents to deliberate upon the much talked of peace with Philip.¹ The matter that had occupied their thoughts for several months was now about to be settled finally; and we may feel sure that in the minds of all there was an expectancy not unmingled with anxiety. If, as Schaeffer thinks,² some business not relating to the peace was first brought before the house, it was probably disposed of with impatient celerity, and the way cleared for the subject most deeply interesting to all. Just what was the order of events at this juncture it is impossible to say. It may be, as I have remarked, that the Macedonian ambassadors had already been given audience and had announced the terms of peace to which Philip was willing to accede: but I rather incline to the view that this announcement was made now for the first time. I shall therefore tentatively consider such to have been the case. Thus I do not risk anything since my remarks can apply just as well to the assembly on the 8th as that on the 18th.

Let us say then that the ambassadors of Philip were at the outset introduced, according to the ^{παραβούλευμα} necessarily passed beforehand,³ into the demos. They bade that body greeting in the name of their master, indulged in the customary compliments; and then proceeded to state their message. Philip, they said was most favorably disposed toward Athens. It was his fervent wish to conclude peace with her; and not only peace, but alliance also--

1. FL 62.

3

2De Gal. 33. ἐψηφίζεσθε ἔχειν αὐτὸν (Φίλιππον) ἃ εἶχεν.

3 FL 321, which I take to refer to this occasion. ἐντεῦθεν οἱ μὲν παρ' ἐκείνου πρέσβεις προὔλεγον ὑμῖν ὅτι Φωκέας οὐ προσδέχεται Φίλιππος συμμάχους

4 FL 145ff.

5 This provision was no doubt in the original, as it was in the final form of the 1889 text.

repeating, I suppose, the assurances Philip himself had given in his letter. Like him, too, they rigidly abstained from uttering any word of definite promise, though they probably succeeded in rousing grand hopes by vague *innuendos*. This done, they proceeded to declare the terms of peace. No doubt these were in great part the terms which we shall see embodied in the final compact, and most of them apparently were accepted without hesitation. *Τῶν*, however, seem to have roused opposition at once.

The first was that each party retain the possessions now in its hands. This is the famous status quo clause—or as the Greek has it, ἐκατέρους ἔχειν ἃ ἔχουσιν.² Its meaning was only too plain. If agreed to, it would confirm Philip in his occupation of Amphipolis. (~~N. several other places, but discuss mainly about Amphipolis.~~)

The second condition had to do with the Phocians. The peace as proposed was to be concluded between Philip and his allies on one side and Athens and her allies on the other. Among the allies of Athens were the Phocians and it was consequently expected that they would be included in the treaty as such. The Macedonian ambassadors, however, declared now at the start that Philip refused to admit the Phocians as Athenian allies.³

In accordance with the request of the ambassadors Philoc. brought forward a decree ordaining peace and alliance between Athens and Philip.⁴ The conditions they proclaimed he acceded to in every detail, providing for the maintenance of the status quo.⁵

¹FL 159 shows that this clause was in the original motion.

²FL 220. et passim.

and definitely excluding the Phocians and the Haleans¹ who seem to have been likewise debarred by Philip from the number of Athenian allies. The concurrence of this proposition with every detail of Philip's wishes, throws some suspicion upon its author's disinterestedness. If it proves nothing else, it certainly shows him to have taken at once a strong pro-Macedonian attitude for which no other Athenian was yet prepared⁺. In fact, there were three things in his motion that were distasteful to the palates of his countrymen: the status quo clause, the exclusion of the Phocians and Haleans, and the conclusion of allianceⁱⁿ addition[^] to peace.

How the idea of relinquishing their claims to Amphipolis would strike the demos, we know from what we have already seen. Confident as they had been of regaining that valued city, they would not yield it up now without a struggle. To this struggle we find allusions in the orations of Demosthenes—allusions only, because it was so well remembered that explicit statements were not needed. These casual expressions enable us to see also how it was quieted.² Aeschines and his friends stepped forward in the new role which now they had made their own and which Aeschines will henceforth continue to act until the end of his political life. They attempted to reconcile the people to Philip and to Philip's will. To be sure they said they were asked to relinquish Amphipolis. But that was nothing. Philip was obliged in his own

Ad. 19

/ FL 318ff. Philip was bound by oath to help the Thebans get back Boeotia, and to aid in restoring the Pylaea to the Thessalians. ~~B. is not fair here in saying that the Athenians were the only helpers the Phocians had, for certainly the~~ Sparta had embraced the cause of Phocis from the first and only recently had offered Phalaecus armed assistance. A. 2, 133.

² FL 319 et passim. per Demosthenis orationes.

interest, to make this demand; and really, it was absurd for them in the present condition of Athens, to persist in claiming the city. Let him have it. They would not be sorry if they did. Philip was the friend of the state. He would give them more than any Amphipolis, if he obtained peace. What would they say to getting back Euboea and Oropus? Such words had the desired effect. The opposition soon subsided, and the status quo clause was adopted. This marks the termination, for the time, of all interest in Amphipolis. Other matters were now becoming far more prominent in the eyes of the people.

As regards the exclusion of the Phocians and the Haleans, however, the friends of Philip did not find matters so easy. Therewith was involved a question which as peace drew near was becoming daily more interesting at Athens—the question as to what part Philip was going to take in the impending settlement of the Sacred War. Hitherto as we know, he had been arrayed with Thessaly and Thebes against Phocis, Athens, and Sparta. Any interference on his part therefore, would naturally have been hostile to the interests of Athens: and so she had from the first been anxious to keep him outside Thermopylae. In 352², when he had defeated the Phocians in the South of Thessaly and was pressing onward to the pass with apparently no obstacle in his path, the citizens, in one of those bursts of generosity and energy of which they were still capable in times of great danger, had fitted out a fleet at great expense and hurried to the scene in time to block

1. See p. 10.

²FL 327 shows plainly that the Athenians desired to see τὰ πατρί' ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ κατασταθῆναι καὶ τὰ χρήματ' εἰσπραχθῆναι τῷ θεῷ.

dC 18 A's disparagement of the Phocians throughout his second oration is striking. Perhaps he is expressing merely his own personal sentiment in the matter, but it seems far more likely that he is addressing a party that shared his views, and did not sympathise with D. in his lamentations over the fate of these former allies.

³D. 3, 27. *Θηβαίωι ἀσχόλῳ ὄντι*

⁴See also dC 18 *Θηβαίοις δ' ὅπου ἂν ἐφροσθῆναι παθούσιν.*

For a sample of the ~~stories~~ talk indulged in at Athens concerning Thebes, see the story related in A. 2, 277.

⁵D. 1, 26; 3, 8; A. 2, 131.

his way into Central Greece. And not long before the present peace negotiations had begun, alarmed by the prospect of another Macedonian invasion, they had eagerly accepted the offer of the Phocians to cede the forts commanding the pass and had voted the 50 ships to support Proxenus after he should occupy them.¹ These exertions had been due far more to Athens' apprehension for her own welfare than to any love for Phocis. Indeed, though there still existed among the citizens a friendliness for the Phocian people, yet the wretched conditions prevailing in that country, the scandalous robbery of the Delphic temple, and the tyranny of Phalaecus and his associates, had roused a strong feeling of disgust.² Such a combination of military despotism, misrule and impiety was tolerated only because it kept Thebes in check.³ The hatred toward Thebes made everything subservient to itself. It was, in truth, just now, "the prevailing political sentiment at Athens."⁴ That city had encouraged Phocis in its struggle because it was humbling Thebes. This sovereign virtue, to the Athenian mind covered the multitude of sins. But matters could not go on as they had much longer.⁵ A crisis was approaching. Phocis was at the end of its resources. Thebes, exhausted, was appealing to Philip, and he was making ready to intervene. The business must soon be settled by some one. Athens felt herself unequal to the task. She lacked the necessary power and energy. Philip alone seemed able to force an adjustment. All the rest of Greece was turning to Philip as the natural arbiter: and this feeling had begun to grow in Athens.

¹ This was of course ardently desired, as may be seen from the promises made by A. after the return of the second embassy.

² Cf. A. 2. 114. . . μὴ μεθ' ὅπλων, ἀλλὰ μετὰ φήφου καὶ κρίσεως
τὰ κεῖ καθιστάναι.

³ Phillips motives in making this declaration are graphically stated by D. FL 318.

⁴ FL 321, That there was opposition is manifest from D.'s words.

During the last six months Athenian sentiment toward Philip had altered much. Though many still distrusted him, yet the people at large had come to look upon him with favor and confidence. The desire to keep him out of Pylae at all costs, had given place to the conviction that if only he would take the right side, his interference would not be a bad thing. If he would in making the necessary settlement humble Thebes once for all, reconstitute the Boeotian cities, straighten out the Phocian business and see that the embezzled money was paid back to the god by the guilty parties—then the matter might well be entrusted to him. He might perhaps arrange affairs without the use of force.² But if an expedition should prove necessary why try to prevent it? This had been one of the considerations impelling Athens to make peace. It was, accordingly, a lively question in the public mind as to what attitude Philip would take regarding the Sacred War. And now, contrary to hopes and expectations, his ambassadors stated at the outset that he did not recognise the Phocians and Athenians allies.³ Naturally such a declaration seemed to the demos tantamount to a declaration in favor of Thessaly and Thebes.

Immediately there seems to have arisen a storm of indignant protest.⁴ As in the case of relinquishing Amphipolis just narrated, the same men came forward to plead Philip's cause. Philip, they said, was now in alliance with Thessaly and Thebes and bound by oath to serve their interest in this matter. It would not therefore be seemly for him openly to accept the Phocians as

²
A. 3, 81 alone would show this. Here A., after vindicating his advice as to aiding the Grecian states—a matter directly connected with the question of alliance with Philip—goes on to speak of the Phocians as an entirely different subject

If he did so, he would get into trouble at once. If, however, he became master of affairs and obtained peace from Athens, then he would carry out whatever the demos might now expect him to agree to. He intended really to put a stop to Theban insolence and to establish the Phocians in security. Their exclusion was merely a measure of temporary expediency. It meant nothing. Let it pass. The opposition however was with difficulty overcome. At last it was agreed not to allow Philip's refusal to break off negotiations. Peace should be concluded in spite of it. But as to the clause in Philoc.'s decree whereby the Phocians and Haleans were expressly excluded, that was not to be thought of. If exclusion there was to be, it must be tacit. The words "except the Phocians and Haleans" were therefore deleted and the text made to run simply "the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians" conclude peace etc. What part was taken in this debate by Aeschines and Demosthenes it is difficult to determine: but it seems that both occupied the middle ground, urging peace but combating the "except" clause in the motion of Philoc.. (Thirlwall)

The question, however, that gave most trouble was that concerning the expediency of forming an alliance with Philip. This and the matters connected with it historians have usually confounded with the entirely separate question of the status of the Phocians. Between the two a sharp distinction should be drawn, for, as we shall see, they had nothing to do with each other; and indeed it was apparently not till the latter had been settled, that

'A., 3, 68.

the former came under consideration. Before we can ^{per}probably understand the debates on alliance as related by the 2 orators, we must turn for a moment to the famous "Decree of the Allies" to which both attribute such importance in this connection.

Aglaocreon of Tenedos, who had been chosen by the demus to represent the Allies upon the embassy, would naturally upon his return make his report to their synod then sitting at Athens. The fact of his being sent with the 10 shows that this body was expected to share not only in the peace, but to some extent also in the negotiations. Now since it had no power of decision, it could do nothing more than to recommend what measures it deemed advisable. This, then, was its share. It was, accordingly, nothing extraordinary but really quite a normal proceeding, when, on the 18th of Elaph., in the first of the 2 assemblies, a "decree of the Allies" couched in the form of a recommendation was delivered to be read before the demus. It ran as follows:

"Since the Athenian demus is deliberating on peace with Philip, while the ambassadors whom it sent out into Hellas to urge on the states in behalf of Hellenic liberty, have not yet returned, the allies think it best, after the ambassadors come back and make their reports to the Athenians and to the allies, for the presidents to appoint 2 assemblies according to the law, and for the Athenians then to deliberate on the peace, the allies accepting beforehand their decision, whatever it may be.

"And let it be allowable for any of the Greeks that wish

¹ Hist. of Greece, xi p. 390.

² FL 307. * * τῶν τε κελευόντων "μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων περὶ
τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνης βουλευέσθαι" θαυμάζειν
(ἔφη Αἰσχίνης).

it, during the space of 3 months (after the conclusion of peace) to be inscribed on the same pillar as the Athenians and to share with them the oaths and the treaty."

This decree was apparently taken up at once as the battle-cry of a large party in the assembly: and the role it played as such in the debates on both days was undoubtedly important. Grote¹ may possibly be right in thinking that this importance was afterward magnified by Demosthenes and Aeschines: but no one who reads their orations can fail to see that even three years later the memory of it was still lively at Athens. This prominence was probably not due to any influence exerted by the ^{of the allies} ~~allies~~-synod, but to the fact that it fell in with the wishes of the majority of the demus and furnished them with a convenient rallying point. It did so, however, only in part. A strict following out of its recommendations would have delayed the conclusion of peace until the absent ambassadors should return; and this the majority did not want. Demosthenes, indeed, seems to indicate that there were some who wished to adhere literally to the decree: but I think this is² only a slight inaccuracy of statement. If such advice was given by any at 1st, I have no doubt that they were soon silenced: and that Aeschines is correct in saying that at the end of the 1st assembly the general opinion was that peace should be immediately concluded. Certainly, as we know, there was every reason to hasten the peace and to disarm the still aggressive Philip. This, however, could be done without forming an alliance: and it was to

¹
A. 3, 58.

²
A. 2, 59.

³
A. 5, 65.

the question of alliance that the decree was applied by its supporters. Let us, they said, do as the allies bid us and not consider alliance until we can do so in concert with the rest of the Greeks.

It will be remembered that after the failure of the 1st series of Hellenic embassies to rouse the Greeks in aid of Athens against Philip, a second series had been dispatched bearing a somewhat different message. Having the accomplishment of peace with Philip now definitely in view, the Athenians invited the states of Greece to send delegates to a general Hellenic convention at Athens, in order that all might deliberate together upon the proposed peace. Could such a convention be brought about, it would present the spectacle of Athens, as the head of Hellas, making treaty with a foreign king.¹ But unfortunately the time for deliberation had come and not one of the absent Athenian ambassadors had returned to tell how the proposal had been met.² What was to be done? Peace Athens might make with perfect consistency. That would affect her pretensions to Hellenic hegemony little: especially if she provided, by adopting the 3 months' clause of the decree, that the peace should for a sufficient time be open to all who wished to be enrolled as her allies. Far different, however, was the case regarding alliance. Did she contract alliance with Philip without waiting for the other Greeks, they would consider her attitude toward themselves as changed.³ Instead of identifying herself with

¹A. 5, 71. D. merely implies that the discussion, of which he represents himself to have been the leader, was favorable to the decree. FL 144.

²FL 144.

³A. 5, 71.

them, she would identify herself with Philip. Instead of pledging herself to stand by them in peace or war and present with them a solid front toward Philip, she would go over to the enemy and turn her back upon them, saying, "Look to yourselves." Her claims to Hellenic hegemony would be definitely given up. She would declare herself no better than any other Grecian State.

We cannot wonder accordingly that the proposition of Philoc found little favor and that "all the 1st day speakers" as Aeschines tells us (and Demosthenes confirms him) advocated the decree of the Allies. Both of these orators seem to have employed their eloquence on its behalf. Finally, when the demus having evidently arrived at a tentative decision on this the last subject of discussion, were about to summon the Macedonian ambassadors and announce the result of their deliberations,² the meeting was for some reason³ adjourned. As they poured out of the pnyx and dispersed, the people carried with them this general opinion: "that peace would be concluded, but that regarding alliance it was better not to deliberate on account of the invitation extended to the Greeks. When however it should be formed, it would be in common with all the Greeks." To the peace itself the 3 months clause would probably be added.

All this was precisely what Philip did not want. His wishes and those of Athens were here diametrically opposed. Any such position in Hellas as she was planning to occupy, he would not for a moment allow her to obtain. His desire was to isolate

¹A. 5, 71.

²A. 5, 71ff.

her and to discredit her in the eyes of her sister states. This was, I think, undoubtedly one of his motives in urging his alliance upon her. Hitherto this alliance had only been requested. Philip and his ambassadors had tried to lead the Athenians into it rather than to drive. Yet now Antipater and Parmenis, as they learned how things had gone in the demus, saw that other tactics must be employed. The present course of that body must be peremptorily checked. During the night, as Aeschines intimates, they approached the influential Athenian politicians, asserting emphatically that Philip would recognise no peace unaccompanied by alliance. It is not improbable that Aeschines was one of those thus addressed. If so, the powerful arguments of Philip's two friends are doubtless in great part responsible for the complete change of attitude manifested by him on the following day. To them may be likewise due in some degree, the sudden intimacy between him and Philoc, which seems to take its beginning at this point and continues uninterrupted till the end of our story. Aeschines on his part would have us believe that it was Demosthenes who was approached and converted. I give the rest of the narrative as it is contained in the oration contra Ctesiphonta delivered 16 years after the events transpired.

² "On the morrow we came into the assembly. Forthwith Demosthenes, occupying the bema before anyone else could utter a word, declared that there was no good in what had been said the day before, if it did not meet the approval of Philip's ambassadors;

¹FL 15.

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²FL 16, 507 311.

³FL 145 ff.

⁴FL 15, 144, ⁵178.

and Philip, he said, wouldn't recognise the peace without alliance. 'For we must not' he said—and I remember the very word used, it was so disagreeable—like himself—'we must not "break off" the alliance from the peace, or wait for the delays of the Greeks, but either fight by ourselves or make peace by ourselves.' And finally he called Antipater upon the bema and asked him some question having told him beforehand what his question would be and dictated what he should answer. So the end of it was that these words of his prevailed."

Leaving aside ^{for} the ~~notice~~ the question as ^{to} the Demosthenes' participation in this debate, let us endeavor to learn the actual matter discussed on the 2nd day. Demosthenes in the de Falsa Legatione relates how Philoc. tried to speak, presumably at the beginning of the assembly, and was hissed down; whereupon Aeschines came to his rescue. The tenor of Aeschines' speech as he gives it in various parts of the same oration is this:² "Do not aid any (of the Greeks) who have not first aided you." "I am surprised at those who bid us deliberate on the peace in concert with the Greeks, as if it were necessary to persuade any one concerning our own business." Elsewhere he seems to say that Aeschines recommended alliance with Philip and the throwing away of all possessions and allies.³ In each case Demosthenes represents himself as opposing Aeschines and upholding the decree of the allies.⁴ In yet another passage he declares that Aeschines opposed the peace of the allies and supported that of Philoc..⁵ In Aeschines' account

¹B.'s accusation of A. begins at this point FL 93 533. See also FL 15 144.

²A. 2, 79.

³A. 2, 69.

just given, it is the decree that Demosthenes attacks. It is therefore evident that the fight was about this decree and the question of Athens' position which it involved. That all this had, as I said before, nothing to do with the safety of the Phocians, is evident from the reply that Aeschines makes in his 2nd oration to the charges of Demosthenes above enumerated. The "aid" spoken of had reference to the Arcadians and "the rest of the Greeks", not to the Phocians; for he goes on to speak of the Phocians as another topic altogether. They were already allies of Athens and really if the promises were to be believed, not excluded from the treaty. She was not therefore abandoning them. But the case was different with the states that had no claim to her alliance. We see, then, the situation facing the Athenians. Philip demands both peace and alliance, or else war. If Athens concludes alliance with him, she leaves "the rest of the Greeks" in the lurch and gives up the hegemony. If she stands by them, "aids" them, then war with Philip must come. What will she choose? "The peace of Philocrates" or "the decree of the allies"?

The question under discussion being thus determined, we may now inquire which side was taken up by Demosthenes and by Aeschines. As regards the latter there can be no doubt that he supported Philocrates and spoke as Demosthenes declares him to have done.¹ He himself in his reply frankly acknowledges much.² Demosthenes, he admits,³ has reported his words correctly, but has put upon them a sinister interpretation. From his own account

¹see p. 73 ff.

²A., however, denies that he changed his views over night. D.'s charge in this respect is, he declares, neither true nor possible: a statement which he attempts to prove as follows. 1. D.'s own decree forbade discussion on the second day. 2. D. himself on the second day was thinking of proposing a decree which provided for peace and alliance on the same conditions as that of Philocrates. Witness, Amyntor of Eretria, whose advice D. sought in the matter. 3. The Athenians themselves would remember that A. had done nothing of the sort. 4. The charge is innately improbable. What had A. to gain by such a change? But this characteristic bit of argument is not so convincing to us as it was to A.'s personal friends. 1. He states the provision of the decree correctly, no doubt, since he has it read in court; and D. confirms him as to the fact that the business before the second assembly was the ratification of the peace which had virtually been decided upon the previous day (L 15, 144); and he implies that the discussion was unexpected (ἐκκρούσας οὗτος εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν). A., however, shows in his third oration that there was a debate on the second day, occasioned by the unforeseen refusal of the Macedonian ambassadors to accept peace without alliance. The provision, forbidding debate was no doubt, as Böhnecke thinks, set aside by force of circumstances.. 2. It is hard to see how D.'s alleged intention has anything to do with the matter. 3. In appeals to the memory of the Athenians on this point, D. to my mind has the better of A.; though it is plain from both orations on the embassy that the recollection of what happened in the second assembly is confused in the minds of the jurors. 4. I have endeavoured to show in the text that A.'s change was quite natural.

³A. 2, 71 ff. This accusation of the generals was common at Athens D. 2, 28; 4, 47.

A. 2, 71. καὶ ταῦτα ὑμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς χάριτος οἱ κατήγοροι δεικνύουσι. The loss of the allies and the squandering of 15,00 talents

here¹given, we can glean that his advice was: "Do not attempt to give aid when the state is 'in such a dangerous position. No other Grecian city had aided us. Let us be reconciled to Philip and agree to this peace." Nor, he asserts, would he now run away from these words or deny them. He is not ashamed of them. Nay, he is proud of them. One must call to mind the circumstances under which they were spoken. He then proceeds to summarize in a manner undeniably powerful his reasons for taking the stand he did. It is not unlikely that we have in them much of the argument employed by Philocrates, or whoever it was that had won him over the night before. At any rate they enable us to appreciate the sudden disgust with which he, and many another like him, now gave up, as it were at the point of Philip's sword, his aspirations after Hellenic hegemony with this burden of protecting ungrateful fellow-countrymen, and turned to the comfortable prospect of alliance with a king whose friendship and cordial help were being freely extended to Athens.²

The war, he says,¹ had been going from bad to worse. Chares, the general, had thrown away 75 allied cities; he had taken 150 triremes from the yards and never brought them back; he had squandered 1500 talents, which should have gone to his soldiers, on his favorites and supporters. These latter had laid iniquitious exactions upon the wretched subject islanders. They had plundered ships and Greek citizens on the high seas. Instead of gaining respect and being looked up to as the leader of Greece,

here was of the stock charges D. S. 37 11.

Athens was getting the reputation of a pirate. While Philip who had started out in the beginning from Macedonia was now striving no longer for Amphipolis, but for Athens' own possessions Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros. Even the Chersonesus had been so threatened that the Athenian colonists had left it. This is the state of affairs which Aeschines had before his mind when he made his speech in the assembly; a fact which we must remember when we come to that point in our story.

The part that Demosthenes took in the proceedings on this the second day is not so easy to discover. Aeschines, as we know, assigns to him, in the speech contra Ctesiphonta, a very definite role: but does he tell the same story in his earlier oration? Quite the reverse. There he says nothing whatever of Demosthenes' activity in the debates. Had Demosthenes really done what Aeschines 16 years after made bold to say he did, we may be sure that in his 2nd oration the fact would not be omitted, but would, on the contrary, be joyfully paraded before the jury. We cannot in consequence place any dependence on the later account in this particular. Aeschines' silence on the first occasion certainly acquits Demosthenes of supporting the motion of Philocrates. Was he then arrayed upon the opposite side? He himself says that he advocated the allies' decree, but was overridden by Aeschines. His statement however is vague—far different from his account of the transactions in the assembly on the return of the 2nd embassy. He does not speak out clearly and point a sharp contrast between himself



and Aeschines as he is always doing in the later accusations. His tone is wavering and uncertain and he seems to be hurrying as it were to pass something which he does not wish to stop and examine. One cannot help feeling that if he had really made a fight for the decree he would speak otherwise. To my mind the appearances all indicate that he remained quiet or at best offered Aeschines only a feeble resistance.

And this is just what we should expect him to do under the circumstances. Whatever he had thought of the 1st series of Hellenic embassies, the project of sending out the second series had never appealed to him. Apparently he despaired of obtaining concerted Hellenic action just then. The time was not ripe. Athens was busying herself with a fool's errand. Her true policy was to conclude peace with Philip and to stop his aggressions. To this end he had been directing his energies for some time past. Yet he was opposed to alliance with Philip, not, I think because he expected anything of the coming Hellenic convention, but because such alliance was unnecessary and would put Athens in a false position. When however it came to a question of peace coupled with alliance or no peace at all, he would from motives of expediency choose the former alternative. Now, being a wary politician he would hesitate to take this stand openly, since it might be remembered against him afterward; and he would therefore be glad enough to let Aeschines come to the front in his stead. He might even venture a little opposition for appearance's sake if he

¹FL 15. τὴν ὑστεραίαν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει τὴν εἰρήνην κυροῦσθαι

²A. 2, 74. ff. οἱ συντεταγμένοι ῥήτορες.

thought it would do no harm. Yet I believe that could we know what was in his heart of hearts at this juncture, we should find him taking much the same view as Aeschines of the necessities of the case. I cannot think that had Demosthenes had his way, the peace of Philoc. would have been rejected and the war with Philip renewed.

Let us now go back to our narrative. When the assembly convened upon the 19th Elaph., it was with the idea that its sole remaining task would be to pass a final resolution upon the subjects discussed the day before. This as we have seen was not to be the case. No sooner had the meeting begun than one of the leading politicians, probably Philocrates, mounted the bema and made the declaration which Aeschines¹ puts into the mouth of Demosthenes: That done, he summoned Antipater² upon the bema to support him. A few questions and answers and the whole matter was laid before the demos. Immediately all was uproar. The men whom Aeschines designates as "the orators of the ring"² rose up in indignation. The course demanded of Athens, they said, was unworthy of her glorious past. Let the citizens look at the propylaea of the Acropolis, let them remember the sea-fight at Salamis against the Persian and the tombs of their ancestors and the trophies that they won. Let them not tarnish the fair fame of their city by yielding to the demands of Philip and abandoning the Greeks. Let them assert her honor, come what might. Better suffering and ruin than cowardly submission. And so for the moment thought the

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' A. 2, 75 ff. For more of A's philosophy of history see A. 2, 171 ff.

wild enthusiasm. Philoc, who tried to stem the current of hostility which threatened to overwhelm the peace, was shouted down before he could utter a word. The war party was in complete control of the assembly. It seemed as if nothing could prevent the sudden and final breaking off all negotiations. But an unexpected occurrence was destined to turn the tide of affairs.

Aeschines, who the day before had been prominent in opposing alliance, obtained the floor. Forthwith the disturbance ceased and all gave ear as to one who would effectually voice their convictions. His speech, as given by himself, I have thought best to introduce in full because of the insight it affords us into Aeschines' views of statesmanship and his interpretation of history.

It was necessary he declared to remember everything that the orator of the ring had spoken of—the propylaea-- the Athenians of old time, their victories and trophies. That he did not deny for an instant. At the same time the demos ought to imitate only the good counsels of their ancestors and beware of their faults and their desire for fighting at unseasonable times. "I bade you" he says to his fellow citizens "copy with zeal the battle against the Persian at Plataea, the struggle at Salamis and at Marathon, the sea-fight at Artemisium and the generalship of Tolmides who, with 1000 picked Athenian hoplites, passed safely through the midst of the Peloponnesus in time of war; but to beware of things akin to the Sicilian expedition, which they sent out to aid the Leontines

A. 2, 79. ff.

31. 12. 30.

at a moment when the enemy had made an entrance into our own country and had fortified Decelea against us; and especially to guard against that last piece of folly, when, being worsted in the war, we were invited by the Lacedaemonians to make peace, while still holding besides Attica itself, Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros and enjoying a democratic constitution exercised according to the laws,—and those in power refused, choosing rather to keep on with the war; and Cleophon the lyre-maker * * * threatened to cut off the head of any man who so much as mentioned peace. So finally they brought the state to such a pass that they were glad to make peace at the cost of everything they had—even having their walls torn down and being obliged to quarter a Lacedaemonian harmost and garrison and exchanging the democracy for the 30, who put to death [without a trial] 1500 citizens. Such folly as this, I confess, I advise you to beware^u, but to imitate that I mentioned first * * * ". As to the Greeks, he said he had done his best during the war to get their help against Philip. But not a single man had given Athens any aid. Some were looking on to see what was going to happen. Some had even taken up arms against her. They did not deserve any sympathy. They had refused to help Athens and she was not bound now to help them. She had done all she could and now it was time for her to look out for herself. It was nobody's affair but her own whether she concluded alliance with Philip or no. Things were going to the dogs. Chares had brought upon her shame, defeat and actual danger abroad. The orators at home

¹ That Eubulus advocated Philocrates' motion, D. tells us also in dC 21 a.f., where Cephalon is likewise mentioned

² FL 391. What was the occasion of his other declaration, found in this passage, is not clear.

³ A. 5, 72.

were using the war to fill their pockets. Let her stop before she was altogether ruined! The peace of Philocrates might be objectionable but it was much better than war. Let her be thankful for obtaining thus much, and not, by refusing it, wait until she could get no terms short of the cession of all her possessions.

The effect of this advice —so unlooked for by all— could not have been other than great. The complete change in the attitude of one known for his sturdy patriotism must have produced a profound impression. Doubtless to many whose confidence in Aeschines' honesty was strong, his speech at once carried conviction. Others regarded it as a plain sign that corrupting influences had been at work upon him. The majority however seem to have been thrown into a confusion of conflicting emotions. Not willing to put aside their warlike sentiments, they yet weakened under Aeschines' powerful presentation of the case. While they were thus swaying to and fro, Eubulus rose and addressed them. His words were all in strong confirmation of Aeschines. The gloomy picture of Athens' condition he drew still darker. At last his tone became actually threatening. "Either," he told the Athenians,² "you must march down to the Piraeus at once and turn your money into the treasury and turn the Theoric fund to purposes of war, or you must pass this motion of Philocrates." Such a speech coming from the most influential man in Athens, seems to have brought the people round. At any rate, "the end of it was that this prevailed:"³ "and the peace of Philocrates" came through victo-

¹ Schaeffer Dem. ii p. 225 ff. He gives in full the passages from which our knowledge of the terms of the treaty is derived.

² This left in the hands of Athens the Chersonesus (D. 9, 16 FL 73 et passim per D. orationes) and the islands Lemnos, Imbrus and Scyros (De Hal. 4). In the Chersonesus, however, Cardia was not included, as will be seen.

³ D. 5, 25, which I think can refer only to the provisions of this peace, informs us that the King of Caria ^{was} to hold Chios, Cos and Rhodes, and the Byzantines, who were at this time allies of Philip, were allowed to take toll of vessels passing their city.

rious. Thus ended the famous assembly of the 19th Elaph. Soon after this Philip's ambassadors administered to Athenian representatives the oaths by which Athens consummated her part of the transaction.

The following are the terms of the treaty so far as we know them. ¹"Peace and alliance should exist between the Athenians and their allies, on the one side, and Philip and his allies on the other. Both parties guaranteed each other their possessions on the basis of the status quo,² agreed upon mutual alliance and friendship, and pledged mutual aid against any attack upon the dominions of themselves and of their allies. On sea and land, trade and commerce were to be free and undisturbed. The Athenians were to stand guard over the high seas, to suppress all piracy, and for this purpose to maintain a sufficiently powerful patrol fleet. Cities that admitted pirates to their harbors were to be considered as hostile."³

¹ A. 2, 98 shows this.

² Libanius' Introd. to FL. 2 a. 1. Schaeffer points out that FL 163-165 shows that the same men served on both embassies. (ii p. 240, n. 1.)

³ D. 3 charge that A. and his colleagues declared the Phocians, the Haleans and Gersobleptes ἔκσπονδοι, and included the Cardians as allies of Philip, would, I think, be meaningless, unless the ambassadors had been entrusted with some discretionary power in these matters. Cf. A. 2, 105

⁴ A. 2, 103. περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαλεχθῆναι. καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰχμαλ-
ώτων εἰπεῖν.

V.

Athens having now ratified a compact of peace which was agreeable to Philip, it was her right to ask as much of him. For this purpose she must choose ambassadors to visit him, settle matters finally and receive from him and his allies their oaths to observe the peace. Sometime, therefore, before the 23rd of Elaph.,¹ an assembly was held in which these ambassadors were elected. They were 10 in number, and, as was not unnatural, the same men that had served upon the preceding embassy were chosen again.² The decree containing their instructions we do not possess in full—an unfortunate thing since it is these very instructions that Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of violating. We can, however, ascertain something of its contents. As I have indicated, there were matters not yet settled, which the ambassadors were to talk over⁴ with Philip when they saw him. Foremost among these was the status of the Phocians and Haleans.³ It had been promised that should he get the peace, Philip would satisfy Athens entirely upon that point: and now that he had obtained it, the people expected him to fulfill the promise made in his name. Awaiting adjustment also was the question as to affairs in Thrace, which we shall speak of later.⁴ Cardia's independence of the rest of the Chersonesus had likewise to be discussed—perhaps other things as well. Power of decision on these matters seems to have been left to the ambassadors, in the feeling doubtless that they would be able to make suitable arrangements with Philip.³ They were further instructed to speak to Philip regarding the captives.⁴ Probably

¹ FL 378

² A. 3, 104.

³ FL 272.

⁴ FL 158. *Χιλίας λαβόντες δραχμὰς ἐφοδίων πρὸς ὑμῶν*

⁵ I am fully convinced that A. is speaking both in his second and third orations of one and the same assembly, though though the date he gives in the latter case is the 24th. In both orations D. is proedros: and the earlier account presupposes just such a decree as is read in the later. The first date—the 26d—is more probable. As has been remarked, A. would have liked nothing better than to put the ^{taking of the throne by Dros} ~~reading of the decree~~ (A. 2, 90) and the assembly on the same day. It was easy for him to make a mistake of a day in his third oration as the matter is not important for the argument there. Schaeffer ^(C) p. 243 n. 1) says such a mistake would have been impossible, since the decree and proedros are read: but the reading of a decree did not necessarily involve giving the date at which it was passed.

⁶ A 2, 82 a. f. 3, 75

⁷ A. 3, 74.

the saying of his courtiers that he would release them on conclusion of peace, had been circulated about Athens and expectations based upon it. The oaths were to be administered to Philip and to his allies individually, each allied city being visited and its magistrate sworn.¹ Finally the ambassadors were enjoined to do anything else for Athens they could.² This last clause upon which we shall find Aeschines commenting so strictly hereafter, was, I think, nothing but the formula usually attached to similar instructions of the demos. The decree further contained the injunction that no one of the 10 should have private conversation with Philip³—a fact which leads Schaeffer to believe that suspicion concerning their honesty had already begun to arise. It seems to me rather that the precaution would be quite natural in the case of any foreign embassy and therefore signifies little. The necessary expenses of the ambassadors were provided for by the appropriation of 1000 drachmae ἐφ' ὅσον.⁴ Who the author of the decree was we are not told.

It now remained for the Athenian allies to ~~swear~~^{swear} the oaths before Philip's ambassadors. To attend to this and other matters yet waiting to be done, a final assembly was held upon the 23rd.⁵ As it happened when the proedros for the day was chosen, the lot fell upon Demosthenes.⁶ The bulk of the business transacted is unknown to us. We learn only that Philocrates⁷ who seems to have taken the lead in directing affairs, offered and carried a comprehensive motion, presumably disposing of matters pertaining

See D's creation against ^sarjocrates.

to the accomplishment of the peace, one of the clauses of which provided that the oaths be administered to the allies upon that very day. It was after the passage of this motion that an event occurred which opened in an unexpected manner the question as to the status of Cersobleptes.

In order to treat this subject intelligently we must summarize briefly the history of Cersobleptes' dealings with Athens. About the year 352 that prince was looked upon by a party in Athens as a real, though not at present as avowed enemy, threatening the Chersonesus.¹ There certainly existed no *φιλία πατρική* between his family and Athens; and he himself had acted in a hostile manner toward the city in several instances. He had, for instance, tried to form a combination with Philip and Pammanes the Theban, to be rid of his rivals at a time when Philip was at war with Athens. At the time when Demosthenes' oration against Aristocrates was delivered, he was turning toward Athens for help. But Philip later seems to have settled the Thracian disturbances and arranged matters there to suit himself. Possibly he established Cersobleptes' supremacy and put down his rivals. Certainly he left that prince in power. After the fall of Olynthus Philip again attacked Thrace and threatened the Chersonesus ^{A.} (2,92). It was at this time, probably, that he exacted as hostage the son of Cersobleptes, whom Aeschines found still at Pella in February 346.² Left to himself once more, our petty potentate did not conduct himself in a way ~~such as~~ to meet Philip's approval; for as we have

¹ We hear nothing of it, and there is everything to show that Cersobleptes' status was uncertain. In its loose sense of the word, I think that D. and A. apply the term ally to the Paracians. A. 2, 9: D. 20 27.

² D. 9, 15.

³ A. 2, 81-82.

seen, when the 1st embassy left Macedonia, Philip was setting out to subdue him. What was Cersobleptes' offence is not clear; but it seems probable that he had been chafing under Philip's yoke and making preparations to rid himself of it. Under such circumstances it had been natural for him again to look toward Athens for support: especially as Athens had at the time been bestirring herself and sending out embassies with a view to a general Hellenic alliance against Philip. One or more of these embassies no doubt had visited Thrace: and Holm would attribute to their activity the understanding between Cersobleptes and Athens. For such an understanding had actually sprung up. That there was any treaty contracted, is unlikely; but the 2 powers were certainly on friendly terms: and Schaeffer has supposed with reason that it was in conjuncture with Cersobleptes that the Thracian forts had lately been garrisoned against Philip by Athenian soldiers.² So matters stood by the 1st of Elaphebolion.

When now Aeschines came back from his 1st trip to Pella, he brought the news of the presence of Cersobleptes' son as hostage at the Macedonian court, together with Philip's promise not to attack the Chersonesus during the peace negotiations. These two things Aeschines declares, account for the fact that when the peace was decided upon, no mention was made of Cersobleptes.³ But is it true that no such mention was then made? Schaeffer says no. He believes Cersobleptes to have been included in the promises along with the Phocians and the Haleans. In this he may go too far.

¹ A's words plainly imply this.

² A. 5, 74 says so distinctly, and his earlier account implies as much.

But what we may legitimately gather from Aeschines' words is that the question of Cersobleptes' status was indeed raised in the assembly but was quickly disposed of by Aeschines himself. The Athenians were interested in Cersobleptes only so far as the safety of the Chersonesus was concerned. That prince, from being himself an actual danger to the cherished peninsula, had lately become its bulwark against Philip, the new and more formidable foe. No wonder that Athenian sentiment toward him had changed. But now Philip himself shone in a new light at Athens. No longer the dreaded enemy of the state, he was about to become its most cordial ally and to bestow upon it "wonderful blessings." True, he was at the moment attacking Cersobleptes, the *Χερσόνησος* garrisoned by Athenian soldiers. But after all, the Chersonesus was safe and the Thracian business was but a small matter. Philip could be trusted to settle it rightly and to act fairly by Athens. Furthermore, Cersobleptes had acknowledged himself Philip's vassal by rendering up his son as hostage. Though nominally in alliance with Athens, he had not taken the pains to have himself represented in that city.² Plainly, it was Philip's business to deal with him. Later Athens felt differently. The illusion concerning Philip's magnanimous intentions vanished. The need of Cersobleptes as a bulwark was once more seen. It became the opinion of all that he should have been included in the treaty and in the light of this opinion past events were looked upon from a new point of view. Consequently, by 343, we find each of our orators blaming the other

/ This is clear from his action in sending Critobulus.

¹A. 2, 63 ff.

for his exclusion. But I incline to believe Aeschines and to think that when the peace was being concluded at Athens, the fate of Cersobleptes, once the Chersonesus and the Hellespont were secure, seemed a matter of small importance.

Cersobleptes, however, now that Philip was actually marching upon him, became much alarmed. He knew that a peace between Athens and Philip was well under way: but evidently he had his doubts as to whether it would help him. He had been on friendly terms with Athens of late, but he felt by no means that when it came to making peace, she would include him as her ally. In his heart he was uncertain how she regarded him.¹ Yet it was an immediate necessity for him to be so included. In his embarrassment, he dispatched Critobulus of Lampsacus to Athens with the demand that he be inscribed on the stelae as among Athens' allies, and that Critobulus, as his representative, be admitted to take the oaths along with the rest.

It was at this juncture just described while the Athenians were holding the assembly on the 23rd of Elaphebolion that Critobulus put in his appearance and announced the message of Cersobleptes.² His words could not but astonish all who heard. The matter of Cersobleptes had been settled 4 days before. They had decided to let him go. And now here was his newly come representative demanding that he be treated as a regular ally. The question was open again. One Aleximachus forthwith laid before the proedri a motion to the effect that Cersobleptes' demand be

He argued further that it was illegal to recognise now those allies who wanted to come in and share the oaths, for another assembly had been assigned to settle that matter. This at least is what I understand from A's words, which to me are quite obscure. The technical objection that D. raised is however of small importance. His real objection, to my mind, is that found in the text.

² Unless his sentiments had changed since writing the oration against Aristocrates. But this fact is of little value in explaining his action. He was scarcely the man to let his personal dislikes influence his public conduct in such a case. The truth is that Aleximachus' proposition was impracticable, and did not coincide with his own views as to how Cersobleptes' status was to be assured. See p. 85.

³ Because 1. A. does not produce the decree, as he probably would have done had it been passed and entered into the public records. 2. The words ἐψηφισμένον τοῦ δήμου in 86 are not decisive, since, if indeed they do not mean merely "put to vote" (Hartel *Dem. Stud.* S. 108 ff.), they constitute only a part of the protasis to a condition contrary to fact. No more are ἐκικλῆαν αὐτὸν (85) for the present participle, as Schaeffer remarks (li p. 244 n. 5) may be merely conative. If D. had succeeded, we should expect the aorist. A. is not explicit here, nor, I think, does he mean to be. 3. Philip's letter declares that Cers-

complied with and that Critobulus take the oaths with the other allies. The motion was read to the house. Whereupon Demosthenes being one of the proedri arose (so Aeschines asserts) and said he was not willing to put it to the vote: that it would undo the peace with Philip.¹

Aeschines declares that this action of Demosthenes was well-remembered by all and it is possible that his story may be true. Philip had no intention of admitting Cersobleptes and his ambassadors must have been instructed accordingly. The leading men of Athens, Demosthenes among them, had doubtless talked over the situation with Antipater and Parmenio and learned this fact. Demosthenes would know, therefore, that should Aleximachus' motion be passed, the Macedonians would refuse to comply with it and delay would ensue—possibly, even, serious complications. Moreover, Demosthenes certainly felt no tenderness toward Cersobleptes himself.² Yet that prince had warm friends among the demos who did not like the idea of leaving him out of the peace. Demosthenes' words were followed by an uproar, the result of which was that the proedri were called upon the bema and ordered to put the motion to vote whether they would or no. The result of the vote must have been unfavorable, although Aeschines does not give it.³ Either the motion was lost, or if passed, was not complied with by the Macedonian envoys; for certainly Cersobleptes was not admitted to take the oaths. I follow the former hypothesis which seems to me more the probable of the two.

Colotesus neither had part with the Athenians in the peace treaty nor was inscribed on the stele. (No. P. 8-9) but that when he tried hard to swear the oaths to P's ambassadors, he was hindered by the Athenian generals, who declared him to be an enemy of Athens. That they thus designated him is probably a misrepresentation. They said, no doubt, that he was not officially an ally. With this statement of P. agree the words of A. 85-86. They are a reply to a charge apparently made by P., but not given in his written speech. We gather from them that Cersobleptes was not admitted; and that the oaths being administered in the strategium, the generals superintended the ceremony and would have been the ones to exclude, if exclusion came from the side of Athens. 4. We find the Athenians later on, when Philip's true purposes had been revealed, decreeing that Cersobleptes, too, should be admitted to the oaths, as though they had neglected to insist upon that point before. PL 181.

¹ A. 2, 85.

² Grote (xi p. 398) says the Macedonian ambassadors announced now for the first time Philip's refusal to accept them as allies.

³ A. 2, 111: 3, 73.

As we know, it had already been decided, on motion of Philocrates, that on that very day the allies should swear the oaths before Philip's ambassadors, and when the assembly broke up, this ceremony had already begun or was then just beginning in the strategium.¹ The allies here spoken of were probably the members of the synod. The Athenians having previously agreed that the Phocians and the Haleans should not, for the moment, be recognised as allies of Athens, it is probable that the representatives of these States were not even present at the ceremony. Certainly we have no reason to suppose that they made any effort to be admitted to take the oaths.² With Critobulus, however, the case was different. Nothing baffled by the unfavorable reception of his request in the assembly, he now approached the Macedonian ambassadors and begged that he be allowed to swear in private. But here the Athenian generals interfered. Cersobleptes, they said, was not to take the oaths; and so, by their refusal, ended a transaction that not long afterward was to occasion Athens the bitterest regret.

Parmenio, Antipater, and their companion having now fulfilled their mission at Athens, set out by way of Thebes and Euboea to seek, as we may suppose, their master Philip in Thrace, in order to inform him of what had taken place. Demosthenes, who during their stay in the city had treated them with such hospitality, did not neglect them upon their departure.³ He provided mules for their journey and even accompanied them himself on horseback for some distance—facts which his accusers loved to dwell upon

¹ A. seems to combat this view. 5, 66.

² Chares letter containing the news could not yet have reached Athens. A. 2, 90
I incline to believe A.'s statement here, since it is supported by the written
evidence-and contemporary evidence too-of a man who was on the spot, and in
a position to know what was taking place. It seems however, from De Hal. 37
that the common opinion was that Hieronoros did not fall till sometime in
Munychion. That Cersobleptes had actually "lost his kingdom" as yet, is un-
likely.

³ FL 150. See also IG 27 50.

⁴ Cr. FL 27 a. f.

afterward as sure proofs of his treason. To us they signify only that his friendliness toward Philip was as yet undiminished.

And now, at this juncture, let us pause for a moment to consider the conditions facing Athens. The peace between herself and Philip she had completely ratified. Having done so, she could of course undertake no movement against him. Her hands were tied. Philip, on the contrary, had made no compact at all with her. Though of course, it was supposed that the peace would be regarded as going into effect upon the day that Athens took the oaths and all conquests made thereafter would be restored,¹ yet practically he was just now still at war with Athens and would remain so till he on his part swore the oaths. He was in Thrace attacking Cersobleptes and capturing the fortified places that commanded the Thracian territory. Already, though the Athenians did not know it,² he had taken the most important of these--Hieron Oros--and had inflicted a severe defeat upon Cersobleptes. If he should continue his victorious course he would soon be the actual, even though not the legitimate, ~~possessor~~ ^{possessor} of the region to West, North and East of the Chersonesus. So matters stood. What then ought Athens to do? Demosthenes gives his view of the situation and its demands with apparent clearness.³ "When the peace was concluded," he says, "and the ambassadors of Philip had administered the oaths and set out homeward (and up to this point nothing irremediable⁴ had been done, but the peace was shameful and unworthy of the city--yet in return for this those wonderful blessings were

τῶν ἐγκαταλειφθέντων ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

to come to us) I deemed it wise—and told my colleagues so—to sail as quickly as possible to the vicinity of the Hellespont and by no means to allow Philip during the interim to get hold of any of the forts there. For I knew very well that whatever one lets go at a time when peace is supplanting war, he loses, thanks to his neglect. For never yet when a man has been persuaded to ~~make~~ peace for the sake of the whole of his possessions, would he be willing to go to war again for the sake of things he has neglected from the beginning (~~To him~~), but these become the property of the first man that takes them. Apart from this, I believed that our sailing could not but bring one of 2 advantages to the state. For either, we being present and swearing him according to the decree, he would give back what he had already taken of its possessions and would keep his hands off the rest, or, in case he did not do so, we would immediately bring the news hither; so that you, seeing his avarice and faithlessness in those distant and unimportant matters would not yield to him in these near and weighty affairs. I mean the Phocians and Pylae. And if he should not seize these latter or cheat you out of your senses, everything would be perfectly secure and he would willingly do you justice. * * * * This I recognise and foresaw immediately and said as much to my fellow ambassadors."

At first sight this vigorous declaration seems to put the case before us simply and entirely. Nothing, we think, could be plainer sailing. And yet, if we reflect upon Demosthenes' \$

¹ Ex. P., 2. Cf. A. 2, 9, where A. declares his crime - according to D. - to have been

ἐκβεβληκέναι τῆς ἀρχῆς Κερσοβλέπτην.

words, we soon find them presenting difficulties, which, though in no way insurmountable, should yet not be neglected, as they are neglected by nearly every historian writing upon the subject. First of all, if Cersobleptes was not an official ally of Athens, how could the ambassadors, even ^{if} on the spot, prevent Philip from proceeding in the war against him? Supposing Philip refused to stop, how would his refusal prove "his avarice" and faithlessness? Was he not doing a perfectly legitimate thing? As I have already said, Chares, the Athenian general had garrisoned with his soldiers several forts in Thrace, among them the Sacred Mountain (Hieron Oros) and Serreion Teichos. This had taken place some time before the peace. Almost certainly it was at the request of Cersobleptes himself, ^{who} ~~he~~ ⁱⁿ ~~desiring~~ aid in repelling the impending attack of Philip. For what end had Athens done this? To obtain possession herself in Thrace? Of such an intention on her part there is no evidence. Later, when Philip had completed his subjection of Cersobleptes, we find her demanding only that Cersobleptes and Teres be allowed to reign over Thrace; while for herself she asks nothing. Her aim I take it was merely to secure the Chersonesus. This action therefore is a proof—and there are many others—that Athens, through her possession of the Chersonesus, was vitally interested in Thracian affairs. She had a certain right to be considered in respect of them. Philip could not declare that because she was not the official ally of Cersobleptes, she had nothing to say concerning his fate. More, whatever might be the legal

Of course, however, it is doubtful if the colleagues of D. would have forced Philip to show his hand, had they been present; and to carry out his purpose D. would need the full cooperation of the other ambassadors throughout.

status of that princeling and the Thracians, certainly they were in the present struggle practically allied with Athens. The forces of the two powers were working side by side against Philip. They were identified and could not be separated. It seems to me therefore, that had the ambassadors been on hand, they would have been right in demanding the cessation of hostilities. Had Philip refused to comply, his true attitude toward Athens would at once have been revealed. He would have broken, if not a legal, at least a strong moral obligation, and Athens' generous confidence in him would have been justly shattered.¹

"He would" also be forced to "give back what he had already taken of the State's possessions." Demosthenes' phraseology here is inaccurate—perhaps intentionally so. Philip had taken no place that really belonged to Athens. He had but captured forts temporarily occupied by Athenian forces and expelled their garrisons. Yet for all that, he would be no whit the less bound to restore them; and the ambassadors could rightly ask that such restoration be completed before they allowed him to swear the oaths. So far, then, Demosthenes tells a straight story. But in case Philip, being forced had actually chosen then to throw off his disguise, would they have dared to refuse to swear him? True, Athens was in no danger herself; but Philip would at once have swooped down on her beloved Chersonesus and even if this had not soon succumbed yet great efforts would have been called for immediately, and the war, with its burdens and expenses, would have been

This only seems to imply that the Athenians in that case
would not be likely to interfere, but nothing I think as to the
objectionableness of the proceeding in D's opinion as an ally
in an extreme case.

In 6, 29, he seems to admit that he believed τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, which, in its context, must mean the promises made by A. and his associates at the time peace was being debated. In FL 318 he implies that there would have been no objection to Philip's entering Pylae if he did so as the ally of Phocis. These passages, however, are not final, since they can easily be accounted for by the customary rhetorical looseness of statement in matters not essential to the argument.

on again. What would be the reception accorded the ambassadors should they announce such a situation on their return? It seems to me more probable that Demosthenes would have urged his colleagues to administer the oaths notwithstanding and by so doing to save the Chersonesus for the time being: then to proceed with all speed to Athens and disclose there the true state of affairs.

On the other hand, had Philip yielded to their demands, Athens would have indeed secured the safety of Cersobleptes and shut Philip out from Thrace, but what is there to show that in regard to the "greater and nearer" matters, she would have fared better than she actually did? She would have been all the more in the dark as to Philip's real purpose and all the more inclined to trust him. Would she not have admitted him into Central Greece? It is hard to say. What would have Demosthenes have advised? He does not make clear. Upon this hangs the question as to whether he was deceived by Philip and by the promises made in Philip's name. That he was an ardent promoter of the peace and exerted himself to work its accomplishment as rapidly as possible, is certain. But what was his motive in so doing? Did he believe with the rest in the "wonderful blessings" which were to come to the state therefrom? Did he, among other things, look for Philip to settle the Phocian business and put down Thebes? If so, he would not have tried to hinder Philip's entrance into Thermopylae, for thus only could Philip have brought this about. But if he was not deceived; if his ultimate purpose was to keep Philip out at all

¹ Perhaps this is what he means by παρ' ἐκόντος ὑπάρξειν αὐτοῦ
τὰ δίκαια. FL 152.

such a prospect was certainly contemplated if we may trust D. G. 36.

² Meidner, Aesch. Ores. p. 54 quoted by Holz III p. 261.
This action would have bound P. to the terms of the treaty & the rights of Athens as holding goods
lawfully obtained, in Thracian would have at least to be determined under the treaty; since early
would be left for determining how far P's appearance in Central Greece as ally of Phobos, who
was in alliance with Athens (no friend of Phobos) before he could settle it with the 'marched for'
Even with the question of Phobos as such left out, it still admitted of discussion how far an alliance
in the field with Phobos was compatible with an alliance on paper with the Athenians.

³ D. asserts that they could have reached the Hellespont in ten days, perhaps e-
ven in two or three. This may be accepted as true, since the length of the
voyage was well known to all Athenians, and no misrepresentation was possible
in the matter. (dG 30)

⁴ FL 156. See note opp. p. 30

"By accepting this peace, we shall gain time. We can stop Philip in Thrace and save the Chersonesus. Then, before he can gather his force to march upon Pylae, we shall have leisure to consider our next move. It may be we can come to an understanding with him before he makes his attack.¹ If the worst comes to the worst, then we shall be no less able to meet him than before." In other words "he tried to outwit Philip and" as the sequel showed "was outwitted himself."² Of course we must remember that Demosthenes could have had no premonition of the extraordinary delay his fellow ambassadors were going to make. He naturally would expect them to go, as he advised, immediately to Thrace, in which case they would have been back in about twenty days.³ His own words show that he did not as yet suspect their sincerity.⁴ For myself, I feel that the latter view is the more correct and that Demosthenes never intended to let Philip come within Pylae. He wished, as he says, to keep the whip hand of Philip, and I think he hoped that matters might thus be peaceably settled. If not, if Philip should endeavor to force his way into Central Greece, Demosthenes trusted that then at last he could arouse the Athenians to energetic measures of resistance. How future events might have shaped themselves, had the affairs at this juncture been managed differently, is a question that never can be solved. Demosthenes' plans might have failed or they might not. Certainly, however, no one can doubt that his advice to his colleagues and the reasons upon which it was based, were most sound. The sooner the ambassadors got to Philip

1. Pl. 18.

² A.(5.34) claims that nobody thought or even knew anything about the Paracian forts, until D. and the "juggles" began to raise a stir about them after the return of the third embassy.. D. himself admits that they were a small matter, but a good test of Philip's faith.(5.16.) Cf. his expression(Pl. 181) τῶν ἐγκαταλειφθέντων ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

and settled matters, the better for Athens every way.

They, however, conceived the situation differently. Instead of starting immediately for Thrace, they manifested no disposition whatever to leave Athens.¹ Day after day passed and still they lingered on, heedless of Demosthenes's entreaties. Thus early they were beginning the notorious delay which constituted one of the chief charges against them in the three ensuing years. Such a waste of time under such circumstances Demosthenes could construe in only one way. All of his 9 colleagues, he would have us believe, were in the pay of Philip. Yet I cannot accept this as true. It seems to me that the explanation of their conduct lies in state of public feeling at Athens. We have seen how, in spite of Aleximachus and his friends, the interest of the demus in Cersobleptes and Thracian affairs was rather low. The Chersonesus was safe and there was no cause for immediately anxiety. Philip might indeed win a control over the regions of the Hellespont which, if maintained, would in time grow dangerous. But Philip fully intended to treat Athens fairly. He would undoubtedly restore all he had conquered and recognise Cersobleptes as Athens' ally. So the people thought, if, indeed, they thought at all about the matter. Their minds were occupied with greater things--the humiliation of Thebes, the confirmation of the Phocian power, the acquisition of Euboea. What Philip was doing in Thrace they cared little.² Everybody was looking to what he would do when he came back from thence. Moreover it was reasonable to suppose

' TL 157. ὁ δὲ τούτοις ἀντιλέγων φανερώς, καὶ ἅπασιν ἐν-
αντιουμένος, οἷς ἔλεγον μὲν ἐγὼ, ἐψήφιστο δ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν,
οὗτος ἦν. (Αἰσχίρην)

² TL 154. 10 66, 67. A. has it read, and gives its date - Junyauion 5 - to 3, 21.
he caused that part which compromised himself - as to now and there the and -
lets to go - to be omitted in the reading, no doubt. B. has it read in full
in both editions.

that he would leave off fighting Cersobleptes so soon as he heard of the peace from his own ambassadors, now on their way to him.

Thus we can account for the fact—otherwise extraordinary—that public sentiment permitted the ambassadors to loiter on at Athens. Had the people felt as Demosthenes, the 10 would have been compelled to leave at once. If, then, the people at large failed to recognise the urgency of the case, is it wonderful that their delegates should be likewise blind? Not that, if left to themselves, they might not have followed the advice of Demosthenes. Some opposing force was at work among them, guiding them with a view to Philip's welfare. Their delay on this embassy is altogether too striking to be accounted for in any other way. What is more reasonable than to suppose that this force is identical with that which we have already seen employed in Philip's interest? I venture to discover here the activity of the corrupt Philocrates, exercising itself primarily upon Aeschines and through him upon his colleagues. Nor would his task have been difficult. Few things are easier than to retard the movements of men already prediposed to inaction. Delay could readily be reconciled with duty and the aggressive Demosthenes would soon appear in the light of a troublesome fool. If this be true, it is not the first instance of a little leaven leavening the whole lump.

Finally Demosthenes grew weary of remonstrating and resolved to bring exterior pressure to bear upon his slothful colleagues. "Since" he says² "there remained no assembly, owing to its

having been dissolved, and these fellows would not set out but were wasting time here, I made a motion in the Boulé—the demos having delegated its authority to that body—for the ambassadors to set out as soon as possible, and for Proxenus the general to convey them to the place where he learned Philip was." This motion the Boulé — which seems just now to have been much influenced by Demosthenes—passed; and the strong arm of the law brought about the result which the eloquence of the great statesman had for more than a week failed to accomplish.

¹ PL 155. ff. Note. ἐξήγαγον αὐτοὺς οὕτως ἄκοιτας.

² rather during the whole fifty days before Philip returned to Pella.

10 30 D. says loosely βραχὺ φροντίσαντες οἱ χρηστοὶ πρέσβεις
οὗτοι, καθῆντ' ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ τρεῖς ὅλους μῆνας, ἕως
ἦλθε φίλιππος ἐκ Θράκης, πάντα καταστρεψάμενος.

³ A. 2, 27. ff.

VI.

At last, therefore, on ^{the} 3rd of Munychion the ambassadors unwillingly quitted Athens. But when they reached Oreus and met Proxenus, Demosthenes tells us, instead of taking ship for Thrace as had been enjoined upon them by his decree, they proceeded in a roundabout was to Macedonia, consuming 23 days in the journey.¹ During this time,² Demosthenes's relations toward his colleagues were converted from the mild friction existing at the first, into the bitterest antagonism. That he would not be silent seeing them wilfully wasting time at a critical juncture—and that too, in direct disobedience to orders—we should confidently expect. And indeed, he says he never let them have a moment's rest; speaking "at first as one giving advice in common council, then as one teaching fools, finally as one concealing nothing from traitors and villians."

Aeschines³ likewise gives a brief account of the journey. According to him, none of them would sit at table with Demosthenes nor, if possible, put up at the same inn as he; being disgusted at his treacherous conduct on the preceding embassy. Furthermore, no one said a word about going to Thrace, since that was not included in their instructions.[†] Nor would it have done any good as Cersobleptes had been already conquered. Demosthenes was accompanied by 2 men carrying *στρωματόδεσμα*, in one of which

[†] i. e. Those given by the demus.

¹ FL 155

² FL 166, 169. This promise, as says (FL 171 ff.) was his only reason for serving on the embassy, after he had found out the treachery of A. and Pailocrates. Historians have naturally refused to give any credence to this purely rhetorical statement.

he claimed, was a talent of silver, wherewith he was going to ransom the captives. Aeschines, therefore, agrees with Demosthenes in affirming that friction existed between the latter and his colleagues and that the embassy did delay. The reasons he gives for this delay are utterly inadequate; the first being a mere quibble and the second untrue: for if Philip had completed his conquests in Thrace on the 24th of Elaphebolion, why did he not return at once to Pella?

Arrived at the Macedonian capital, the ambassadors found that Philip was still absent; and in spite of Demosthenes's remonstrances, they decided to wait there till he should come back. This he did not do for 27 days.¹ In the meantime Demosthenes, despairing of influencing his colleagues, set about looking up the Athenian prisoners detained in that city.² While on the previous embassy, he had promised some of these unfortunates to bring money for their ransom. This money, a talent of silver, had come in one of the *στρωματόδεσμα* which excited Aeschines's ridicule and Demosthenes was now in a position to fulfill his promise. He told all the prisoners he could see, indeed, that he expected to secure their release without ransom from Philip, as soon as he should return. Yet those of them that had been set free on security, suspecting (as it seemed to him) that he would be unable to persuade Philip, said they wished to ransom themselves and be under no obligation to Philip; and accordingly they borrowed of him, one three

¹ The dinner at Xenophon's may have taken place, even though D.'s account of what happened there is not to be believed. FL 196 ff.

² FL 156: 3, 64.

³ 10 30. πάντα καταστρεψάμενος.

⁴ D. 2, 15.

⁵ 10 27. μὴ προλαβὼν ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐπικαίρους τῶν τύπων κύριος τῆς Θράκης κατασταίη, μηδὲ πολλῶν μὲν χρημάτων. πολλῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν εὐπορήσας, ἐκ τούτων ῥα δίως τοῖς λοιποῖς ἐπιχειροῖ ἡ πράγμασιν.

⁶ A. 2, 103, 114.

⁷ A. 2, 132. ἡ μὲν γὰρ Θετταλῶν καὶ Φιλίππου στρατεία (ἐπὶ Φωκέας) πρόδηλος ἦν

⁸ A. 2, 112. παρόντων τῶν πρέσβεων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑ.

⁹ A. 2, 104. FL 152., Diodor, 16, 59. D. 2, 11

minae, another five, each as the amount of his ransom demanded. While Demosthenes was thus occupied, Aeschines and his friends apparently gave themselves over to the enjoyment of the good cheer and hospitality for which Macedonia was so celebrated.¹

So passed the time until Philip's arrival. That prince on his part had been occupying himself most profitably in Thrace.² He had completely subdued Cersobleptes, had captured the important fortresses of Serreion, Teichos, Hieron Oros, Ergisce, Serreion, and Doriscus, expelling Athenian garrisons from the two former,⁴ and had made himself master of Thracian affairs generally,³ extending his influence to the coasts of Propontis. The Athenian Chersonesus alone was left untouched. Besides the prestige thus acquired, his conquests seem to have afforded him material help in the form of tribute and levies of soldiers.⁵ But he had greater matters yet to engage his energies. At last the time was ripe to respond to the invitation of Thebes and step in to settle the Sacred War; or, in other words, to establish himself in Central Greece. With this in view he had been assembling a great army at Pella and making preparations to march in force upon Thermopylae. By the time of his return from Thrace the expedition was about ready.⁶

The momentous news of this intended campaign had been circulated throughout Greece some time before,⁷ and had occasioned universal excitement. The result of this excitement we see in the embassies from almost every State in Hellas which we now find at the court of Philip.⁸ Sparta, Thebes and Phocis⁹ were all repre-

¹ In ~~this form~~ desire they were in full accord with the Athenians, and the ambassadors of the two states were working in common to that end - that is, with the exception of B.. See p. 100. A. 2. 156. For the state of affairs in the Peloponnese just now, see 50 13.

² D. 5, 21, says only Orchomenus and Corinth, but we may be sure she asked for all that she actually received. (FL 141, 128) That she worked against Sparta the whole course of events both before and after this would lead us to infer.

⁶ They were probably represented in Macedonia now, since they were prominent in the proceedings of the Amphictyonic Council after the Philip got through Py-lae, as is plain from D. 5, 14+13, where the Messenians and Megalopolitans are likewise mentioned as being of the same mind toward Sparta as the Argives.

³ For the impression produced on Greece by Philip's successes, see FL 67.

⁴ FL 78.

⁵ A. 2, 101 ff.

sented. The object of each State was, briefly stated, to induce Philip to further its particular interests when he should make the expected general adjustment of Hellenic affairs. Sparta wished to renew her preponderance in the Peloponnesus, to see Thebes humbled,¹ and perhaps to regain her ancient possession of the Temple at Delphi. Thebes desired the destruction of Phocis, the regaining of Orchomenus and Coroneia with a slice of Phocis besides and the curtailing of the influence of Sparta in the Peloponnesus.² This latter object also engrossed the attention of the Argives who were working hand in hand with Thebes.⁶ Finally, the care of the Phocian ambassadors was to secure the safety of their people, and, if possible, the decisive weakening of the Theban power. But whatever the end in view, all seem to have unquestioningly acknowledged that Philip was "the arbiter of the destinies of Greece" and that to his decision every one must yield assent.³

But as yet no one knew what that decision would be. Philip's true purposes were in the dark. We have seen the promises made in his name to the Athenians. Thebes, whose ally he was and by whose invitation he was coming into Hellas would of course expect him to take her side. So the Thessalians—While, if what Demosthenes tells us is true, he had likewise held out flattering hopes to the Spartans.⁴ Some one was destined to be disappointed. But who?

Such, then, was the condition of affairs upon Philip's arrival. As soon as the Athenian ambassadors heard⁵ that he was in

Pella, they held a meeting. Their instructions were read, and they then proceeded to enumerate the things, other than the mere taking of the oaths, which they were enjoined to do. "And as no one" says Aeschines "mentioned the most important things of all, but occupied themselves with lesser matters, I said ---I thought they were utterly neglecting the weightiest injunction of the demus. For the administering of the oaths and the discussion regarding the prisoners etc. could have been attended to by under officials. But the thing for us to do as prudent ambassadors is to take right counsel over the whole state of our relations toward Philip. "I mean' said I 'in the matters of this expedition to Pylae. Here are the ambassadors from Thebes and from Sparta and we are here too with a decree of the demus in which it says "for the ambassadors to do whatever else they can." And all the Greeks are looking to what is about to take place. If then the demus deemed it fit openly to urge Philip to crush the insolence of Thebes and to set up again the walls of the Boeotians, they would have said so in the decree. But they have desired to remain in the background themselves, in case they fail in persuading Philip; yet it was their idea to make a bold attempt in our persons.'

"And while I was right in the midst of what I was saying, Demosthenes interrupted me loudly. 'This fellow is full of disturbance and impudence-- I say for us not to stir up the states against each other or to act the busy-body --- Philip is marching upon Pylae---But that's none of my business. I'm not responsible

for Philip's arms. I'm to see that I omit none of my instructions and that's all.'

"However, the end of the matter was that my colleagues upon each of us being asked individually what he thought was best, voted to speak ^{as} ~~what~~ I had recommended."

From these words of Aeschines, as well as from his speech to Philip which he recounts later, we learn his attitude of mind at this moment. His great desire is the humiliation of Thebes: only incidentally does he wish for the safety of the Phocians. To gratify his hatred against Thebes, he freely gives everything over to Philip. This is "the most important thing" (τὰ μέγιστα). All else is subordinate to it. The fulfillment of the instructions is a minor affair (πράγματα ελάττω). He would put Athens on the level of the other petty brawling states of Greece, kneeling at Philip's feet for favor; and would increase the intense bitterness toward Athens already felt by the Thebans. What a glaring example of the fatal weakness of the Hellenic people! And it is but too true that here he was speaking for the Athenians also. There is every evidence that they felt just as he did. Not necessarily that he was right in interpreting his instructions as he did; but in acting thus he was almost certainly fulfilling the wishes of the large majority of his fellow citizens, even if they had not expressed those wishes in their decree. I have little patience with the view that represents Aeschines as the cunning adventurer using his devices to cheat an unwilling people. I

¹ A. 2, 136. Cf. D. 2, 11.

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rather regard him as only an accentuated type of the average Athenian, a man of great ability as an orator and politician, but in statesmanship guided by, rather than guiding, the main current of public opinion. This account of his was related three years after the events which it narrates. In the meantime the Athenians had learned some hard lessons concerning Philip and his true character. Yet even in 343 Aeschines dared to take the same stand as before. He tells of his action at this point with the relish of one who is sure of approbation; and we can see from both his speech and that of Demosthenes that a large number of the citizens still accepted his views. How much more would this be the case now, when the hopes of all were riding high and the blighting disappointment had not yet come! "How stood public opinion among you" (at this time)? Aeschines elsewhere triumphantly asks his countrymen "Didn't you all expect that Philip was going to humble Thebes?" And what did this mean but that they desired and would gladly permit him so to do?

In striking contrast is the conception of the situation entertained by Demosthenes. To him it seemed imperative immediately to constrain Philip to fulfill his promises, or, at any rate, to show his hand. Philip, we must remember, was not yet proved false and Demosthenes may have had hopes of actually obtaining from him a fair settlement with Athens. Certainly, a speedy settlement should be had. Athens should know how matters stood. Much time had been lost already through the delay of the embassy, but still

¹ D. 137. εἰ δὲ καὶ πᾶσιν ἤρεσκεν ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις πρέσ. κ.τ.λ.

² For a concise statement of A.'s view of the situation and his attitude of D.'s attitude, see A. 2, 116.

³ D. 16, 25.

⁴ A. is continually sneering at D.'s Indian leanings. 2, 141 et passim.

⁵ A. 2, 104 ff.

it was not too late to save matters. Hence he and his colleagues of whom Aeschines is a representative¹ were working at cross purposes. They looked upon Philip's entrance into Pylae as an accepted fact; and, basing their hopes upon what he was to do for Athens after he was in Pylae, considered the fulfillment of their actual instructions as a small matter; certainly not to be insisted upon if by so doing they should lessen Philip's good-will toward their state.² Demosthenes, on the other hand, probably did not intend for Philip to enter Pylae at all. At all events, he was resolved that Athens should at least have the opportunity to decide whether or no she would admit him; and as the first step toward bringing this about, he would be urgent for the full and instant carrying out of the instructions. Nor, we may be sure did Demosthenes share in the fierce desire to behold Thebes humbled. He wished indeed to see the Boeotian cities reconstituted.³ Yet this wish was entirely subordinate to the longing he felt for the harmony of the Hellenic people.⁴ No wonder, then, that we find him interrupting Aeschines and protesting against such a speech as Aeschines intended to make. Its whole tone would be revolting to him. The words that Aeschines puts in his mouth, while manifestly perverted, have yet the ring of truth. "Let us not stir up the states against each other; let us not belittle Athens by meddling in this disgraceful business; our duty is merely to fulfill instructions and leave."⁵ Aeschines then proceeds to give an account of the audience of the embassy before Philip. Apparently Philip,

1
A. 2, 112.

2
A. 2, 113 ff.

as soon as he got home, had appointed a time for all the embassies then in the country, to meet him at Pella, the state their business; and it was in the presence of this general assembly of men from all over Greece,¹ that the Athenian ambassadors were heard. Demosthenes somehow or other (according to Aeschines) assumed the right to speak first. He began by slandering his colleagues, saying that all the ambassadors had not come there with the same object in view or with the same opinions; and then passed on to tell what services he had performed for Philip. He spoke of his aid of Philocrates and of the decrees he had moved to further the consummation of the peace, boasting that he had been the first to stop the mouths of its opponents: he showed how he had brought about the discussion of alliance in the demos, and narrated in detail the efforts he had expended in the entertainment of the Macedonian envoys, thus manifesting his desire to serve Philip openly and not hiding it as some others whom he could name. Not satisfied with this, he proceeded to compliment the king's person and attainments in a most immoderate way; and in short, made himself so ridiculous that the audience burst into roars of laughter.

It was after such a disgraceful exhibition of bad taste and servility that Aeschines was compelled to make his speech.² Having of necessity said a few words in dignified refutation of the slander Demosthenes had uttered against his colleagues, he next touched briefly on the matter of administering the oaths and recounted the instructions which the ambassadors were to fulfill; for

Demosthenes, with all his eloquence, had not mentioned any of the business to be done. But the main part of the speech he devoted to the expedition to Pylae and the Amphictyonic affairs; as he had been directed to do by the vote of the council.

"I was especially urgent" he says "that Philip settle the disturbance there not by force of arms but by his vote of peaceful decision; yet if this should not be possible (which was evident before hand since the army had been assembled and was now at hand) I said 'He who is about to take counsel concerning the religious matters of Greece, ought to have great care for piety and should pay attention to those who undertake to inform him as to their ancestral customs.' And beginning at the beginning I told him of the founding of the Temple, and the first meeting of the Amphictyons and I read their oaths, whereby it was lawful for those men of ancient times neither to destroy any Amphictyonic city, nor to cut it off from running water either in war or in peace; and if any one should thus breack the oaths, they were to make war upon him and reconstitute the cities: and if anyone should plunder the property of the god or be privy to such plunder or form a plot against the temple, they were to punish him in every way possible. And there was added to the oaths a mighty curse.

"All this being read, I declared that I did not think it just to overlook the ruin of the Boeotian cities. And to show that they were Amphictyonic cities and shared in the oaths, I

counted up the 12 nations jointly owning the Temple; Thessalians, Boeotians—not the Thebans alone— Dorians, Ionians, Perr^{ae}ebians, Magnesians, Locrians, Oetaeans, Phthiotians, Malians, and Phocians
 - - - - - The beginning of the expedition then, I declared to be holy and just; and I urged Philip to assemble the Amphictyons in the temple, assuring them of their safety and their vote, and then to see that those guilty from the beginning of seizing the temple, receive just punishment—not their native states, but the guilty parties themselves; and that the cities which yielded up for trial these wrong doers, get off free. 'But if,' said I 'instead of this you forcibly confirm the crimes of the Thebans, you will reap no gratitude from those you help; for you could not help them as much as Athens once did and that they don't remember; while those whom you leave in the lurch you will find to be your enemies, not your "friends."

This is all that Aeschines has to tell us of the audience and even this is not entirely to be believed. What he says about the speech and action of Demosthenes is generally regarded as an utter fabrication; and not without justice. Demosthenes stooping to abject flattery before a foreign king is a picture which we find ourselves unable to contemplate. In all his extant speeches we cannot find a single evidence of cringing or servility. We see only the fearless resolute man, who, like the true rhetor of the Gorgias, administers gently but unflinchingly the sharp medicine that the souls of his hearers need. And is it not right to be-

/ his own expression used in a different connection. TL 335.

lieve that he, who could thus "for the sake of right and truth" / brave the fierce storms of unpopularity at home, would abroad conduct himself in a manner at once so dishonorable and so inconsistent.

Yet perhaps there may for all that be a grain of truth in what Aeschines reports of Demosthenes's speech. It is to be noticed that Aeschines is somewhat fond of "a lie that is half the truth." He has learned that it is far more effective to pervert, in the telling, the spirit and meaning of what a man actually did or said, than to weave a falsehood outright. Perhaps he has done this here. Let us see what were the conditions under which Demosthenes spoke. He had always been Philip's aggressive enemy at Athens, and Philip knew it and would not be disposed to listen to him cordially on that account. But it was essential to gain Philip's good will if he wished his demands to be treated with consideration; and this he could strive to do honestly, since he had now really laid aside his former hostility. What ^{is} more natural than that he should say, "I am no longer your enemy. See what I have done to bring about peace and how cordially I entertained your ambassadors. I am willing to let by-gones be by-gones now, if you will but act rightly toward Athens?" Courtesy and policy alike would have dictated such a speech, nor would it have been in any way unmanly or undignified.

It is, however, absurd for Aeschines to say that Demosthenes mentioned nothing of the business to be done. Whatever

else he may have been, as an orator he was certainly the most business-like of men. Never a word of idle declamation: everything brief and to the point. Probably what Aeschines gives us was only the introduction to Demosthenes' speech, while the main portion of it, since it didn't suit his purpose, he has left out. Demosthenes, we may be sure, stated what the embassy was instructed to do. This task would naturally fall to the first speaker. It is likely, also, that he was especially emphatic upon the matter of the captives, since that subject, as we have seen, had excited his peculiar interest. More than this we cannot say. Yet either now or later he must have made such demands regarding the fulfillment of Philip's promises as seemed to him just. Of course this being a public audience, some degree of reticence was necessary.

Aeschines' own speech, I doubt not, was in substance what he represents it to have been. Upon the attitude of mind which it evidences I have already commented. The emphasis is laid on the expedition to Pylæ and the settlement of Amphictyonic matters. Philip is master of affairs, and as such he is besought in accordance with law and piety, to reconstitute the Boeotian cities, to punish Thebes and incidentally prevent the promiscuous condemnation of the Phocians.

In consequence of the abrupt termination of the account at this point, we are left in ignorance as to the reply given by Philip to the ambassadors. Perhaps it was now that he made the promise to ransom the Athenian prisoners and send them home during

¹ See p. 102. Philip boasted later of his generosity in this instance. De Hal 52.

² 3C 32. This clearly took place in Macedonia.

³ FL ~~III~~ ~~III~~ ~~III~~ 44 174 273.

⁴ As is evident from FL 159-160. | ⁵ Cf. Ep. P. 8.

⁵ Cf. D. 5, 35. Ep. P. 11. FL 174.

⁶ Cf. FL 42, which shows that at this time there must have been talk about secrecy. I do not mean here that Philip himself made direct promises, to the ambassadors, but that he contrived to create in their minds this impression. See p. 112.

the Panathenaic festival at the end of Hecatombaeon (July- Aug.)¹ This was a long time to wait and Demosthenes blames Philip for the delay. Yet it is easy to see why Philip retained them. He was by no means sure of what position Athens would take during the operations of the next month, and his continued possession of the captives during that time would be a hold upon her which he was not disposed to relinquish.

Nor have we anything but fragmentary information upon the subsequent proceedings of the embassy. We know that sometime after the audience, but before Philip left Macedonia, ~~Demosthenes~~ he swore the oaths to the treaty.² The demands of Demosthenes were evidently not echoed by his colleagues; for when the oaths were taken, they did not insist upon the return of Philip's Thracian conquests and the inclusion of the Phocians, the Haleans, and Cersobleptes among the Athenian allies.³ Demosthenes says they actually declared the these three ἐκ σπονδῶν : but this declaration, if made, was not included in the text of the treaty.⁴ They furthermore acknowledged the independence of the Cardians and suffered them to be enrolled among the allies of Philip: thus giving up what seemed to every Athenian by right a part of the Chersonesus.⁵ No doubt they believed that these concessions (with the exception of the last) were only temporary. Philip would of course represent that he dares not reveal his true attitude now and would make easy promises in regard to Thrace.⁶

¹ FL 131. οὗτοι δ' ἐχαρίζοντο πάντα, ἐνδεικνύμενοι καὶ
ὑπερκολακεύοντες ἐκείνους.

² FL 137 ff.

³ ξένια

The ambassadors yielded to all his wishes. Indeed, Demosthenes tells us, from now on their settled conduct was to yield to all his wishes and to flatter him outrageously.¹ So was their zeal to win Philip for Athens consuming them!

Demosthenes, as usual, has the one explanation for their conduct, videlicet, that they were bribed: and he tells a story of how they were bribed on a particular instance: which story has, as will be seen, the double² merit of exhibiting not only their knavery but his own honesty and patriotic activity.² Philip, he says, "tested all of us. How? By sending to each privately a sum of gold and a lot of it too. But when he failed in a certain quarter - - - he thought to himself that if he gave all of us in common something, we should be fools enough to take it, and that would make it all plain sailing for those who had sold themselves, even if what we all took in common was only a little. That's why he gave us what he styled 'presents of hospitality.'³ When, however, I wouldn't have it, these fellows took the money and went shares on it, too. So Philip, when I asked him (as I did) to spend the money on ransoming the the prisoners (instead of giving it to us) couldn't in decency accuse the knaves or say 'Why so and so has that money' but had to shoulder the expense. He agreed then to do as I asked, but put me off saying he would save the prisoners home at the Panathenaea." This story, though not denied by Aeschines, is to be taken cum grano salis. That Philip gave presents to the ambassadors--which were accepted, is believable.

¹ FL 126.11.

² They could not have done so before this, on their way into Macedonia, as D. implies in FL 158.

³ dC 32.

⁴ D.(FL 51.) says two. A.(2,137) says one.

⁵ FL 51 H.

So it is that he exerted himself to obtain their good will. As to the captives, the truth is probably that Demosthenes was especially urgent in pressing the point. The narrative (as that of the dinner at Xenophron's)¹ sounds like a romance. Yet what he says of his request of Philip's promise is supported by witnesses and may be true. It is to be noticed that the incident implies friendly intercourse between Demosthenes and Philip.

After Philip had sworn the oaths,² it was the duty of the ambassadors as laid down in their instructions, to visit his allies in their several cities and to administer the oaths to them also. Instead, they stayed in Pella. Philip in his letter to the Athenians, admits that this was due to his persuasion. What were his motives in urging them thus to violate their instructions we may learn from Demosthenes.³ He did not wish them to go home for fear Demosthenes should stir up his fellow-citizens to take a hand in the proceedings now underway. This was the last thing Philip desired.

It was apparently not long before return ambassadors that Philip, in this anxiety to keep the Athenians quiet, sent them a letter (possibly two in rapid succession)⁴ urging them, as his allies, to march out under arms to aid the cause of justice. This he did, Demosthenes tells us "in order that they, fancying he was going to do what they wanted might pass no vote hostile to him."⁵ He likewise sent for the Lacadaemonians in order that their pres-

[illegible]

This at least is what I gather from D.'s obscure words in PL73. According
came with 1,000 auxiliaries. Diodor. 16, 59.

² PL 160, 159.

3 FL 56.

ence at Pylae might strengthen among the Athenians the idea that their own services were not needed by the Phocians.¹ Neither was it Philip's desire that his allies should see the text of the treaty.² They, of course, were confident that Philip was making this campaign as the enemy of the Phocians and as such they supported him. The text of the treaty, however, might seriously shake their confidence, should they examine it. For therein it was provided that the peace and alliance was to be shared by Athens allies, no exception being made: and the Phocians were among these allies. The suspicion thus aroused at such a critical moment might occasion Philip much trouble. No doubt also, as Demosthenes points out, if the fact that he had made such an evident concession to Athens were bruited abroad, it would weaken his prestige not a little. Moreover, we may feel sure that Philip wished not alone to prevent the ambassadors from going home but also to keep them at his side when he could manipulate them. He therefore pressed them to remain with him, assuring them that he needed their services to help him reconcile the Haleans with the Pheraeans in their present feud.³ As for them it is easy to see why they yielded. Apart from the fact that Philip's invitation was most flattering to their vanity, the contest for Philip's favor was now waxing hot between the representatives of the various states assembled around her. To Aeschines and his coadjutors viewing matters as they did, it would seem imperative to be on the ground and press the cause of Athens. They would look upon departure as something

¹ FL 174.

² FL 523.

³ Hist. of Greece, ii p. 407.

very like desertion: not to be considered for a moment by patriotic and courageous men.

Demosthenes, on his part, would soon see how things were going. Such tactics employed by his colleagues, would have Philip inside Pylae before Athens could become thoroughly aware of the situation. Perceiving this fact, he would naturally act just as he says he acted. First, he drew up a report giving the state of the case in plain terms from his point of view, and endeavored to persuade the other ambassadors to ratify it that he might send it to the demos as the official report of the embassy.¹ Of course, he would not embody in it any accusations of Aeschines and his friends, but would simply tell the facts as he conceived them to be. But his colleagues refused to accept the document, and sent home instead, a report in harmony with their own ideas of the situation. Then in despair, Demosthenes hired a ship with his own funds and tried to get away in it to Athens, that he might in person inform his countrymen of the danger; but Philip, having little mind to allow such a proceeding, interfered to prevent his embarkation.² It seems strange to me that historians should be inclined to disbelieve both of these statements: yet such is the case. Why, it is asked, did not Demosthenes send a private letter to the demos when his report was rejected? But Grote points out³ most pertinently that he had only suspicion; and while the suspicion of a whole embassy might have had weight with the people, those of 1 member only, especially when opposed by the confident

A. 2, 136. 188.

expectations of the rest, would have been none. Moreover, it would have been nearly, if not quite, as easy for Demosthenes to get away himself, as to send a letter. Concerning the hiring of the ship, it was of course an extraordinary and unsafe proceeding, yet what other remedy could he find? And Demosthenes was not the man to let obstacles stand in the way of fulfillment of his aims. That he would be hindered in carrying out such a project, is almost certain. Philip could easily do so, if he wished: and we may be sure he had no intention of letting the orator go. He would no doubt plead some lawful motive as excuse e. g. that the peace would not be regular unless all the ambassadors were present to administer oaths to his allies.

When finally he had completed all his preparations, Philip, about the beginning of Scirophorion began to move Southward at the head of his army. All the Grecian ambassadors accompanied him on the march. Everybody was now in a state of excited expectancy. Already, as I have said, the rivalry of the various parties about the person of the King had grown keen and intense. Even while still in Macedonia the Spartan representatives had actually openly broken with those of Thebes and threatened them frequently in a most violent manner. Aeschines and his friends on their part were urging the desires of Athens upon Philip with right good will. It is evident from Aeschines's words that they met with much encouragement. Philip indeed seems to have been

¹ A. 2, 136 ff.

² D. FL 175 charges that finally both by night and by day the others would go away leaving A. with Philip. A. 2, 134 ff denies only that he visited Philip at night.

³ A. 2, 120. ἡμῶν καὶ Φιλίππου τὴν ἐξαίφνης ἐμόνοιαν.

silent, but his friends talked. Some of them told some of the Athenian ambassadors explicitly that Philip was going to reconstitute the cities in Boeotia. The Theban ambassadors themselves were evidently in perplexity and fear. The Thessalians made sport of everybody else, saying the expedition was on their behalf. The Euboeans intimated to Aeschines pretty clearly that they were afraid Philip was going to hand over Euboea to Athens in return for Amphipolis. Everything seemed on Athens' side. Moreover, Philip personally bestowed many flattering attentions upon Aeschines and possibly upon some of the other Athenians. Aeschines and he, indeed, became finally quite intimate, Aeschines visiting his tent frequently alone, in spite of the express prohibition of such solitary interviews in the instructions of the demos.² The result of all this was that Aeschines and his friends received the impression that they and Philip were in full harmony and concord;³ and that he had been won over by their efforts to play the game of Athens. I need not say that Demosthenes took no part in any of this activity. He had now, as far as we can see, definitely broken with his colleagues. As for them they ignored him entirely, leaving him out of their deliberations and doing everything they could to snub him and thrust him aside: in which endeavors they were no doubt heartily seconded by Philip.

At last, however, when the Macedonian army had reached Pherae, Aeschines and his friends conceived that it was time to set out for Athens. This may have been their own idea, but it is

¹ News would have been brought by the Paccian envoys in any case.

² D-FL 333 ff-gives a graphic picture of Paillio's anxiety at this point.

³ For D.'s way of putting it, see FL 77.

rather probable that it was suggested by Philip. To slip through Pylae without the knowledge of Athens would have been impossible as events proved;¹ and Philip no doubt anticipated as much.

Athens would hear of his proximity in time to interfere and as she had already checked his progress once at this point, she might quite possibly do it again.² He had already detained her ambassadors long enough to make certain that she should learn the true state of affairs at as late a moment as possible; and now it was expedient for him to send them home, in order that they, being themselves fully convinced of his friendly intentions toward Athens might exercise their influence in his behalf among their fellow citizens when the inevitable revelation should come.³ Demosthenes, of course, might do some damage, but that would be more than counterbalanced by the efforts of his colleagues. He took the precaution, however, as we shall see later, to discredit the orator as much as possible with the demos: while nothing short of the actual making of explicit promises did he leave undone to lend weight to what Aeschines and the rest might say. Just how far he and they determined upon a plan of concerted action, after their arrival, it is impossible to say: but no one will deny that we find matters at Athens proceeding with a most suspicious smoothness and harmony toward the goal of Philip's advantage. Such a plan, if it existed would be looked upon by Aeschines and his friends as a laudable and patriotic device for defeating the pernicious aims of Demosthenes, Hegesippus and the other "jingo" at an exceedingly critical

¹ FL 273. οὐς Φίλιππος αὐτοῖς προσέπεμψε, τούτους ἄρκισαν.

² A. 2. 129.

³ FL 158.

⁴ From the 3d. of Munychion to the 15th. of Scirophorion was 70 days. D. rhetorically calls it three whole months. FL 57, 156.

So, then, the ambassadors decided to start homeward.

Yet, before this could be done, it was necessary to fulfill that irksome clause of their instructions which directed them to visit the cities of Philip's allies and administer the oaths to the treaty: at a time, too, when delay was most undesirable. Philip, however, had a way out of the difficulty. To accommodate them he offered to send to them such representatives of those cities as were present with him, and let them swear the oaths on behalf of their respective states; so that the whole business might be finished in Pherae at once.¹ He would also, he said, dispatch later to Athens envoys from such of his allies as were not then represented in his train, that they, too, might swear in due form.²

His offer was accepted; and stationed in a common inn opposite the Dioscoreum, the ambassadors received those whom Philip sent into them as representatives of his allies and administered to them the oaths. "A disgraceful business—and unworthy of Athens!" declares Demosthenes, telling of it three years later in a burst of indignation with which we cannot but sympathise.³

When this ceremony had been completed and their instructions carried out to their own satisfaction, the ambassadors left Pherae and began the journey to Athens. They were, indeed returning after an absence of 70 days,⁴ with a record which history agrees with Demosthenes in declaring to be one continuous betrayal of their country's interest: yet there is absolutely nothing to show that they at all realized this fact. To the best of our

knowledge, they took their homeward way, not conscious-stricken and in guilty fear--as historians like to paint them--but elated and full of hope, with a proud consciousness of having effectively done their duty. The ambassadors, I say, with one exception Demosthenes, "after being outvoted and silenced" ever since he left home, was now looking forward with feverish impatience to the moment when at last he could meet his countrymen face to face and show to them the full extent of the impending danger.

¹ 1.2, 137.

² When the can returned. See D.S. chronological reckoning of the important events from this point down to the announcement of Percyus c.137. PL 57 ff.

³ PL 17 ff.

VII.

We are not told anything about the state of affairs at Athens during the absence of the 10, but it will not tax our imagination much to picture it as it must have been. At first the thought that the war with its burdens was ended would bring with it nothing but joy and a sense of rest: while the future would be lit up by the expectation of the "wonderful blessings to come." Yet as time went on and nothing was heard of the ambassadors, wonder would arise; which, together with the rumors now afloat in Greece as to Philip's intended expedition, would soon lead to irritation and uneasiness. At length, however, the encouraging report of the ambassadors sent from Pella, would arrive to allay all fears and give fresh life to the people's hopes. Yet, as the 10 still delayed, uneasiness would again be felt. Finally, sometime before their return the demos received Philip's letter (or letters) inviting the Athenians to march out and aid the cause of justice. Whether or no there was any idea of coupling with this invitation is uncertain. At any rate, the "jingoese", Hegesippus at their head, vehemently opposed such action and carried their point.¹ All this combined with the rumors of Philip's nearer approach and the fear and distrust which despite all promises, these tidings created, would raise the excitement in Athens, by 13th of Scirophorion,² to a high pitch.

Hence it is that when the 10 at last arrived and entered the Boule to make their report, "the *Βουλευτηριον* was full

PL 52.

. 52 . 52

after the first embassy, Demosthenes being a senator had the privilege of acting as spokesman: and so he came forward and began his report. He gave his view of the situation with terrible clearness. He recounted the first glowing hopes that had been brought to Athens by Ctesiphon and Aristodemus and recalled how, after that, when the peace was being concluded, Aeschines had made promises: he showed to what extremities they had now brought the state: and urged his hearers again and again not to let go what little was left—the Phocians and Pylae—and not by clinging to hopes on hopes and promises on promises, to let matters go on to utter ruin. His words had the desired effect. The Boulé were won over and some senator, not Demosthenes, proposed and carried a *προβούλευμα* probably embodying the orator's recommendations as to future action; though this we only infer. The fact that Demosthenes commented upon when he had it to read in the action was that it neither commends the ambassadors nor invites them to dinner in the prytaneum: a thing, he says, which never happened to anyone before.

The impression created by Demosthenes's speech upon the public mind must have been profound. Alarm at Philip's approach mingled itself with anger at the 10 for their delay and apparent treason. Yet it is to be remarked that to all appearances the Athenians did not think Philip as near as he really was. Demosthenes had left him at Pherae and whatever he might suspect, had no means of actually knowing that the King was even now at Pylae. We do not learn what he told the Boulé on this point, but it looks

¹ I infer this from D.'s words in FL 34, where there is a silent contrast between the conditions when the Boule met and those when the assembly met. This cannot mean that the members of the assembly had not heard D.'s announcement, because not present in the Boule, since the proceedings of that body would have been noised abroad immediately. More, if there had been any idea of immediate danger, an assembly would have been called forthwith, and two whole days would not have been allowed to elapse before the meeting.

² A. 2, 136.

³ FL 320.

⁴ A. 2, 137

⁵ At least he had been accompanied on his southward march by Phocian ambassadors who shared to some degree in the expectation of the Athenian envoys as to Philip's sumbling of Phoeas. (D. 2, 11)

as if the impression received was that there was no necessity for immediate action.¹ The alarm and anger of the people attained a climax, however, when just before the assembly on the 16th came the definite news that the invading army was actually before Thermopylae.

And here let us pause a moment to glance at the situation around the Gates of Greece.

Philip, (as far as we can see) on the departure of the Athenian ambassadors marched straight from Pherae to Pylae. Affairs were now for him approaching a crisis. He was openly the friend of the Thebans and the Thessalians. Of these, the latter trusted him entirely and were eager to aid him against the Phocians.² Demosthenes indeed says³ he was having troubles in Thessaly and at first the Pheraeans refused to follow him, but this evidently refers to an earlier time in the year, and probably the matter was now settled. Of the Thessalians, then, he could be sure. The Thebans, however, were suspicious and could easily be turned against him by any little error he might make. They had marched out in force, ready to help him, indeed, should he take their part, but just as ready to fight him if he should act in any way contrary to their interests.⁴ Just now they were waiting to see his next move. Before him were the Phocians in the pass. To these he was openly an enemy, though he had done his best of late to make them believe he was secretly their friend.⁵ He must get the pass from them before he could do anything else. If they would yield it

¹ FL 520.

² FL 524. This is clear, as D. argues, from their sending to Athens. (FL 58)

³ FL 77.

⁴ FL 53. D. implies that this happened contemporaneously with the arrival of the ten at Athens. Diodorus (16, 59) says that Philip intended to assault the pass, but that Phalaecis prevented him by sending an embassy to him. This seems to me unlikely.

without resistance, good; but if they should persist in holding it then complications would arise. The pass was invincible, yet he could get round it by sea, and no doubt, he had transports ready. Nothing would be easier, were the Phocians alone concerned. But here was presented the question as to what Athens, Phocis' weighty ally, would do. If in confidence of Philip's good intentions toward her, she should let him alone, well; but if her suspicion should be aroused and she would determine to keep him out, a single vote of the demos could "fill the sea with triremes." In that case, it was doubtful if he would find the time ripe to come in to open conflict with her; or, if he should endeavor to force his way in spite of her opposition, perhaps he might not get off so easily in the end.¹ This the Phocians knew; and did they think Athens would help them they would probably hold out against him, for he was far from possessing their confidence.²

The supreme moment, therefore, in the diplomatic transactions Philip had been directing during the last few months, had come. He was face to face now with either failure or success. The Lacadaemonians had, to be sure, withdrawn from Pylae,³ and so 1 factor in the problem was gone; but the more perplexing ones still remained. It must have been with considerable anxiety, accordingly, that Philip, about the 13th of Scirophorion took his station in front of Thermopylae and began to communicate directly with the Phocians as to their withdrawal.⁴ What arguments he used to induce them to yield the pass, is not known; but we may judge

² A. seems to forget this change in Phalaecus' attitude in 2,135.

¹ FL 59.

³ There is no mention of these envoys obtaining a hearing - a fact that may indicate that they were not ambassadors at all, but merely, as A. calls them, dromokerukes. Possibly the Paocians and Phalaecus acted independently and sent the one an embassy, the other dromokerukes: though this is improbable. A. 2,130.

⁴ FL 58,59,54 ff. ὕμῳς ἐκπεπληγμένους τῇ παρουσίᾳ τὸ πρῶτον τῇ τοῦ Φιλίππου, καὶ τούτοις ὀριζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ προηγγελκεῖναι.

from Demosthenes's words that at first he employed promises rather than threats. But the Phocians were not won over. The actual presence of Philip and his army filled them with a dread and an apprehension which no fair words could allay. In their indecision they turned, as might have been expected, to the power that 6 years before had stood between their routed army and this very foe—that now again alone was able to save them, if their fears as to Philip's real intentions should prove true. Some time earlier there had been 2 parties in Phocis with different feelings toward Athens but now, in the hour of peril, Phalaecus and the opposition alike united in sending an embassy to the Athenian people. From Demosthenes's own words it appears that the object of this embassy was not distinctly hostile to Philip, but that the Phocians merely wished to be advised what course to pursue. We may infer, however, from this action of theirs that they were willing to combine with Athens whatever reasonable measures she might adopt. Phalaecus' attitude toward Athens had changed much.² Yet we learn of no offer to cede the passes such as was earlier made.³

These ambassadors then, arriving in Athens, as they did on the 16th, probably brought the news of Philip's presence at Thermopylae; but how so ever it came, it threw Athens into uproar and confusion.⁴ In the midst of the excitement, the assembly which was to hear and act upon the report of the ambassadors was convened.

¹ FL 19.

² FL 19. τὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ πράγματα λυμηνάμεν' ὑμῶν καὶ διαφθεί-
ρανθ' ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἥδη. See also dC 33 a.f., 142 a.f.. A. professes to be vastly
amused at the idea that Philip got through Pylae οὐ τοῖς αὐτοῦ στρατηγήμα-
σιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς . A. 2, 150. Also 2, 10.
ἐμαῖς δημηγορίαις]

³ FL 19 ff. See also dC 35: A. 2, 119; D. 5, 10: 6, 30, where a promise that Philip
would dig through the Oerschesus at his own expense is mentioned. Cf. De Hal.
40. FL 74, 112.

Under the circumstances it looked much as if some measure of *Βοηθεία* would be passed, and to initiate such measure the *προβούλευμα* of Demosthenes' friends was ready. But fate willed it otherwise. When the report of the ambassadors was called for, Aeschines rose before all the others and addressed the people.¹ I give the account of his speech found in Demosthenes's oration on the embassy. Demosthenes often dwelt upon Aeschines's words at this juncture. In his eyes, they were the finishing stroke.²

As Demosthenes has it,³ then, Aeschines said nothing of the actual business transacted on the embassy: he did not mention the proceedings that had already taken place in the *Boulé*, as to whether he had spoken the truth or no; but entirely passing over all this, he began to paint the future in brilliant colors. He had, he said, persuaded Philip to do everything Athens wanted both as to the *Amphictyons* and in everything else; and he recounted a long speech against the Thebans which he professed to have addressed to Philip, giving in full the main points thereof. And he reckoned that as a result of his activity on the embassy, the Athenians, remaining themselves quietly at home, without a campaign and without bother, would in two or three days hear that Thebes had been isolated from the rest of Boeotia and was being besieged by itself: that Thespieae and Plataea were being reconstituted: that the money was being collected for Apollo, not from the Phocians, but from the Thebans, who had first plotted the seizure of the temple;

¹ A. likewise laid stress on the community of interest binding Athens and Phil-
is together against the threats of 35.

² FL 35.

³ { FL 35-~~36~~
FL 19. ἅπαντας ὑμῶν λαβὰν ἄχετο.

⁴ FL 42:30 36.

⁵ FL 85. καὶ κατὰ Θηβαίων ἐλπίδες.

⁶ FL 36.

for, he said, he had instructed Philip that the plotters were no less impious than those who had actually carried the deed out: and for this the Thebans had set a price upon his head.² Furthermore, he said, some of the Euboeans, who were in a great state of fear at the friendship that had sprung up between Philip and Athens, had said to the ambassadors "You need not think we do not know the conditions on which you Athenians have made peace with Philip, or are ignorant that he has agreed to give you Euboea in return for Amphipolis." Yes, and there was something else he had managed, which he wouldn't tell just now, for some of his fellow ambassadors were jealous of him; thus hinting that Athens was to recover Oropus also.

The effect of this speech was tremendous. The demos, at the first hostile to the orator, were soon carried utterly off their feet by his glowing promises and filled the air with storms of wild applause.³ Nor should this surprise us. Aeschines had good reason for his success. He had played upon the strongest passion of the Athenian heart—the hatred of Thebes⁴—and he had wonderfully renewed and refreshed those delicious "hopes against Thebes,"⁵ which were so soon to prove vanity and emptiness. And now, when the applause had died away, he produced the letter of Philip to the demos,⁶ which the ambassadors (or probably he himself personally) had brought home. This letter is alluded to by both Aeschines and Demosthenes, and it is not hard to make out much of its contents. Philip announced that he had sworn the oaths before

¹ 1. 2, 199.

² FL 38.

³ FL 39.

⁴ FL 41.

⁵ FL 39. . . ὥς καλὴ καὶ φιλαίνθρωπος.

⁶ FL 37, 39. περὶ δὲ Φωκέων ἢ Θηβαίων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς οὕτως
ἀπήγγειλεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ.

⁷ FL 40.

the ambassadors in due form. He gave a list of his allies that were present at the ceremony and promised to send those who had come too late for it, to Athens to swear there.¹ As to the conduct of the Athenian ambassadors, he said that they had intended visiting the several cities to receive the oaths, but that he himself had prevented them and kept them with him, in order that they might help him reconcile the Haleans with the Pharsalians.² He then spoke of the Athenian prisoners which he had taken at Olynthus: no doubt repeating the assurance already made to the 10, that he would send them home at the Panathenaic Festival.³ Finally he expressed his good will toward the city, saying that while he did not himself know what he could do to oblige the demos, yet he would be glad to carry out whatever they might suggest provided he did not injure his honor or his fame by so doing.⁴ The general tone of the letter was most courteous and friendly;⁵ but "not a grunt" did it contain in respect to the Phocians or the Thebans or anything else that Aeschines had to say.⁶ Furthermore, Demosthenes points out it was significant that Philip "did not know what he could do to oblige the Athenians" now, when before the peace he had written on this wise "I should say clearly what great things I will do for you if I knew I should get your alliance as well as the peace."⁷ Now, however, that he had got both peace and alliance these "great things" had vanished into mist.

But the people saw nothing of this. To them the latter

¹ as D. points out. FL 37.

² The "reconciliation" resulted, D. informs us, in the exiling of the Haeleas and the ruin of their city. FL 32.

³ FL 36. A. denies the charge (2,124) but his attempt to make it appear absurd (2,129) fails of its purpose, since he has only part of the letter read, or at any rate comments on only a part of it.

seemed only to confirm Aeschines' statements. Being in a most pleasant frame of mind, they were ready to accept unquestioningly Philip's apology for the dereliction of the 10: though of course, such an apology was a mockery, transferring, as it did, the guilt upon one who could not be punished by Athenian laws.¹ Moreover, the picture of the Athenian ambassadors joining with Philip in reconciling the states of Greece, would be a flattering tribute to Athenian hegemony which could not fail to please.² The announcement, too, of Philip's intention to liberate the captives would cause real and fervent thanksgiving. On the whole, the letter was excellently fitted to heighten the impression already made by Aeschines on the people: and it is not hard to believe with Demosthenes that it was written in conjunction with him and his associates, and intended directly for such a purpose.³

It is further noticeable that this letter was kept from Demosthenes so that he could not produce it or comment upon it when he made his report in the Boulé: and that, to all appearances, he was hearing it now for the first time. This fact shows how utterly he was thrust to one side on the embassy by Philip and his own colleagues, how little knowledge he had of what was going on among them. Their object in keeping him in ignorance of the latter would be both to prevent his commenting upon it—which he could have done most effectively—and also to discredit him with the demos. They knew how he would act when he got to Athens and desired

¹ Cf. FL 44, 45.

² FL 38-40. The exact meaning of this passage has, to my mind, not yet been discovered; but its general significance is plain. D's pride in his generous exertions and sacrifices in ransoming these captives was one of his vulnerable points. See FL 332, 339, 339; 40 516: 8, 71. A. ridicules his action. (A. 2, 100.)

³ FL 25.

⁴ FL 44.

⁵ FL 23.

⁶ FL 45.

⁷ Cf. 5, 10.

to take the wind out of his sails as much as possible. Indeed, it was not till now, apparently, that he had any definite idea of what promises Aeschines intended to make: though when he spoke in the Boulé he knew promises would be made and guessed what they would be. From Aeschines' speech and from his presenting Philip's letter, the audience would easily get the impression that he was the man who was aware of Philip's intentions and that Demosthenes was merely a jealous, suspicious outsider. This impression would be heightened by a statement in the letter expressly casting a slur upon his activity in ransoming the prisoners.² So it was that Aeschines prepared the way for Demosthenes's opposition, which he knew was sure to come.

"And being a high feather" from his glowing promises (Demosthenes goes on to say)³—"naturally and seeming to be both a splendid orator and a wonderful man, he stepped down" from the bema" very pompously." "And I,⁴ hearing his promises, and knowing certainly that he was lying - - - rose and coming forward, tried to reply" . "And Aeschines,⁵ here and Philocrates, jumping up one from one side and the other from the other, began to bawl out and to interrupt me and finally to jeer me"; "And⁶ as you wouldn't hear me, I kept quiet, saying only so much 'I know nothing of this and have no share in it' and I added 'I don't expect to either'.⁷ And as it enraged you for me to say I didn't expect it, 'Take care, men of Athens', I cried, 'If any of this happens, take care that

¹ FL 24. For this scene see also D. 6, 29 ff.

² FL 55.

³ FL 50 a. i. . εἰς Φωκίαν here does not mean "against the Phocians" as FL 173 shows.

⁴ Who was then near Pylae. FL 52.

you give these fellows praises and houses and crowns; but if not, wreak your anger on them. I wash my hands of it.' 'Yes' cried Aeschines here, interrupting; 'Yes, but don't wash your hands now, and then lay claim to the glory.' 'If I do, I'm a scoundrel' said I. And Philocrates jumping up, with all his insolence cried, 'No wonder, men of Athens that I and Demosthenes don't think alike; for he drinks water and I drink wine.' And you burst out laughing." "And you did what was perfectly natural. For who expecting such great blessings would have put up with a man either saying all this was false or finding fault with what these fellows had done. For everything was small compared with what you expected and hoped, and he who opposed seemed a mere disturber and slanderer, while—oh, what wonderful things you thought these were that had been done for the state!"

After that Aeschines and his friends had it all their own way. No one so much as read the *προβούλευμα* to the assembly.² They were at liberty to make their own motions as to the future action of Athens and were quite sure of passing them. And here Demosthenes accuses them of inconsistency which to his mind proves their corruption quite clearly. First, he says, that, knowing that Philip had invited the Athenians to come to his aid, they should have proposed that the citizens make an exodus themselves, or at any rate send Proxenus,⁴ to aid the Phocians.³ This measure would not have been hostile to Philip, if Philip's promises

¹FL 52.

²FL 43 z.f., 47. οὐδέν ἄλλο φανήσονται πλὴν παραδόντες Φι-
λίππῳ καὶ Θηβαίοις Φωκέας, μόνον οὐκ ὀπίσω τῷ χεῖρε
δήσαντες.

were really to be fulfilled, for it would mean not to aid the Phocians against Philip and his allies, the Thebans and Thessalians but to aid Philip and the Phocians against those who were really their common enemies. As a matter of fact, had such action been taken and the combined forces of Athens and Phocis occupied Pylae by land or sea, Philip would have been in a corner: for the allies would not have admitted the Thessalians and Philip would have had to declare against them then and there or stay out. Yet, if Philip's true purposes had been, as Aeschines declared they were, friendly to Athens and Phocis, these measures would have been eminently proper for Aeschines to urge—advantageous not only to Athens and Phocis but to Philip also. For all this, Aeschines told the Athenians they need only remain quietly at home, and if he mentioned an exodus or $\beta\omicron\nu\acute{\kappa}\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ at all, certainly did not advocate it. Demosthenes had no other explanation for this neglect than that it was due to a corrupt understanding with Philip. That it bespeaks an understanding is not to be doubted. Yet this understanding might have been nothing more than an assurance on Philip's part that he could settle things without bothering the Athenians, and an honest belief in this assurance on the part of Aeschines. If Aeschines did not think it necessary thus to bother the Athenians, he surely would not propose such an unpopular thing as an exodus.

Secondly, Demosthenes claims² that the motion actually made and carried was really hostile to the Phocians. From Aeschi-

¹ PL 50.

² PL 49.

³ PL 50.

⁴ See C. 132.

nes's speech to Philip delivered in Macedonia (which he himself had just recounted to the assembly) we gather that Philip, (after his entrance into Pylae) was expected to assemble the Amphictyonic Council⁺ and entrust to ~~its~~ ^{his} decision the whole matter of the Sacred War. In this Council Athens, Sparta and the Boeotian towns, backed by Philip, were to overwhelm Thebes and Thessaly. Now, says Demosthenes,¹ such being the case, Aeschines and his friends should have moved an assembling of the Amphictyons or, if their assembling were already assured, they should have advocated a postponement of any action on the part of the Phocians until this assembly took place. Instead, Philocrates embodied in his decree the words² "If the Phocians do not do as they should and hand over the temple to the Amphictyons, the Athenian people will help in subjecting by force those who try to prevent this from being done;" which meant nothing more or less than to hand the temple over to the Thebans or the Thessalians since they were the only Amphictyons then on the ground.³

Demosthenes is to my mind right in this matter. To say the least, Philocrates was thus throwing away that advantage of possession which is $\frac{9}{10}$ of the law. Had Phocis, with Athens'

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It seems that Athens had already received her invitation, for we find delegates to the Council elected in this very assembly. It was brought no doubt by A and Co.⁴

¹ PL 48.

² PL 55.

help,⁺ given over nothing until the Amphictyons were all assembled the situation would have been far different. The meeting would have taken place with the Macedonian and Thessalian armies still outside Thermopylae and all the strong points in the hands of Athens and her allies. And yet Philip would have had no ground for complaint; for would not Athens and Phocis express their complete willingness to abide by the decision of the assembly whatever they might be? Now, however, we see Athens forcing the Phocians with hostile threats to surrender forthwith. But we must remember that to Aeschines and his friends, confident as they were of Philip's intention to hold such a meeting and to manage in it the interests of Athens, these precautions would seem quite unnecessary--if, indeed, they thought of them at all. From their point of view, the motion was not hostile to the Phocians. It would amount simply to a warning that they should not interfere in the execution of a plan which was entirely in their interest.

So much, therefore, for Demosthenes's accusations. Let us now examine the further proceedings of the assembly.

The decree, to which I have just alluded, was presented by Philocrates. It opened with copious praise of Philip,¹ ordaining that the peace and alliance contracted with Philip, should remain unchanged to his descendants also, and commending² him because

⁺ Demosthenes plainly implies that this would be needed. His two charges, which for clearness sake I have separated, thus hang together. In the oration they are not distinguished.

he promised to act justly [albeit as Demosthenes remarks, he promised nothing.] It then gave the warning to the Phocians, the words of which I have quoted above: and ended, possibly, by providing for the election of another embassy, to be sent as delegates to the coming Amphietyonic Council.¹ This decree was carried and a copy given to the Phocian ambassadors who set out homewards with it at all speed. Whether upon the motion of Philocrates or not, the assembly then proceeded to elect by show of hands the members of the new embassy.² Those chosen were mostly the men who had served on the two previous occasions, including Aeschines and likewise, strange to say, Demosthenes. He, however, was in no mind to serve under such circumstances. He had washed his hands publicly of the whole business. So now, coming forward immediately upon his election, he emphatically declined to go.³ Several disapproved noisily and shouted to him to go, but he remained firm in his decision: and we may infer that another ambassadors was elected in his stead. Soon after this the assembly adjourned.

In this account of the conduct of the two rival orators

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 (it is) We are not told that the election took place in this ecclesia but generally supposed^{that} it did. It seems to me most probable.

He may have been proposed by A and Co. to get him out of the way. But still had his staunch friends who would not forsake him now.

¹ A. 2, 119 ff.

² Cf. A. 2, 81.

³ Holm agrees with A. here (iii p. 260). "In the days of the democracy" he declares "the Athenians allowed everyone to speak" Theoretically, yes. Practically, by no means. Holm seems to forget the ominous frequency with which that word $\theta\acute{o}\rho\omicron\beta\omicron\varsigma$ appears in the orators from first to last.: If a modern critic, with the facts of history before him, can credit A. to this extent, we should not be surprised if we find many Athenians of his own day holding to him.

after their return from the 2nd embassy, I have followed Demosthenes, who, I am convinced tells us the truth. What Aeschines has to say upon the subject is briefly this.¹ He admits that he reported in full to the assembly the speech he made to Philip on the embassy: that he told the Athenians what Cleochares the Euboean had said: that the demos applauded enthusiastically. His answer to Demosthenes is that he did not promise anything²: he merely announced what he had heard, thinking it was his duty to inform the city of everything said concerning Hellenic affairs. Yet his denial is weak and at all events it is evident that he gave the impression Demosthenes describes, even if he didn't use the words Demosthenes puts in his mouth. To Demosthenes's³ assertion that he tried to reply but was shouted down, he opposed the statement that Demosthenes was called up and praised him. That was the time, he declares, for Demosthenes to say what he had to say. No Athenian ambassadors was ever refused a hearing by the demos.³

That Demosthenes acted thus is inconsistent with what Aeschines tells us of the relations between him and his colleagues on the 2nd embassy; with Demosthenes's own story, repeated again and again in almost the same words: and (as Grote says in another connection) "with all the probabilities of the case". At any rate, Aeschines's⁴ refutation is very lame. It is significant too, that while Demosthenes always lays stress on the proceedings of this assembly, Aeschines merely alludes to them here and in his third

¹ PL 132.11.

² This seems to be the situation contemplated in sec.133.

oration passes them over entirely. But to return to the story.

The warmth of excited hopes raised in the minds of the people by Aeschines's words in the assembly, seems to have soon cooled, and a reaction set in.¹ The Phocian ambassadors had gone, bearing to their people instructions to yield everything to Philip and his allies. A few days and the Macedonian would be in Pylae. Hope, indeed, was still strong, but mistrust began to grow in spite of hope. All sorts of rumors were presently afloat in the agora. Knots of men gathered here and there. After all, everything was as yet in the air. There was no telling what Philip might do when he was once "inside the gates" of Greece. We can see in fancy the uneasiness increasing every moment. Presently it came to look as if, of a sudden, a special assembly might be called, and—a thing not altogether new in the Athenian history—some course of action entirely different from that just adopted, be resolved upon. It was not too late to mend matters. Any news of Athens' coming to their aid would encourage the Phocians to hold the pass against Philip: or, if they should already have given it up,² they would at any rate be stimulated to resist him to the utmost behind the walls of their towns. And indeed, Demosthenes argues, even after his entrance into Pylae, Philip could not have remained had Athens and Phocis combined against him.

"For neither were there provisions in the country (Phocia) it being unsown because of the war, nor could he transport them from without, if your triremes were on the spot and controlled the

¹ FL 122. A. says he really was sick. He states, moreover that he did not resign finally, but promised to go if he were able. What is the truth of the matter we can never know. (A. 2, 94.)

² FL 124.

sae; and the(Phocian) cities were numerous and hard to overcome, not to be taken, indeed, but by a lengthy siege: for if he had taken a city a day, there were 22 of them."

This argument may sound improbable to some, but it is not to be denied, that such a combination would have been, if not positively dangerous, at least most embarrassing to Philip. Of that fact Aeschines and his associates were not ignorant. They knew that if another assembly should take place and Demosthenes get a hearing, he might win over the people and induce them to pass such a resolution on the Phocian question as would bring upon Philip certainly troubles and delays, and possibly failure: and Philip's failure meant to them the blighting of the fair hopes of Thebes' humiliation. If they should all go away on the embassy and leave Demosthenes alone in town, he would be more likely bring this about. They deemed it wise, accordingly, for one of their number to stay behind at Athens and mount guard: so that, after the assembly in which the ambassadors were elected had adjourned, they held a meeting to decide who this sentinel should be: with a result that the choice fell upon Aeschines. Such at least, is Demosthenes's story (not altogether improbable) whereby he explains Aeschines's subsequent conduct.¹ Certain it is, that before the ambassadors set out, Aeschines's brother² took the physician Execestus with him into the Boule and declared on oath that the orator was sick and unable to go: whereupon he himself was elected by that body in his

¹ That eight or nine days intervened between the departure of the ten and the return of Dercylus is unlikely, if they got no farther than Chalcis. It is more probable therefore that they did not leave Athens till the 22d or 23d.

² D. places this on the 20th. (FL 59.)

³ FL 53. τὰ παρ ὑμῶν ἐπύθοτο ἐκ τῆς ἐκκ., τὸ τὲ φήψισμα τοῦτ' ἐλάβον τὸ τοῦ Φιλοκράτους.

⁴ FL 53 ff.

⁵ κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους ἀπώλοντο

⁶ FL 58. Diodor. 13, 59. Possibly by this time Philip had grown tired of waiting, and actually was making preparations to "decide the issue by a battle" See note opp. p. 121.

⁷ FL 62 ff. The inference he draws is certainly thus far correct - that the Phocians had more confidence in Philip than in the Amphictyons present; but I suspect that Philip himself had something to do with excluding these as parties to the treaty. He would not be unwilling to keep things in his own hands.

brother's stead.

On the 18th or 19th¹ the ambassadors left Athens, probably directing their course to Pylae, where they would expect to meet Philip. They had scarcely well begun their journey, when on the 20th² the Phocians heard the news from Athens (including Aeschines's promises) and received the decree of the demos.³ The effect produced upon them is strikingly described by Demosthenes: and there seems no reason to doubt his accuracy in the matter.⁴ "Some among them" he says "mistrusted Philip, like sensible men. These were encouraged to have confidence. Why? Because they were convinced that not even if Philip deceived them 10 times, would he ever dare to deceive the Athenian ambassadors, but that what Aeschines promised was true and that ruin was coming upon the Thebans, not upon them. There were others, who fancied they must resist at all costs. But even they weakened, being persuaded of Philip's friendship and knowing that if they did not yield, you would march against them—you whom they expected to aid them. Yes, and some thought you would repent of having made peace with Philip," and lo! they see you voting that it continue to his descendants. So were the luckless Phocians "done for on all counts."⁵ By common consent ambassadors were sent to Philip and a treaty was concluded;⁶ only a little over a day being spent in settling upon the terms. The parties were on one side, Phalaecus and the Phocians, on the other, Philip alone.⁷ Phalaecus handed over to Philip Nicaea and

¹ Diodor. 16, 52. A. 3, 140 a. f., 142.

² FL 58, 61. Diodor. 16, 52.

³ FL 59 a. f.

⁴ Diodorus says he held a council with the Thebans and Thessalians and decided to assemble the Amphic. Council. to which full power should be given to settle everything. But, as I said (p. 130), Athens had already known of the meeting and elected delegates thereto before Philip got through Pylae.

⁵ xi p. 421. Yet A. represents the Thebans as still in uncertainty about Philip's action, when the third embassy arrived. 2, 140 Certainly Grote is wrong in adding "of transferring to them Oronomenus, Korsiae, and Koroneia....and of keeping the rest of Boeotia in their dependence, just as he found it." These matters were decided by the Council.

⁶ No city was taken by siege or by assault. All joined in the treaty. FL 61 ff.

⁷ FL 60, 125.

Alponus, the places commanding the pass: and in return he and his mercenaries good in number, were permitted to depart wherever they wished.¹ The remaining Phocians surrendered their cities to the king and threw themselves upon his mercy.² This was on the 22nd of Scirophorion.³

So Philip marched through Pylae at last. Exactly what happened upon his entrance into Hellas proper, it is impossible to know.⁴ Probably, as Grote says⁵ "The moment he was master of the country, he joined his forces with those of the Thebans and proclaimed his purpose of acting throughly upon their policy." We may infer also that he took immediate advantage of the treaty by occupying the Phocian towns with an armed force.⁶ At any rate, when the Athenian ambassadors reached Chalcis in Euboea they heard the startling news that Philip had played entirely into the hands of the Thebans.⁷ Whether this intelligence was merely a general rumor or clear and definite information we can only guess. From Demosthenes' words and also, I think, from the probabilities of the case, we may judge that it was the former. But it was enough to throw the ambassadors into consternation. To go on with the embassy under such changed conditions appeared unallowable and they forthwith started back to Athens. One of their number, Dercyllus, in his anxiety to make known the evil tidings at home, pressed forward ahead of his colleagues.⁷ On the 27th he reached the city and found his fellow citizens assembled in the Piræus deliberating as to docks and arsenals. We can see him breathless and excited

¹ This I take to be the meaning of the last statement.

² FL 135. ff.

³ Grote, xi p. 423. See FL 88: dJ 36 ff; 7A. 3, 80.

⁴ A. 2, 139.

⁵ A. had now recovered and was on the scene. A. 2, 95.

bursting into their midst and with loud voice compelling the attention of the throng. Philip, he said, had persuaded the Phocians to surrender. He was inside Pylae. He had played entirely into the hands of the Thebans, and the Phocians were done for. More, it was now the 5th day since the surrender had taken place. What might he not have done in the meantime? ¹

Immediately the people were in uproar.² Rage at Aeschines and his fellow ambassadors for having tricked them with the hopes that they now saw were a delusion, was combined with consternation at the thought suggested by Democylus that Philip might even now be marching into Attica at the head of an hostile army. Dockyards and arsenals were forgotten and all set themselves to considering what must be done to avert the danger. On the motion of Callisthenes it was decreed "To put the Piraeus; as well as the fortresses throughout Attica, in immediate defence. To bring within these walls, for safety, all the women and children and all the movable property now spread abroad in Attica."⁴ To celebrate the approaching festival of the Heroclea not in the country as was usual, but in the interior of Athens. Such were the significant votes, the like of which had not been passed in Athens since the Peloponnesian War attending the terrible reaction of feeling occasioned by the disastrous news from Phocis."³

By the time that the rest of the ambassadors returned, however, the excitement seems to have subsided somewhat. It would probably soon be pointed out by Aeschines and his friends that the

¹ A. 2, 95.

² D.'s own words show that he was reelected and resigned a second time FL 172 a.f.

³ That is, if what D. says of A.'s journey may be may be applied to that of the embassy as a whole. FL 127.

cf. A. 2, 117, συλλεγόντων δὲ τῶν Α. εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν.

A. 2, 140 ff.

news just received was not final: that the Phocians were not yet condemned: that in spite of appearances, matters might yet be settled satisfactorily in the Amphictyonic Council, and that, at all events, it was decidedly to Athens' advantage to have representatives in the coming meeting of that body. Certainly, we find the Athenians voting "for the ambassadors to go on their mission none the less."¹ No new election of ambassadors was held but those chosen in the beginning were simply reappointed as a whole.-- Among them were of course Aeschines and Demosthenes.² Aeschines now felt well enough to serve and accepted the post. Demosthenes, however, again declined. This action of the demos seems to me to ridicule that Aeschines's party were now once more in the ascendant; though as events proved, only temporarily so.

The ambassadors set out in haste from Athens and passed through Thebes and the Theban encampment on the way.³ Their destination was probably Delphi, as it seems that the Amphictyonic Council was held there in the temple of Apollo. Aeschines mentions briefly the conditions he found prevailing upon their arrival. No Athenian troops were present and Phalaecus had already gone away ὁπλοῦσιν, so that the Phocians were unprotected: the Thebans (who had turned out in full force) had taken up their position on Philip's flank, and their ambassadors were plying him with entreaties: the Thessalians had joined forces with the Thebans; while the Orchomenians, beside themselves with fear, were begging

¹ Diodor. 13, 59.

² D. 5, 19. Also FL 61, 64 a. f. Diodorus gives them very fully 16, 60.

³ D. complains of his admission FL 527.

Philip for security to leave Boeotia.

Amid such confusion and disorder the Council was held. Its business was to decide the whole matter of the Sacred War.¹ At least such was the task nominally entrusted to it by Philip. Of course Philip was the man who held the reins and possessed the real power of decision. Yet it would not have been wise for him to enforce his power directly, since this would have been too great a shock to Hellenic public opinion. It was much better to have all things seemingly done by the lawful, recognised power of the Council. Hence we find that body now debating over the fate of the Phocians and kindred matters with much zest. The result of their deliberations as embodied in the *δόγματα τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων*, mentioned by Demosthenes, has been already so well depermined by scholars that I shall merely give it in outline.² Firstly the Phocians were expelled from the Delphian temple and the Amphictyonic League and their 2 votes were given to Philip, who was now admitted as a member.³ Then the Phocian cities were stripped of their walls and their inhabitants dispersed in villages. The land was not taken away from its owners, but the natives were required to pay annually a tax of 50 talents into the treasury of the Delphian temple. The horses found in the country were sold and the arms destroyed. Those personally guilty of robbing the temple were proclaimed accursed and everywhere liable to arrest. Finally the suffrage of the Lacadaemonians was taken away, on the ground that they had been allies of Phocis: while the promantea

¹ FL 327 a.f. That it was awarded to Philip is stated in the doubtful passage D. 9, 32.

² A. 2, 142.

³ At any rate this explanation of Philip's conduct was soon current at Athens (D. 5, 22), and continued to be insisted on (D. 6, 14). See A's own words 2, 138 ff.

⁴ A. 1, 169. shows that not much later new promises of Philip were talked of, and that A. professed his confidence in them. One of these D. mentions 6, 14.

hitherto in the possession of Athens was awarded to Philip.¹

We thus see plainly from the results that the expected ascendancy of Athens in the Council proved to be an utter delusion; for the legislation enacted was all contrary to her own interests and ruinous to her allies, the Phocians. Whether or no their delegates exerted themselves greatly in her behalf, we cannot say. Once when the Oetean Locrians proposed that the Phocians of military age should be cast over a precipice, Aeschines in his capacity of delegate, introduced some Phocians into the Council and secured for them a hearing and also made a speech himself in their behalf. It was through these efforts of his, he tells us, that the proposition was defeated.² This statement may not be true: yet the incident shows that he was not altogether idle, and that he fancied himself to have some influence among the Amphictyons. He and his colleagues, however, seem to have acquired with readiness to the general action of that body. Of course, it is most probable that they would complain to Philip of their disappointment in not seeing Thebes humbled. He, however, would apologize and plead that he was being coerced by the Thebans and Thessalians because Hegesippus and the "jingoos" had prevented the Athenians from coming to his aid.³ He would further solace them, no doubt, by new promises and make hints as to what he would do when he should have extricated himself from the present difficulty.⁴ For the most part they made their minds easy and enjoyed themselves.

¹ A. and B. both plainly imply that it did not occur earlier.

² A. 9, 183, 182. FL 128, 538 a. f. .

When the business before the Council was finished,¹ cojointly with the other Amphictyons celebrated with sacrifice great feast of victory. The number of guests, including the ambassadors present from the Grecian states, amounted to two hundred. Thanksgivings were said over the downfall of the Persians, crowns distributed, paeans sung and healths drunk to Persians and others. The Athenian delegates, being of course invited attended, and Demosthenes alleges that Aeschines joined heartily in the festivities. Aeschines does not deny the charge, but rather tries to justify his conduct. "Athens was safe", he declares, "her citizens had suffered no misfortune; and if I did concert with all my colleagues, sing the paeon, when the god being honored and the Athenians were in no disgrace, I was doing an act of piety and not of wrong and ought to be acquitted therefore."²

ἕτα γὰρ ἄρχοντα Καλλίμαχον, ἐφ' οὗ τὰς εἰς Ὀλυθον βοηθείας ἀπέστειλαν Ἀθηναῖοι - Θεόφιλος ἔστιν ἄρχων, καθ' ὃν ἐκράτησε τῆς Ὀλυθίων πόλεως Φίλιππος.

² Καλλίμαχον, ἐφ' οὗ παρ' Ὀλυθίων ἦκε πρεσβεία περὶ τῆς βοηθείας, ἐπεὶ ἐπικέζοντο ὑπὸ Φιλίππου - τῶν δ' ἐξῆς - Φίλιππος Ὀλυθίους κατεστρέψατο.

³ Πλείους βοηθείας τοῖς Ὀλυθίοις ἀπέστειλαν οἱ Ἀθ. κατὰ μέρος. οἱ στρατώται οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς τελευταίας, πνθόμενοι τὴν Ὀλυθον ἠλωκέειν, πάλιν ὑπέστρεψαν καὶ ἄλλοι πάλιν ἀπῆλθον εἰς Θράκην.

⁴ Βοηθοὺς ἔπεμψαν Ἀθ. ναῦς μ' καὶ Χάρητα στρατηγόν οὗ, χειμῶνι ἀποληφθέντος, προδόντων δὲ τὴν Ὀλ., Εὐθυκαρέτους καὶ Λατθέουσι. τὴν μὲν ἀνάστατον ἐποίησε (Φίλιππος)

Also Aristeid. Panath. S. 179, 9 (ἡ πόλις ἔτασε) Χαλκιδέας τὸ καθ' αὐτὴν: + scholium αὐτοῦ it - εἶπε δὲ τὸ καθ' αὐτὴν. ἐπειδήπερ ἔπεμψαν αὐτοῖς Χάρητα τὸν στρατηγόν εἰς Βοήθειαν, τοῦ δὲ ὑστερήσαντος, ἐπρόβησε Φίλιππος τὴν Ὀλυθον.

NOTES .

I. The chronology of the events treated of in Chapter I. The chief question to be considered, is: When did Olynthus fall? Various opinions have been held, but to me the most probable is that of Grote (xi, p. 364), who places the event in the early spring of 347 B. C.. Others place it earlier. Schaeffer (ii, p. 152) says that it occurred in the very beginning of Ol. 108, 4, Summer 348. His arguments are these:

Philocorus (quoted by Dionysius Ep. ad Amm., ii, s. 736, 11) says that the Athenians sent the succours to Olynthus in 349-348: while Olynthus fell 348 - 347.

A passage in the Lives of the Ten Orators (s. 845d) informs us that the Olynthians sent an embassy to Athens appealing for aid in 349-348: that in the next year Philip subdued the city.²

The last succour sent out by Athens under Chares did not reach Olynthus before its fall, as we learn from a Scholium to D.'s Meidian oration, (197, s. 578, 3.)³ and Suidas⁴ under *Κάρπυος*. The latter passage further says that the reason for the delay of the expedition was a *Χειμῶν*, which Schaeffer takes to mean the Etesian winds.

Chares, therefore, "set out from Athens during 349-348, close upon the end of the year, immediately before the regular beginning of the Etesian winds. For that year had an extra month and did not end till July 16. If we allow for the Etesian winds their regular time of 40 days, Olynthus must have been taken before the end of August; otherwise, Chares' delay is inexplicable. With this date accords the festival of the Pierian Olympia: for this Alexander visited in the autumn of Ol. 111, 2, after he had destroyed Thebes. Arrian i, 11, 1. Diodor. 17, 16." ii, p. 157, n. 5.

But to place the fall of Olynthus so early in 348-347 scarcely agrees with Diodorus, who implies that it occurred later; for he says that after the beginning of the year Philip first got possession of Mecyberna and Torone by treachery, and then proceeded to attack Olynthus: the siege of which was not begun till two battles had been fought with the Olynthians. Even after that considerable time seems to have elapsed before he finally succeeded in, by corrupting the chief men of the city, in accomplishing his end. See cap. 53. bk. 16.. Schaeffer recognises this contradiction and declares that it is due to the inaccuracy of Diodorus. (ii p. 158 n. 4.)

A more serious difficulty is that presented by the account of Aeschines (2, 12 ff) which is the only contemporary evidence we have, and must in consequence be allowed great weight. If Olynthus fell at the end of August, we should have a vast deal happening in the two months immediately preceding. Phrynnon is captured during the Olympic truce, somewhere about midsummer. He sends to Athens for his ransom, and receives it—not a very speedy proceeding, we may believe. He returns to Athens. The embassy is sent to Philip, is heard, and returns. Philocrates' motion is made, and the mover is indicted with a *παρὰ νόμον γραφή*. The case comes up in due time and is tried. And then Olynthus falls. Moreover, we must remember that during forty days of this time the Etesian winds have been blowing, rendering sea travel towards the north impossible.

We should likewise have the Athenians dispatching an armament at a time when they knew that on account of these winds it would be unable to reach its destination.

Now it is Philochorus alone that puts the sending of the last succour in 349-348. The other passages quoted by Schaeffer say nothing of the time when it was dispatched, but merely state that during its voyage to Olynthus

¹ * * * τοῖς πνεύμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἄραις τοῦ ἔτους
τὰ πολλὰ προλαμβάναν διαπράττεται Φίλιππος, καὶ
φυλάξας τοὺς ἐτήσιαις ἢ τὸν χειμῶν' ἐπιχειρεῖ,
ἥνικ' ἔρ ἡμεῖς μὴ δυταίμεθα ἐκεῖα' ἀφικέσθαι.

² μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλῶσιν τῆς Ὀλύμπου Ὀλύμπια ποιήσας
(Φίλιππος) τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπινίκια, μεγαλοπρεπεῖς θυσίας
συντετέλεσε. (16, 55)

* * * παρορμήσας διὰ τῶν δόρων πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶτας,
θυσίας μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τοῖς θεοῖς συντετέλεσεν ἐν Δίῳ
τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ σκηνικοὺς ἀγῶτας Διὶ καὶ
Μούσαις, οὓς Ἀρχέλαος ὁ προβασιλεύσας πρῶτος
κατέδειξε. (17, 16)

~~τοῦτο δὲ πράξας (i.e. taking Olympians), χρημάτω δὲ
πολλῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εὐπόρησε, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις
τὰς ἐναντιουμένας κατεπληξάτο. τοὺς δὲ~~

³ ἐπεὶ δὲ γὰρ εἶδεν Ὀλύμπου Φίλιππος, Ὀλύμπι'
ἐποίει, εἰς δὲ τὴν θυσίαν ταύτην καὶ τὴν παήνηριν
πάντας τοὺς τεχνίτας συνήγαγεν

that city fell. The word χειμῶν however seems to indicate that this occurred during the winter or thereabouts, certainly not in the summer, since the word means a storm such as occurs in winter, and can not refer to the Etesian winds, as D. 4, 31' shows: the ἐτήσια and the χειμῶν being there distinctly contrasted. The ἐτήσια were ἄνεμος.

The reference to the Pierian Olympia proves nothing, since it is clear from Diodorus himself that this festival was not that which Philip celebrated after the capture of Olynthus; for the latter he instituted at the time, while the latter were instituted by Aronelaus.²

Did therefore Philochorus make a mistake? His source was no doubt the official records at Athens, where the various succours voted would be recorded accurately. Yet we know that these records did not always correspond with the facts. The Athenians sometimes voted to send out expeditions and neglected to carry out the votes immediately, if indeed at all. For a memorable instance of this, see D. 3, 4 ff. Perhaps, then, the Athenians actually did vote at the end of 349-348 an expedition that was not sent till the next fall or winter.

At any rate, I have followed the chronology indicated by Aeschines and supported by the probabilities of the case. How much time each of the incidents narrated by him, consumed, I have endeavoured to determine as best I could in the absence of any certain data. The results are embodied in the text.

If Olynthus fell during the winter or early spring of 348-347, the festival celebrated by Philip should be placed a month or so later, in order to allow time for settling matters in Chalcidice; since the fall of Olynthus did not bring about immediately the surrender of the remaining towns of the peninsula Diodor. 12, 45. It would also take time to assemble the artists from all over Greece, as D. implies he did FL 192.³

οἱ μὲν καιροὶ τῆς πᾶσις τοιοῦτοι ἦσαν, ἐν οἷς οἱ
περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐγείσθη λόγοι.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ Θεττάλῳ καὶ Φιλίππου στρατεία πρόδηλος
ἦν κ. τ. λ.

It was during the summer probably that the attack upon Thrace mentioned by A. 2, 72 if occurred. That it took place not long before peace was concluded seems plain from the words immediately following (2, 74): and I can find no more likely occasion for it than this.

During the fall and winter Philip was evidently making preparations to attack Phocis, since this fact was known in Greece proper (A. 2, 132).²

I have, in accord with the ~~usual~~ common view, placed the dispatch of the first series of Hellenic embassies soon after the news of the fall of Olynthus reached Athens. The state of public feeling evidently occasioned by that event would have been most favorable to such a project. Moreover, the fact that A. on his return from Arcadia met Atrestidas coming from Olynthus with his train of slaves, shows that the fall of the city was then a matter of recent occurrence. FL 306.

The date of the dispatch of the first embassy to Philip is shown by the fact that the heralds, who had been sent out to announce the truce of the Mysteries, reported to the demos on the very day that the embassy was voted. A. 2, 133. ff. The Lesser Mysteries were celebrated about the 20th of Anthesterion (Harper's Dict. Class. Lit. and Antiq. p. 579.) If we suppose the heralds to have returned about the beginning of the month, it would leave nearly the whole of it for the journey of the ten to Macedonia and back. We know that their journey was hasty, and that they did not return till the first week in Elaphebolion: so perhaps they may have started as late as the 10th of Anthesterion. That A. in the above mentioned passage was speaking of the Lesser and not the Greater Mysteries which took place in Boedromion; and that he meant the assembly in which the ten were appointed and not some other about which we know nothing - is not certain, but, I think, very probable.

1 ἡ. ε. καὶ ταῦθ' ὁ σχετλίος καὶ ἀναιδὴς οὗτος ἐ-
τόλμα λέγειν, ἐφεστηκότων ἔτι τῶν πρέσβων καὶ
ἀκουσόντων, οὓς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μετεπέμψαθε,
ὑπὸ τούτου πεισθέντες, ὅτ' οὕτω πεπρακώς αὐτὸν
ἦν.

2 ἵνα κοινῇ καὶ πολεμοῖεν, εἰ δεοί, Φιλίππῳ μετὰ
Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, εἰ τοῦτο εἶναι δοκοῖ
σύμφορον, μετέχουσιν.

11. A's words in 2,57 if cannot refer to the first series of embassies sent out after the fall of Olynthus, since, apart from the fact that nearly a year had elapsed since their dispatch, we know that A., who was one of those embassadors had long ago returned. The natural conclusion is therefore that he is speaking here of another series; or else that he is lying. There is no other alternative. The general opinion among historians is that he is here misrepresenting facts: that there was only one series of embassies. It is said that had there been a second, D. would surely have mentioned it. The truth is that most of the absent ambassadors had returned; and that the Decree had reference only to those still absent; that finally D. in FL 16 was speaking of the first series.

I myself think that both D. and A. told the truth. D. was evidently referring to the first series, ~~since he says "while the ambassadors were"~~, as the context shows. But there was yet a second series of embassies, not one of which had yet returned to Athens.. This I believe:

1. The fact that A. neglects the main charge - that of his change in attitude and devotes his attention entirely to the minor charge, which is scarcely a charge at all, making such an elaborate and detailed reply, would naturally lead us to suspect that while in the greater matter he was wrong, yet in the smaller he was right, and knew it.

2. To deceive his audience in the matter would be well nigh impossible. They evidently remembered distinctly his activity in advocating the first series and they knew that he had himself gone as envoy to Arcadia. For him therefore to declare - and to challenge contradiction as to the fact, too - that by the 19th Elapn. not one of those envoys had returned, would have been absurd.

3. The object of the embassies, as given by A. in 2,57², could hardly apply to the first series. It evidently looks to peace, while the tone of the first series was quite hostile to Philip. Moreover, it is only on the supposit-

ion that there was a second series that the Decrees will make sense. The first series had proved a failure already. Most of the ambassadors had certainly returned; and to wait for the few still absent to straggle in before Athens began to decide on peace, would have been foolishness. If however a second series had lately been dispatched with a different message, and not an envoy had come back as yet to announce how he had been met, though any day might bring several, the Allies' recommendation would appear more reasonable.

4. A. tells the same story in both his orations, except that in the third the object of the absent embassies is represented as ^{entirely} hostile to Philip; an inaccuracy easily accounted for by A.'s desire to score an additional point on his opponent. D.'s reply is not directed against the possibility of a peace embassy, except in the words *ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην; ἀλλ' ὑπάρχειν ἔρασκον* (24). D.'s whole statement (23-24) is suspicious, contradicting as it does by one sweeping assertion the documentary evidence of the Dogma produced by A. in 2. His tone is that of one speaking about forgotten events.

5. The argumentum ex silentio is usually unsafe. D. had no reason to speak of such a second series of embassies in FL, unless it were directly connected with A.; and in dC he had every reason to deny its existence. A., on the other hand, would in both orations avoid mentioning explicitly the first series, for it was connected with a phase of his political career which he wished to be forgotten. His object is rather to throw attention upon the second series, which is his strong point; for on it he builds his accusation of D.. But of course he really does mention both series, since in 79 he admits that he went as envoy to Arcadia - necessarily in a different series of embassies from that referred to in 2, 57 ff.

If, then, there was such a series as the latter, when was it sent out? From its message, I should infer that it was dispatched at a time when peace with Philip was definitely in view. Since by the 19th March none of the envoys

and come back, I should put the date a little later than that of the departure of the first embassy to Philip.

Its aim, and the expectations it aroused, we learn from A.'s third oration. See the text.

By whom was it agitated? A., after his return from Arcadia, kept advising the dispatch of another embassy thither FL 503. Evidently he was not discouraged in his policy. His sentiments toward Philip did not change till his visit to Macedonia. But there is no proof that A. had anything to do with it. He seems however to have viewed it with favor until he shifted his attitude so suddenly just before the assembly on the 19th, and came to see what D. implies that he himself saw all along, that the Greeks had long ago been found wanting dC 23 *πολλὰ πάντες ἡσυχάζοντες ἐλεγεμενός*. He [D] seems to have had nothing to do with either of the series. He had, come to the conclusion, no doubt, that Athens would have to fight the fight alone and that the thing to be done was to arrange a peace with Philip as soon as possible, and not to bother about stirring up the other Greeks.

III. The decrees. The second decree mentioned in 2,53 is the same as that read in 2,61; otherwise A. would state the fact. In this oration only one decree of this kind is mentioned, except in D.'s alleged speech before Philip 109-110 which is a muddle. In (3) however two are given 1. For an assembly on the 8th (67). 2. For two assemblies on the 18th and 19th respectively (68). This latter corresponds to the decree given in 2,61. Everything is clear if we suppose that A. puts the decree in 2,53 at the wrong time. Then *ἐπειδὴν ἤκουσιν οἱ πρέσβεις* must be regarded as A.'s own words, inserted by way of explanation. Otherwise it is necessary to suppose

three decrees, while A. implies plainly that there were only two 3, 68 ἐν
ταύτῃ ἑτέρων ψήφισμα νεκῶν Δημοσθένος.

IV. The Decree of the Allies. A's different versions in (2) and (3) have led some to suppose that there were two such decrees. Certainly, however, there was only one. The reconciliation of the two orations in this matter is easy. In (2) A. gives in full the first clause; in (3) he gives both διὰ βραχείων 1. The decree in (3) is handed in to the demos on the first of the two assemblies (69) the time set for deliberating (2, 65). The decree in (2) shows that the Athenians are deliberating. 2. The first clause of the decree in (3) is suspicious. The mere recommendation to deliberate on peace, without specifying how or when, would have been nonsense, since the demos was already doing so. Had it said "peace and not alliance", the case would have been different; but A. tells us that it does not mention alliance at all. (69) Some specification must have been added. Everything is clear if we suppose that the first clause stood in full as given in (2). A. passes over it quickly in (3), because time was pressing. There was, furthermore, no reason to give it in full, and a good reason not to do so, for it would contradict his statement in 3, 71 where he claims to have advocated the Decree and at the same time to have urged an immediate conclusion of the peace: a thing impossible. 3. That there were two clauses in all is seen from πρῶτον μὲν . . . ἔπειτα in 3, 69. How much reason A. had to suppress the latter clause in (3) is well known by Schaeffer (ii p. 219). Moreover, D. shows that this Decree, which was evidently well remembered, represented the view of the party which triumphed on the 18th. (FL 144) and it was against this view that A. spoke on the 19th. (FL 15, 16, 307). Since he spoke against βουθεία it must have been βουθεία

that the Decree advocated. This would correspond more especially to the second clause of the Decree, while the advice to deliberate on the peace in conjunction with the Greeks (FL 507) would correspond to the first clause. Thus D's words harmonise with the hypothesis of a single decree.

4. Finally, as Schaeffer points out, (ll p. 218) there is throughout talk of only one decree.

It was passed probably after D's decree on the 8th, with a view to having it read in the assembly on the 18th.

were sent

V. It is generally supposed, that these letters, after Philip had reached Pylae and the ten had returned to Athens. This is inferred from FL 50 ff. Yet in my opinion D's argument amounts to this - "You (A) knew that these letters had been sent before you came home. Why did you not, when you arrived, urge the Athenians to do as Philip bade them do therein?" It is clear that A(2, 137^{ff}) and D. had reference to different moments and different conditions. The exodus A. has in mind was discussed at a time when ἡ κμαζον ἐν τῇ μακρία φωκεῖς, ἐπολέμουν δ' Φιλίππῳ, εἶχον δὲ Ἀλπαῖον καὶ Νίκαιον, οὕτω παραδόντος Φαλαίκου Μακεδόσι κ.τ.λ. and would have been against the Phocians, in concert with Philip and the Thessalians. On the 16th Scirophorion, however, an exodus would have been friendly, not hostile to the Phocians, as D. shows plainly. He tells us also that then no such proposition was ~~discussed~~ brought forward by A. and his coadjutors (FL 52) and if not by them, presumably by no one else. The matter was apparently not discussed at all. A., however, clearly implies a discussion on the subject, for he says that the οὐ γὰρ πολέμικοι persuaded the Athenians not to comply with Philip's request (2, 137). Moreover on the 16th and shortly thereafter, the anti-Macedonian party were in the

πάντα δὴ πού ταῦτα πρὸ τοῦ τοῖς πρέσβεις τοῖς
δεῦρ' ἦκειν ἐπέπρακτο.

background: a fact which alone would make it probable that the discussion took place before the 16th, and hence before the return of the ten - the assembly on the 16th being clearly the first one after that event. We know, too, that one of A.'s standing arguments to justify the course of Philip toward the Phocians was this - that owing to the absence of the Athenian hoplites whom he had sent for, he was compelled to yield to the demands of Thessaly and Thebes (A. 2, 140; D. 6, 14.) Several of these standing arguments of A. D. dismisses in FL 72 ff. One of them is an accusation of Hegesippus. Now Hegesippus was the *πολεμικὸς κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Is this passage (2, 137 ff) the expected accusation of Hegesippus? It is the only passage in the oration that seems to be. The fact that D. does not state the substance of the accusation in 72 ff, but assumes that his audience knows what it will be, does something to convince us; for A.'s *πολεμικός* argument was likewise well known. That A. does not name Hegesippus is not strange, since the latter seems to have been very popular just now. If this identification of the accusations is correct, then Philip's letters came, and the discussion over them took place before the return of the ten: for D. tells us so FL 73. True, it seems at first sight that A. accuses D. of taking part in the discussion 2, 138 along with the *πολεμικός*. Yet on closer examination we see that it is the *πολεμικός* whom the jury remember as the speakers, and not D. A. only couples D. with them to increase his odium. Apart from this, the only thing that I can see militating against my hypothesis are D.'s words FL 51 *οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τοὺς χρόνους ἀρεδών, ἐν οἷς ἠδυνήθητ' ἂν ἐξελεῖν, τὴν καὶ ἐκάλε* but these can easily refer to a time just preceding the 13th; for they are in any case but a rhetorical statement which contradict D.'s own declaration that matters could, by energetic measures, have been mended even after Philip got through Pylae. (FL 123.) By this hypothesis alone can I reconcile A.'s

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